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DOES (DID) (SHOULD) THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE REST ON A "PRINCIPLED BASIS"
RATHER THAN AN "EMPIRICAL
PROPOSITION"?*
YALE KAMISAR**

[U]ntil the [exclusionary rule] rests on a principled basis
rather than an empirical proposition, [the rule] will remain in a state of unstable equilibrium.'
Mapp v. Ohio,2 which overruled the then twelve-year-old Wolf
case 3 and imposed the fourth amendment exclusionary rule (the
Weeks doctrine) 4 on the states as a matter of fourteenth amendment due process, seemed to mark the end of an era. Concurring
in Mapp, Justice Douglas recalled that Wolf had evoked "a storm
of constitutional controversy which only today finds its end."' 5 But
in the two decades since Justice Douglas made this observation
* © 1983 by Yale Kamisar. This article is a revised and much-expanded
version of the Dean Louis J. TePoel Lecture I delivered at the Creighton University
School of Law on March 19, 1981. Actually, the original lecture has undergone
several revisions. One version was the basis for my testimony before the Attorney
General's Task Force on Violent Crime, June 3, 1981, reprinted in essence in Search
and Seizure of America: The Case for Keeping the Exclusionary Rule, 10 HUMAN
RIGHTS 14 (Winter, 1982). Another version was the basis for my testimony before
the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Law, March 25, 1982, reprinted
in essence in How We Got the FourthAmemdment Exclusionary Rule and Why We
Need It, 1 CaiM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (Summer/Fall, 1982). This article does not deal, as
such, with the oft-proposed "good faith" or "reasonable, good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule. I plan to discuss that in a forthcoming issue of the Iowa Law
Review.
** Henry K. Ransom Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B., New
York University, 1950; L.L. B., Columbia University, 1954.
As usual, I am greatly indebted to my colleague, Jerold H. Israel, for the many
hours he has spent with me discussing various aspects of this article. As usual, too,
we have not always agreed. Indeed, in the main, Professor-Israel sees no cause to
be alarmed about the Burger Court's work in the constitutional-criminal procedure
field. See Israel, CriminalProcedure,the Burger Court and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. Rav. 1319 (1977).
1. Allen, The JudicialQuestfor PenalJustice:The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. Iii. L.F. 518, 537. For reasons that I shall discuss at length in this
article, I would state Professor Francis Allen's point somewhat differently: Until
the exclusionary rule rests once again on a principled basis rather than an empirical proposition, as it did originallyandfor much of its life, the rule will remain in a
state of unstable equilibrium.
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
4. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. 367 U.S. at 670.
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the storm of controversy has not only intensified-but
engulfed the
6
fourth amendment exclusionary rule itself.
It is now clear that once a provision of the Bill of Rights, such
as the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures, is
deemed "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," 7 it applies to the states to the same extent that it has been interpreted to
apply to the federal government.8 Although some members of the
Court have balked at "incorporating" a specific provision of the Bill
of Rights into fourteenth amendment due process "jot-for-jot" and
"bag and baggage," especially in the jury trial cases, 9 this has come
to be the prevailing view. Thus, critics of Mapp v. Ohio have had to
direct their fire at the efficacy, validity and constitutional basis of
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule as well-and they have
10
done so with great force.
6. As Professor Telford Taylor has pointed out:
[T]he Court's division in the [Mapp] case, sharp as it was, did not concern
the merits of the exclusionary rule. The disagreement concerned only the
federal dimension of the constitutional question: should the states be left
free to apply or not to apply the exclusionary rule according to state law?
That is the issue on which the justices divided, and there is not a word in
[Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion] suggesting that the rule is intrinsically bad.
T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTrrUrIONAL INTERPRETATION 20-21 (1969).

Although the Wolf Court, per Justice Frankfurter, had declined to impose the
exclusionary rule on the states as a matter of federal constitutional law, it did say of
the federal exclusionary rule: "Since [Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)]
it has been frequently applied and we stoutly adhere to it." 338 U.S. at 28. The same
day Wolf was handed down, Justice Jackson, who had joined the opinion of the
Court in Wolf, stressed the need for the federal exclusionary rule, untroubled by
any "inconsistency" in adhering to the federal rule yet allowing the states to admit
illegally seized evidence: "[F]or local excesses or invasions of liberty are more
amenable to political correction, the [Fourth] Amendment was directed only
against the new and centralized government, and any really dangerous threat to the
general liberties of the people can come only from this source." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
7. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
8. See generally the cases extracted and discussed in W. LOCKART, Y.
KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES, COMMENTS & QUESTIONS 488-94

(5th ed. 1980).
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., Burger, C.J., dissenting in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 411-24 (1971); Burger, C.J., concurring in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
496 (1976); Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of stay in
California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916-28 (1979); S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE (1977); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 215 (1978).
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THE INABILITY TO OBTAIN MEANINGFUL "ADVANCE
PROTECTION" AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES OR SEIZURES-AND WHAT
FLOWS FROM THIS INABILITY
Why the continuing storm of controversy over the exclusionary rule? Why the deep and widespread hostility to the rule? I
think a recent "law office search" case, because it arose in a setting
so unlike the typical search and seizure case, furnishes a clue.
In O'Connorv. Johnson," St. Paul police obtained a warrant to
search an attorney's office for "business records" of a client suspected of making false written statements in applying for a liquor
license. The attorney happened to be present when the police arrived. Holding on to his "work product file," which contained some
of the records sought, the attorney persuaded the police not to
carry out the search. 12 He also persuaded them to accompany him
judge who issued the warrant, so
to the chambers of the municipal
13
it.
quash
to
move
could
he
that
When the lawyer applied to the state supreme court for a writ
of prohibition to quash the search warrant, the municipal judge
amended his order to the local prosecutor so that the judge himself, rather than a representative of the prosecutor's office, would
determine which documents were unprotected and could be
turned over to the police. 14 The lawyer was not satisfied. He challenged the amended order, again by writ of prohibition, and even5
tually prevailed.'
For me, the most remarkable feature of this extraordinary
case 16 is that the police never actually seized, let alone searched,
the lawyer's work product file. Thus the courts were able to rule
on the legality of the police action in an adversary proceeding
before a search or seizure was carried out-before anyone other
11. 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979) (en banc). See generally Bloom, The Law Office Search: An Emerging Problem and Some Suggested Solutions, 69 GEO. LJ.1
(1980).
12. 287 N.W.2d at 401.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. A unanimous Minnesota Supreme Court held that a warrant authorizing
the search of an attorney's office is invalid when the attorney himself is not suspected of any wrongdoing and there is no indication that the documents sought will
be destroyed. See id. at 405. Under these circumstances, held the state supreme
court, law enforcement officials have to proceed by subpoena duces tecum in seeking documents held by an attorney. See id. at 405.
16. O'Connor "was the first state or federal appellate decision to consider directly whether an attorney's office legally is subject to search." Bloom, supra note
11, at 4.
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than O'Connor knew what was in the file. Thus Mr. O'Connor did
not need an "exclusionary rule" to effectuate his rights.
But O'Connor is not a typical search and seizure case. Usually
there is no way that a potential victim of unreasonable search and
seizure can invoke "advance protection." In this respect, freedom
from unreasonable search differs from most other constitutional
rights:
For example, any effective interference with freedom of
the press, or free speech, or religion, usually requires a
course of suppressions against which the citizen can and
often does go to the court and obtain an injunction. Other
rights, such as that to an impartial jury or the aid of counsel, are within the supervisory power of the courts themselves. . .. But an illegal search and seizure usually is a
single incident, perpetrated by surprise, conducted in
haste, kept purposely beyond the court's supervision and
limited only by the judgment and moderation of officers
whose own interests and records are often at stake in the
17
search.
In the typical case the courts do not enter the picture unless
and until the challenged search has already turned up something
incriminating. As a practical matter, nobody can stop the police
from carrying out a search or seizure, if they are unwilling to be
stopped, not even a lawyer. A good illustration is Mapp v. Ohio
itself.
In Mapp, the police made two trips to the defendant's house.
The first time the officers demanded entrance, Miss Mapp, after
telephoning her lawyer, refused to admit them without a search
warrant. 18 But twice as many officers returned three hours lateragain apparently without a warrant' 9-and forcibly gained admittance.20 Miss Mapp's lawyer did arrive on the scene about this
time, "but the officers, having secured their own entry,. . . would
permit him neither to see Miss Mapp nor to enter the house."' 21 A
widespread search of Miss Mapp's home failed to produce the gambling paraphernalia the police were looking for, but did turn up
22
alleged "lewd and lascivious" materials.
If Miss Mapp's attorney had persuaded the police to accom17. Jackson, J., dissenting in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949).
But on another occasion, Justice Jackson voiced serious doubts about the efficacy of
the exclusionary rule. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134-37 (1954).
18. 367 U.S. at 644.
19. See id. at 644-45.
20. Id. at 644.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 643-45.
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pany him to a judge's chambers, rather than carry out the search of
Miss Mapp's home, the legality of the search would have been decided "in the abstract." If the judge had ruled that the police were
proceeding unlawfully and had to abandon their course, we would
never have known what evidence of crime, if any, the search would
have uncovered. But as Mapp, and, thousands of other cases, illustrate, this is not the way the system works.
Almost always the legality of a search is not contested in an
adversary proceeding unless it has already produced incriminating
evidence. Hence the strong need for the exclusionary rule. Almost
always the court is asked to "unring the bell" 23 -to reconstruct
events as though the damaging, often damning, evidence never existed. Hence the strong resistance to the exclusionary rule. The
damaging evidence "flaunts before us the price we pay for the
'24
Fourth Amendment.
Why don't the requirements for obtaining search warrants furnish adequate "advance protection"? Because despite repeated
announcements by the Supreme Court that warrantless searches
are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, '25 the exceptions are neither well-delineated nor few. 26 The
27
overwhelming majority of searches are made without a warrant.
One category alone, warrantless searches incident to arrest, "outnumber[s] manyfold searches covered by warrants." 28 And the
percentage of arrests made pursuant to a warrant is astonishingly
small.29 Moreover, even in the unusual case where law enforcement officials do seek a warrant, the judicial officer's participation
23. Cf.Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 460 (1975) (compliance with an order to
produce material which an attorney believes in good faith may tend to incriminate
his client "could cause irreparable injury because appellate courts cannot always
'unring the bell' once the information has been released").
24. J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 216 (2d ed. 1978).
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasis added), quoted in,
e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 219 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
26. See generally Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and
Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. Cane. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLIcE SCI. 198 (1977). See
also Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L REv. 47, 79
(1974).
27. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Commentary at 492-94,
521 (Official Draft, 1975); L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF
CRIME 99-116 (1967).
28. T. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 48. See also MODEL CODE, supra note 27, at 521;
L. TIFFANY, supra note 27, at 105.
29. In 1966, for example, of 171,288 arrests made by the New York City police,
only 366 were made pursuant to an arrest warrant. See MODEL CODE, supra note 27,
at 493 n.5.
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is "largely perfunctory" 3 0-it is "notoriously easy" 3 1 to obtain
search warrants or court orders for electronic surveillance, 32 and
even easier to obtain warrants for arrest.33 Thus, almost always
the first and only meaningful opportunity to decide the legality of a
search or seizure arises after the fact.
It may well be that "many judges are reluctant to become truly
involved in what they conceive to be a relatively ministerial task of
issuing process,"3 but maintenance of "only the fiction of beforethe-fact judicial control [in] practice" 35 may stem as much, or
more, from an incapacity to get "truly involved" in the warrant
procedure as from an unwillingness to do so. As Dean Edward
Barrett observed some fifteen years ago (and undoubtedly the
caseload is even greater today), the Los Angeles Municipal Court,
for example, finds itself so pressed that "in large areas of its
caseload it averages but a minute per case in receiving pleas and
imposing sentence." 36 Where, asks Dean Barrett, is "the judicial
30. LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making
and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 987, 992 (1965).
31. Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in
Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 169, 190-91 (1969).
32. Concurring in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (striking down New
York's electronic surveillance statute), Justice Stewart observed: "The need for,
particularity and evidence of reliability in the showing required when judicial authorization is sought for the kind of electronic eavesdropping involved in this case
is especially great. The standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth
Amendment demands that the showing of justification match the degree of intrusion." 388 U.S. at 69. But a decade later, in appearances before the National Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance (National Wiretap Commission), "prosecutor after prosecutor, particularly on the state level, testified that judges rarely exercise any meaningful control. From 1969 through 1976, only 15 applications have been denied, out of
5,563 federal and state applications.. .. One prosecutor told the National Wiretap
Commission, 'I have not found one judge who takes the time to read an ex parte
wiretap application.'"
H. SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE 23
(Field Foundation pamphlet 1979). See also S. DASH, R. KNOWLTON, & R. SCHWARTZ,
THE EAVESDROPPERS 44-45 (1959); Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politicsof "Law and Order," 67 MICH. L, REv. 455, 485-86 (1969).
33.

See W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY

502-03 (1965); Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privilegesin General, in
POLICE POWER AND INDrVIUAL FREEDOM 11, 13 (C. Sowle ed. 1962). See also
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 347 (1972) (a court clerk may issue arrest
warrants, at least for violations of municipal ordinances).
34. LaFave & Remington, supra note 30, at 994.
35. Id. at 993.
36. "The Los Angeles Municipal Court with annual filings of about 130,000 (excluding parking and traffic)finds itself so pressed that in large areas of its caseload
it averages but a minute per case in receiving pleas and imposing sentence. How
could it cope with the added burden that would be involved in the issuance of warrants to government the approximately 200,000 arrests made per year in Los Angeles for offenses other than traffic?" Barrett, CriminalJustice: The Problem of Mass
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time going to be found" to devote "at least some minutes in each
case to reading the affidavits .. in support of the request for a
warrant, and inquiring into the background of the conclusions
stated therein?" 37 And "[h]ow can a magistrate be more than a
'rubber stamp' in signing warrants" 38 unless he finds the time to
make such inquiries?
Dean Abraham Goldstein offers another reason why judges
"rubber stamp" warrant applications in practice-an explanation
that has "deeper roots in fundamental postulates of the accusatorial model." 39 'The American judge," points out Goldstein,
assumes that he is to react to matters presented to him
and that if initiatives are to be taken, counsel will take
them .... Even when only one side is represented, as with
warrants,. .. the American judge tends in practice to be
reactive. He has come to rely on the parties and their
counsel to define and develop issues.4 °
Unfortunately, because search warrant proceedings are ex parte,
there is, of course, "no defense counsel to question the state's pres41
entation or to share in protecting the public interest.
WHY THE FRAMERS PROBABLY BELIEVED THAT BY
CONTROLLING SEARCH WARRANTS THEY HAD
CONTROLLED SEARCHES
The framers of the fourth amendment were occupied-preoccupied-with general warrants, not warrantless searches, and they
seem to have had tax collectors and customs officials more in mind
than the police. They could hardly have been expected to foresee
the current state of affairs-when a single police force makes tens
of thousands of warrantless arrests and searches every year. Two
hundred years ago the police had not yet assumed the functions of
criminal investigation-indeed, no organized police forces had yet
emerged. Until well into the nineteenth century, the only "police
service" of any kind, even in our largest cities, was the "watch system" and "such protection as [it] afforded was provided only by
night-generally between the hours of nine o'clock in the evening
and sunrise" (and "sunrise" was variously interpreted as between
Production, in THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, THE COURTS, THE

PUBLIC AND THE LAw EXPLOSION 85, 117-18 (H.W. Jones ed. 1965) (emphasis in
original).

37. Id. at 117.
38. Id.
39. A. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: InquisitorialThemes in American
Criminal Procedure,26 STAN. L REV. 1009, 1024 (1974).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1023-24.
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three o'clock and five o'clock in the morning).42
Two hundred years ago-when "enforcement of criminal laws
was largely confined to courts" and "the initiative was left to the
complaining party to invoke criminal sanctions by gathering his
proofs and presenting them at trial" 43-relatively few arrests (and
warrantless searches incident to) were made and probably only
where there was "hot pursuit," "hue and cry," or an arrest warrant.44 These arrests and "arrest searches" did not trouble the
framers. 45 Some common law warrants for stolen goods were issued by justices of the peace, but this "hybrid criminal-civil process" did not concern the framers either.46 Indeed, because this
hybrid process contained "elaborate safeguards against its improvident or abusive use, and provision for immediate confrontation of
the alleged miscreant and his accuser before the magistrate," 47 the
framers sought to contain the use of general warrants along the
lines of the relatively rigorous standards applicable to the old sto48
len goods warrants.
What very much did concern the framers-"insofar as 'concerned' is used to denote the specific subject that they had under
consideration" 49-were the general warrants and writs of assistance.50 Striking evidence of this is provided by the seven state
declarations of rights that served as precedents for the fourth
51
amendment.
The Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, "it] he first American prece52
dent of a constitutional character for the Fourth Amendment,"
prohibited only general warrants. So did the Maryland and North
Carolina Declarations of Rights, adopted shortly thereafter. The
42. See R. FOSDICK, AMERICAN POLICE SYSTEMS 61-62 (1920). It was not until
1844 that the New York Legislature passed a law "creating 'a day and night police,'
which forms the basis of modern police organization in America." Id. at 66.
43. Goldstein, supra note 39, at 1017. Cf. Note, An HistoricalArgument for the
Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1041 (1964).
44. See T. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 28, 39.
45. See id. at 39-41, 43.
46. See id. at 24-25.
47. Id. at 27. See also id. at 24-25.
48. See id. at 41.
49. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
410 (1974).
50. See generally N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-105 (1937); J. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 30-48 (1966); T. TAYLOR, supra note 6,
at 35-46; Amsterdam, supra note 49, at 366, 398, 410.
51. See N. LASSON, supra note 50, at 79-83. The various state declarations of
rights are set forth in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGirrS: A DOCUMENTARY HIS-

TORY 231-379 (1971).
52. N. LASSON, supra note 50, at 79.
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Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights (adopted three months after
the Virginia Bill of Rights and soon copied by Vermont) was the
first to state the broader principle, but did so "merely as a basis for
the minor premise condemning general warrants: '53 "X. That the
people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and
possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants
without [satisfying certain specified standards] are contrary to
54
that right, and ought not to be granted."
The first expression of the phrase "unreasonable searches and
seizures" appears in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of
1780 (soon duplicated by New Hampshire), but again the statement of the broader principle served only as a basis for prohibiting
broadside warrants:
Art. XIV. Every subject has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his
house, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants,
therefore, are contrary to this right, if [certain enumerated
conditions are not met]; and no warrants ought to be issued, but55in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by
the laws.
Moreover, when the time came to adopt a federal bill of rights,
James Madison, who "committed his great prestige to the fight for
[such a bill] and assumed the role of sponsor in pushing the
amendments through Congress, '56 proposed a search provision
57
that "seemed to be directed against improper warrants only:"1
The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, their
houses, their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by
warrants issued without probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the
be searched or the persons or things to be
places to
58
seized.
The transition from Madison's "single-barreled" original proposal
in the House of Representatives to the present "double-barreled"
form of the fourth amendment--one clause dealing with the essentials of a valid warrant, the other giving "[t] he general right of security from unreasonable search and seizure ... a sanction of its
own" 5 9 -occurred without any recorded vote of the House approv53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 81 n.10.
Id. at 81 n.11 (emphasis added).
Id. at 82 n.15 (emphasis added).
J. LANDYNsKi, supra note 50, at 41.
N. LASSON, supra note 50, at 100.
Id. at 100 n.77 (emphasis added).
Id. at 103.
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60
ing the change.
I share the view that "the choice of the amendment's doublebarreled form was advertent" 61 and that this change in the form62 of
the search provision "intentionally [gave it] a broader scope." I
would only add that even if the fourth amendment had emerged in
Madison's original form, i.e., had literally been aimed exclusively
against general warrants, the courts still would have (and should
have) interpreted the amendment to prohibit indiscriminate, arbitrary and unjustified warrantless searches as well. The courts
would have done so, I am confident, for the same reason they did
not literally apply the self-incrimination provision as written"early courts saw that the protection of the amendment itself

would be an empty gesture if ... literally applied.

63

The art of interpretation, to use Learned Hand's felicitious
phrase, is "the proliferation of purpose. '64 Here, as elsewhere,
"our use of the history of [Jefferson's and Madison's] time must
limit itself to broad purposes, not specific practices. '65 The colonists concentrated their fire on general warrants because they "opposed leaving the power to search and seize solely in executive
hands" 66 and because in their immediate past experience uncontrolled executive discretion had taken this particularform. They
condemned general'67warrants, but they valued "specific writs" or
"special warrants.
While they did not protest warrantless
searches, the most plausible reason for not doing so is that, aside
60. Id. at 100-03.
61. Amsterdam, supra note 49, at 468 n.465.
62. N. LASSON, supra note 50, at 103.
63. E. GRIswoLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

TODAY 55

(1950):

Is it not clear that a legislative investigation is not a 'criminal case'? What
application, then, does the [prohibition against compelling a person 'in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself I have in such proceedingsor in civil trials, or elsewhere, where persons may be subjected to questioning? This is a question which was raised and answered long ago, so long
ago in fact that lawyers tend to take it for granted. But early courts saw
that the protection of the amendment itself would be an empty gesture if it
was literally applied. . .. [Thus,] courts long ago concluded that if the privilege is to be effective at all it must be given a comprehensive application,
and thus must prevent compulsory self-incrimination in any proceeding.
This is, indeed, a broad construction of the constitutional language, but it is
a construction which has seemed to be required if the basic objective of
that language is to be realized.
Id. at 54-55.
64. Quoted in F. FRANKFURTER, The Reading of Statutes, in OF LAW AND MEN 44,
47 (1956).
65. School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
66. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 603, 620 (1982).
67. See id. at 618-21 and authorities cited therein.
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from searches incident to arrest (and how far they could extend
beyond the body of the arrestee is unclear), 68 "such searches...
'69
simply did not exist.
Can there be any doubt that the colonists would have vigorously opposed warrantlesssearches exhibiting the same characteristics as general warrants and writs and thus impairing privacy
and freedom to the same degree? Indeed, I think it fair to say that
the colonists condemned writs of assistance because such writs
''no more controlled official discretion than would a statute that
'70
simply permitted warrantless searches.
The fact that the general warrants and writs dominated the
framers' thinking about searches and seizures has, I believe, a
most important bearing on the "exclusionary rule" debate. Concentration on the specific evils which brought about the fourth
amendment distracted attention from the need for post-search
safeguards. For when the framers prohibited overreaching warrants they had good reason to believe that the magistrates and
judges would exercise vigilant pre -search control.
Even after the Townshend Act of 1767 had disposed of all technical objections to the legality of the writs of assistance 71--even
"in the face of mounting pressures from the executive-which paid
their salaries and could at any time remove them, or offer them
preferment" 72-the judges of most of the colonies had either refused or ignored applications for the writs. 73 Surely an "independent judiciary" could be counted on to take seriously the command
of the fourth amendment.
Surely it could be said especially of the people's right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures--"the one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that grew directly out of the
events which immediately preceded the revolutionary struggle
with England" 7 4 --what James Madison said generally of the Bill of
Rights in urging its adoption:
If [a bill of rights is] incorporated into the Constitution,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves
in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they
68. Amsterdam, supra note 49, at 412.
69. Grano, supra note 66, at 617 and authorities cited therein. See also Amsterdam, supra note 49, at 412, 417 n.522.
70. Grano, supra note 66, at 619. See also Amsterdam, supra note 49, at 410-12
and authorities cited therein.
71. The Act authorized the superior or supreme court of each province to issue
writs of assistance. See N. LASSON, supra note 50, at 69-70.
72. J. LANDYNsKi, supra note 50, at 37.
73. Id. at 36-37; N. LASSON, supra note 50, at 72-73.
74. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 50, at 19.
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will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption
of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated 5for in the Constitution by the
7
declaration of rights.
Although the fourth amendment establishes guidelines for the
issuance of search warrants, it has nothing to say specifically about
warrantlesssearches. This seems like a colossal oversight today,
but, as indicated earlier, this was quite understandable two hundred years ago.
Most of the events concerning the writs of assistance occurred
in Massachusetts. 76 At one point, the Governor of Massachusetts
issued writs of assistance himself. 77 When this practice met criticism, however, the Governor directed customs officers to apply to
the Superior Court of the province for writs. 78 In 1755 the Superior
Court granted such a writ and thereafter continued to exercise this
79
function.
As already pointed out, courts of most of the colonies resisted
writs of assistance. But this was not the case in Massachusetts,
apparently because "a man pliable to the wishes of the monarchy"
had been appointed Chief Justice of the Superior Court in 1770.80
But if the courts of Massachusetts did not resist the writs, the people did.
In the late 1760s "it became almost impossible to enforce the
writs: the populace gathered to thwart the efforts of the customs
whenever they appeared."8 1 In 1766, after a group had forcibly recaptured goods seized under a writ,82 a Boston merchant had successfully resisted customs officials with sword and pistol 83 and the
seizure of John Hancock's sloop had caused a riot, 84 Chief Justice

75. Address by James Madison, House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 224 (M. Meyers ed. 1973). As has been
pointed out, both in language and in spirit the Court's approach to interpreting the
fourth and fifth amendments in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) and
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914), is much like Madison's in offering
the Bill of Rights for adoption. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961), and the
concurring opinion of Justice Black, id. at 662 n.8.
76. See N. LAsSON, supra note 50, at 55.
77. See id.; J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 50, at 31-32.
78. See N. LASSON, supra note 50, at 55-56.
79. See id. at 56; J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 50, at 32.
80. J. LANDYNsKI, supra note 50, at 33 (so describing Lieutenant Governor
Thomas Hutchinson).
81. Id. at 36. See also N. LASSON, supra note 50, at 68-72; T. TAYLOR, supra note
6, at 38.
82. See N. LAsSON, supra note 50, at 68.
83. See id. at 68-69.
84. See id. at 72.
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Hutchinson, the judge said to be "pliable to the wishes of the monarchy, '85 wrote British authorities, who were pressing for the use
of the writs, that he doubted whether any customs officer would
venture any more to make a seizure. 86
If customs officers, although urged on by their British superiors, although armed with warrants issued by colonial courts specifically designated by the Townshend Act as the courts of issuance,
grew unwilling, or at least most reluctant, to execute searches and
seizures, would they do so without any statutory authority and
without the authority of any judge or magistrate? Surely the framers of the fourth amendment should not be faulted for thinking
they would not.
In light of the events preceding the fourth amendment, the argument advanced by Justice Black that had the framers desired to
exclude illegally seized evidence from criminal trials "they would
have used plain appropriate language to do so ' '87 is hardly persuasive. Moreover, and more generally, this argument proves too
much. One might as well argue, for example thatIf they had meant to authorize only judicial officers to issue warrants, not attorneys general or local prosecuting attorneys (the amendment nowhere specifies that a warrant may
be issued only by a judicial officer, but the whole point of the
warrant clause, the Court has told us, is that executive officers
''simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality
with regard to their own investigations"),88 the framers would
have used plain, appropriate language to say so. (Incredibly,
Justice Black once seriously maintained, in a dissent, fortunately, that "no language in the Fourth Amendment" provided
"any basis" for disqualifying a state attorney general from issuing a search warrant). 89 OrIf they had desired the police, whenever practicable, to obtain advance judicial authorization for searches (and the Court
has said that they must),90 the framers would have used plain,
appropriate language to do so. OrIf they had desired to test warrantless searches by the
85. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
86. See N. LASSON, supra note 50, at 72.
87. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 76 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). See also
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 496-98 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
88. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 450.
89. Id. at 501.
90. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1 (1977); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
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"probable cause" standard in the warrant clause, rather than
by the more general proscription against "unreasonable
searches" in the opening, general clause (and the Court has
gone so far as to declare that "in a doubtful or marginal case
[of probable cause] a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fail"), 91 the framers would
have used plain, appropriate language to say so. OrIf they had meant to allow the police to make felony arrests without warrant, even when they have ample opportunity to procure one; and to conduct warrantless searches
incident to arrest, even when there is no evidence or fruits of
the offense with which the arrestee is charged nor any reason
to believe that he is armed or otherwise dangerous (and the
Court has told us that the police may make warrantless arrests
and searches in these situations), 9 2 the framers would have
used plain, appropriate language to say so. OrIf they had meant to allow the police to make warrantless
searches of the home on the "authority" of a third party's consent, even when there is ample time to obtain a warrant (and
the Court has told us that the police may make a warrantless
search on such a basis), 93 the framers would have used plain,
appropriate language to say so.
The likely explanation for the failure of the fourth amendment
to provide explicitly for an "exclusionary rule" is that the framers
thought little, if at all, about after the fact judicial control. (And if
they did they probably thought there would not be much illegally
seized material to be offered in evidence). The framers focused on,
and placed their trust in, the warrant procedure. Justice Jackson
put it well when he observed that the fourth amendment "roughly
indicate [ sI the immunity of the citizen which must not be violated,
goes on to recite how officers may be authorized, consistently with
the right so declared, to make searches," and then comes to an end,
"apparently because [the framers] believed that by thus control' 94
ling search warrants they had controlled searches.
We know now, however, that the framers' trust in the warrant
procedure was misplaced. We know now that so many searches
are made without warrants that even if judges and magistrates had
both the time and the desire to exercise vigilance in all of the rela91. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965).
92. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S.
260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
93. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
94. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 195-96 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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tively few cases in which warrants are sought they simply could
not control searches by controlling search warrants.
KEEPING PACE WITH THE REALITIES OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
"The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men,"
Cardozo once observed, "do not turn aside in their course, and
pass the judges by."9 5 At least they should not. In the 1960s the
Court finally arrived at the conclusion that in a world of "parabolic
microphones" (capable of eavesdropping on conversations taking
place in an office on the other side of the street) and laser beams
(capable of picking sound waves off closed windows) 96 the protection against unreasonable search and seizure could no longer turn
on whether the challenged invasion of privacy was accomplished
by a physical invasion or "trespass. ' 97 To so limit the reach of the
fourth amendment would be to read that amendment "with the literalness of a country parson interpreting the first chapter of Genesis."9 8s The fourth amendment "protects people, not places," 99
observed the Court in the seminal Katz case;10 0 thus the command
of the fourth amendment cannot be limited by "nice distinctions
turning on the kind of electronic equipment employed."''1 1
Again in the 1960s, when police interrogators had long been
carrying out the functions which historically the judiciary had performed before the emergence of organized police forces, 10 2 the
Court finally held that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and the right to counsel did apply to the proceedings in the
police station as well as those in the courtroom. To continue to
limit constitutional rights to criminal court proceedings when police interrogators were eliciting confessions from those likely to assume, or often led to believe, that they had to answer questions or
95. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
96. See generally S. DASH, R. KNOWLTON & R. SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS
339-79 (1959); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 69-89 (1967).
97. Until Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) were overruled, the fourth amendment applied only when
electronic snooping was accomplished by a physical invasion or "trespass."
98. A. BEISEL, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAw:
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 32 (1955) (so describing Chief Justice Taft's interpretation of the fourth amendment in the Olmstead case).
99. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

100. Id.
101. Justice Douglas had so argued, concurring in Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961). His view prevailed in Katz.
102. See A. BEISEL, supra note 98, at 104; see also Kauper, Judicial Examination
of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224, 1235 (1932);
Morgan, The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 34 MIN. L REV. 1 (1949).
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it would be so much the worse for them,1 0 3 would again be to reach
the relevant constitutional safeguards with the literalness of the
aforementioned country parson interpreting Genesis. Thus, in the
famous Miranda case, the Court applied these constitutional safeguards to "informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement of10 4
ficers during in-custody questioning."'
Similarly, in an era when, as pointed out earlier, 10 5 it has become abundantly clear that the great bulk of searches and seizures
are being made without any warrants (and there is ample evidence
to believe that even in the relatively few instances where warrants
are sought the magistrate's involvement in the process is "largely
perfunctory"), the Court must keep pace with the realities of the
criminal justice system. Because often, much too often, the legality of a search or seizure cannot be tested in any meaningful way
before the fact, a defendant must be permitted to test it as soon as
it is practicable to do so after the fact.
Otherwise a person could be convicted of a crime punishable
by a long stretch in the penitentiary on the basis of a search or
seizure whose legality had been judged solely by "judges of their
own cause."' 0 6 Otherwise, "[t] he awful instruments of the criminal
law" would be "entrusted to a single functionary."'10 7 Otherwise
the majestic fourth amendment would look like a huge whale
stranded helplessly on the beach after the tide has gone out.
If the fourth amendment's controls on the issuance of search
warrants were "the answer of the Revolutionary statesmen to the
evils of searches without warrants and searches with warrants unrestricted in scope,"' 0 8 they are not a sufficient answer today. It is
103. See Y. KAMisAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW
AND POLICY 37-38, 195-97 (1980).
104. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).
105. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
106. But [law enforcement officials] should not be the sole judges of when
to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks. The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain
incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech.
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
107. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943):
Experience [has] counseled that safeguards must be provided against the
dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The awful instruments
of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated process of criminal justice is therefore divided into different parts,
responsibility for which is separately vested in the various participants
upon whom the criminal law relies for its vindication.
(Frankfurter, J., for the Court) (quoted with approval in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 118 (1975)).
108. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
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no less true of the search provision than the freedom of speech
provision that if the safeguards on which the framers relied become illusory "then the meaning of the guarantee ought to outreach the particulars that gave it birth, in order that the freedom
envisaged at its core can be vindicated." 10 9 What has well been
said of the scope of the fourth amendment's protection applies
with equal force to its enforcement: If the guarantees of liberty
written into it are to endure as something more than "hedges
against the recurrence of particular forms of evils suffered at the
hands of a monarchy beyond the seas"l10 -if the experience of the
framers is to be "carried down the stream of history"'11 -- our
courts must exclude the unconstitutionally obtained evidence
brought before them.
THE CONSTITUTION SAYS NOTHING ABOUT AN
EXCLUSIONARY RULE-BUT IT HAS NOTHING TO
SAY ABOUT A GREAT MANY THINGS
I am well aware that critics of the fourth amendment "exclusionary rule" disparage it as merely a judge-made rule of evidence.
Thus, in his recent testimony before the Attorney General's Task
Force on Violent Crime, Judge Malcolm Wilkey said of the exclusionary rule: "This rule of evidence did not come from on high. It's
1 12
man-made, not God-given .... It's not even in the Constitution."
I must say this doesn't strike me as a forceful point-not, at
least, unless someone can name one Supreme Court decision or
doctrine that is not "a matter of judicial implication,"-that was
not, to use Judge Wilkey's phrase, "man-made."
What, for example, is the source of the constitutional rulefirst applied in 1936-barring the use of "involuntary" confessions,
even though, as the Court made clear in the 1950s and 1960s, the
confession is corroborated by physical evidence and hence trusting). Rabinowitz was overruled, and Justice Frankfurter vindicated, in Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 753 (1969).
109. Freund, The Great Disorderof Speech, 44 THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 541, 551
(1975).
110. Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 49, at 399.
111. Cf. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 70.
112. Quoted in Mathias, The Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 28 Loy. L. REV. 1, 7
(1982). The author of this article is Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Subcomittee on Criminal Law, which recently held extensive
hearings on various proposals to displace or to modify the exclusionary rule. See
The ExclusionaryRule Bills: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on CriminalLaw of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,on S.101, S.751 and S.1995, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d sess.
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Exclusionary Rule Hearings].
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worthy? 1 3 Read the Constitution. It has nothing to say about
"confessions," "involuntary" or "coerced" or otherwise. Is this rule
any less a constitutionalrule because it is "judge-made" or "judicially-created"?
Consider the reapportionment cases, 114 the 1896 "separate but
equal" case 1 5 and the 1954 school desegregation case which overruled it, 116 the school prayer 1 7119and released time cases, 118 the
"clear and present danger" test,
the "symbolic speech" cases, 120
and the recent Richmond Newspapers case, establishing the media's right of access to criminal court proceedings-even though, as
Chief Justice Burger recognized in his lead opinion, this important
12 1
right is not explicitly defined or articulated in the Constitution.
Some years ago, when attending (as an observer) a conference
of journalists, lawyers and judges, a conference characterized by
much suspicion of, and hostility towards, the courts, Justice Potter
Stewart could contain himself no longer. He interrupted:
Where, ladies and gentlemen, do you think these great
constitutional rights that you were so vehemently asserting, and in which you were so conspicuously wallowing
yesterday, where do you think they came from? The stork
didn't bring them. They came from the judges of this
113. Perhaps the most explicit articulation of the view that a defendant is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is based, in whole or in part, upon an
"involuntary" confession-without regard for the truth or falsity of the confessionis to be found in Justice Frankfurter's opinion for a 7-2 majority in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-46 (1961). See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-91
(1964); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952). See generally Y.
KAwSAR, What Is an "Involuntary" Confession?, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND
CON ESSIONs: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLCY 1-25 (1980).
114. See generally McKay, Reapportionment:Success Story of the Warren Court,
67 MIcH. L. REv. 223 (1968).
115. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
116. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
117. School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
118. Compare McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) with Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
119. Compare Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1949) with Kalven,
Ernst Freundand the First Amendment Tradition,40 U. CH. L REV. 235 (1973) and
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 105-16 (1980). See generally Linde, "Clear and
Present Danger" Reexamined, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1970); Strong, Fifty Years of
"Clear and Present Danger:" From Schenek to Brandenburg-andBeyond, 1969
SUP. CT. REV. 41.
120. Compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) with Tinker v. Des
Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974).
121. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1980) (Burger,
C.J., joined by White and Stevens, JJ.)
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122
country, from these villains here sitting at the table.
Well, I am perfectly willing to concede that the stork didn't
bring the "exclusionary rule" either. But I am still waiting for
someone to name one constitutional rule, one constitutional case,
the stork did bring. I think it worth recalling that the stork didn't
even bring the great principle established in Marbury v. Madison
that the Supreme Court of the United States is the ultimate or
supreme interpreter of the Constitution. This, too, is a matter of
123
"judicial implication."'
Justice Black was fond of contrasting the ambiguity of the
fourth amendment with what he considered to be the clarity of the
fifth amendment. "In striking contrast to the Fourth Amendment,"
he observed, "the Fifth Amendment states in express, unambiguous terms that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.'"124 The fifth amendment, he
stressed, "in and of itself directly and explicitly commands its own
exclusionary rule-a defendant cannot be compelled to give evi12 5
dence against himself."'
But much constitutional law pertaining to the privilege is also
a matter of "judicial implication." The fifth amendment, for example, does not define "compulsion" and many judges and distinguished commentators long maintained that comment on the
refusal of the accused to answer questions did not constitute "compulsion" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 126 But the

122. Quoted in THE MEDIA AND THE LAW 185 (H. Simons &J. Califano eds. 1976).
See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAmisAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COM-

649-50 n.a (5th ed. 1980), where the authors explain why it is
generally understood that these remarks were made by Justice Stewart.
123. One of our greatest judges, Learned Hand, insisted that there was "nothing
in the United States Constitution that gave courts any authority to review the decision of Congress." L. HAND, THE BILa OF RIGHTS 10 (1958). Indeed, observed Judge
Hand, it could be forcefully argued that such a view of the Supreme Court's authority "invaded that 'Separation of Powers' which, as so many then believed, was the
MENTS & QUESTIONS

condition of all free government." Id. at 10-11. But see Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 3-5, 7-9 (1959).
As the noted legal historian, Leonard Levy, has pointed out, one of our most
eminent authorities on constitutional law, Edward S. Corwin, once declared, " rhe
people who say the framers intended [judicial review over Congress] are talking
nonsense'-to which he hastily added, 'and the people who say they did not intend
it are talking nonsense.'" Levy, Judicial Review, History and Democracy: An Introduction, in JuDIcIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1967). Adds Professor
Levy: "A close textual and contextual examination of the evidence will not result in
an improvement of these propositions." Id.
124. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 497-98 (1971).
125. Id. at 498.
126. As Justice Stewart, joined by Justice White, pointed out, dissenting in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), comment by counsel and instruction by the
judge on the defendant's failure to take the stand had the "sanction" of both the
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Supreme Court held otherwise in 1965.127
The fifth amendment provides that "No person . .. shall be
1 28
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."'
It is restricted on its face to criminal cases. But long ago the Court
held that the protection of the fifth amendment applies to ordinary
witnesses before a grand jury or a legislative investigating committee or even to someone in a bankruptcy or other civil proceeding. 129 As historian Leonard Levy, perhaps our leading student of
the privilege, has said of it: "Of no other clause in the Constitution
has the Court declared that it cannot mean what it seems to
0
say.",13
The fourth amendment, to be sure, does not contain a provision explicitly stating: No evidence obtained in violation of one's
right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be admissible in a criminal prosecution against him. But
neither does the amendment add:
Despite the foregoing, however, if an unreasonable search
or seizure is committed, any evidence obtained as a result
may be used in any trial, hearing or proceeding which the
government may see fit to 13
bring
against any person whose
1
rights have been violated.
Nor does the fourth amendment contain a proviso, and we
should be slow to read one into it, stating:
Despite the foregoing, however, the decision of executive
officers that a search or seizure was reasonable shall be
final and conclusive in all criminal prosecutions in which
the produce of such search or seizure is offered in evidence and in no such prosecution shall any court consider
132
or review the legality of any such executive action.
Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence and "the support of the
weight of scholarly opinion." Id. at 622.
127. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
128. U.S. CONsT. amend. V (emphasis added).
129. See note 63 supra.
130. Levy, The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and JudicialHistory,
in JUDGMENTs: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTONAL HISTORY 265, 274 (1972) (emphasis added).
131. In an effort "to expose the hypocrisy involved in a high-sounding proposal,
which nevertheless permits the violation and the use of its fruits," one delegate to
the New York State Constitutional Convention, the famous trial lawyer, Max
Steuer, who favored an exclusionary rule, did propose such an addition to the protection against unreasonable search and seizure. See 1 NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, REVISED RECORD 578-82 (1938).

132. Cf. Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), a suit challenging the constitutionality of a statutory provision denying certain veterans' educational benefits to
conscientious objectors. The government argued unsuccessfully that the courts
were deprived of jurisdiction over the action by 38 U.S.C. § 211 (a), which provides
that "the decisions of the Administrator [of Veterans' Affairs] on any question of
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Because the fourth amendment has nothing to say about any
consequences that might flow from its violation, reading it as permitting the use of evidence obtained by means of an unreasonable
search and seizure and remanding the victims of a violation "to the
remedies of private action and such protection as the internal discipline of the police... may afford"'13 3 strikes me as no less "creative" or "judge-made" than the view of the Weeks Court.
It is worth recalling what the great critic of the exclusionary
rule, Dean Wigmore, had to offer in its place-and how he expressed it. The fourth amendment, maintained Wigmore, "implies
both a civil action by the citizen thus disturbed and a process of
criminal contempt against the offending officials"13"--"contempt of
13S
the Constitution" he called it.
Where does this view of the
amendment come from?
"Sending for the high-handed, over-zealous marshal [and] imposing a thirty-day imprisonment for his contempt of the Constitulaw or fact under any law administered by the Veterans Administration... shall
be final and conclusive and no ... court of the United States shall have power or
jurisdiction to review any such decision. . .." The Court held this provision inapplicable to actions challenging the constitutionality of veterans' benefits legislation,
viewing it as aimed at prohibiting review only of "decisions of the Administrator"
arising in the administration of the statute. A contrary construction, recognized
the Court, "would, of course, raise serious questions concerning the constitutionality of § 211(a) ..." 415 U.S. at 366. See also Oestereich v. Selective Service System
Local Board No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968). Petitioner, exempt from military service as
a full time divinity student, returned his registration certificate as a protest against
American involvement in the Viet Nam war. His local board then declared him "delinquent" for violating the regulation requiring possession of certificates and reclassified him 1-A. He sued to restrain his induction, but the lower federal courts
dismissed his complaint, in part on the basis of § 10(b) (3) of the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967, which provides that there shall be no preinduction judicial review "of the classification or processing of any registrant," judicial review being
limited to a defense in a criminal prosecution or to habeas corpus after induction.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "pre-induction judicial review is not precluded in cases of this type." 393 U.S. at 239. Harlan, J., concurring, observed: "To
withhold pre-induction review in this case would ... deprive petitioner of his liberty without the prior opportunity to present to any competent forum-agency or
court-his substantial claim that he was ordered inducted pursuant to an unlawful
procedure. Such an interpretation of § 10(b)(3) would raise serious constitutional
problems.. .." Id. at 243. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, P. SHuIRO & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 309-75 (2d ed. 1979).
Of course, if the exclusionary rule were to be abolished, a person could not
even challenge the constitutionality of the police conduct which produced the evidence when defending the criminal prosecution brought against him.
133. Cf.Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).
134. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8
A.B.A.J. 479, 481 (1922) (emphasis added). To the same effect is 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2184, at 35 (3d ed. 1940).
135. J. WIGMORE, supra note 134, § 2184, at 40. See also Wigmore, Comment, Evidence-FourthAmendment-Documents Illegally Seized, 9 IIL L. REV. 43-44 (1914).
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tion" 136 may have struck Wigmore as "[tjhe natural way" to do
justice and to enforce the fourth amendment, 137 but it strikes me
as a bolder reading of the amendment than the one the Weeks
Court gave it. After all, "[tihe sanction most frequently imposed
in response to a constitutional violation is the sanction of
138
nullification."'
Moreover, if Wigmore's reading of the fourth amendment had,
prevailed, I venture to say that it would have caught much of the
same heavy fire that the exclusionary rule has. The "contempt of
the Constitution" remedy would have been criticized, for example,
for "mak[ing] no distinction between [the investigation] of minor
offenses and more serious crimes"139-the officer would be held in
contempt whether he was pursuing a teenage policy runner or a
"syndicate hit man accused of first degree murder"14 0 -for treating
"honest mistakes" the same way as "deliberate and flagrant...
violations"; 141 for overlooking that "[pjolicemen do not have the
time, inclination, or training to read and grasp the nuances of...
the standards of conduct they are to follow"S42 -"[w]henever the
rules are enforced by meaningful sanctions, our attention is drawn
to their content"; 14 3 for encouraging police perjury'" (to avoid being sent to jail); for inducing judges to "fudge the standards of
probable cause" 145 and "making hypocrites" out of them generally'

4

(to avoid sending officers to jail); and for "discourag[ing]

internal disciplinary action by the police themselves."' 147 Although
the pressure to limit the exclusionary rule to situations where the
police have acted willfully, recklessly, in "bad faith" or "where
there was no reasonable cause to believe there was reasonable
cause" has been considerable,'4 the pressure to limit Wigmore's
136. J. WIGMORE, supra note 134, § 2184, at 40.
137. Id.
138. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv.
L. REV. 1532 (1972).
139. Cf.Wilkey, The ExclusionaryRule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence? 62 JUDICATURE 215, 226 (1978).
140. Id.
141. Cf. Burger, C.J., dissenting in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 418 (1971).
142. Cf.id. at 417.
143. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, in POLICE
POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 87, 88 (C. Sowle ed. 1962) (emphasis added).

144. Cf.Wilkey, supra note 139, at 226.
145. Cf.Wilkey, A Callfor Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule: Let Congress
and the Trial Courts Speak, 62 JUDICATURE 351, 356 (1979).
146. Cf id. at 355-56.
147. Cf.Wilkey, supra note 139, at 226.
148. See H. FRIENDLY, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, in
BENCHMARKS 235, 260-61 (1967); Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The
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"contempt of the Constitution" remedy along the same lines would
have been enormous.
In short, if Wigmore's way of reading the fourth amendment
had prevailed and had become the principal means of enforcing
the basic right, the great debate would have come to be known as
the "contempt of the Constitution" debate rather than the "exclusionary rule" debate, but it would have been no less bitterly
fought. And not a few law enforcement officials, I suspect, would
have offered the exclusionary rule as an alternative to what surely
would have been called Wigmore's "Draconian device" for enforc"Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J.

CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY &
Sci. 365 (1978); Coe, The ALI SubstantialityTest: A FlexibleApproach to the
Exclusionary Sanction, 10 GA. L. REV. 1 (1975); Jensen & Hart, The Good FaithRestatement of the Exclusionary Rule, 73 J. CRIM. L, CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 916
(1982) (the senior author, D. Lowell Jensen, is Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice); Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidencefor
Criminal Prosecution Some ConstitutionalPremises and Practices in Transition,
35 VAND. L. REV. 501 (1982) (but "good faith" belief of searching officer should "save
evidence" only if officer made "error of fact," not "error of law"); Wright, Must the
Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 736 (1972). See also
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIMES, FINAL REPORT 55 (1981);
and the views of Professor G. Robert Blakey, Frank Carrington (Executive Director,
Crime Victims Legal Advocacy Institute), George Deukmejian (Attorney General,
now Governor, of California), Assistant Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen, Wayne
Schmidt (Executive Director, Americans for Effective Law Enforcement), and
others in Exclusionary Rule Hearings,supra note 112.
For recent criticism of various proposed "good faith-substantiality" modifications of the exclusionary rule, see LaFave, The FourthAmendment in an Imperfect
World: On Drawing "BrightLines" and "Good Faith,"43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 333-59
(1982); Mertens & Wasserstrom, Foreword: The Good FaithException to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365
(1981); Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor'sDefense, 1 CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ETHIcs 28, 32-33 (Summer/Fall 1982); Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule:
Good Faith Limitations and Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRIM. L, CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 875 (1982). See also the views'of John J. Cleary (Executive Director, Federal Defenders of San Diego), Professor Leon Friedman (on behalf of the ACLU),
Professor William W. Greenhalgh (on behalf of the ABA), Stephen H. Sachs (Attorney General of Maryland and former U.S. Attorney for Maryland), and others in
Exclusionary Rule Hearings,supra note 112.
Last November, the Supreme Court restored to the calendar for reargument
Illinois v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981) (search warrant should not have
issued on the basis of an anonymous letter describing defendants' alleged drug
dealings and some corroborating evidence produced by an independent police investigation) and requested the parties to address the question "whether the rule
requiring the exclusion ... of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment ... should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the
exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure
at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment." 103 S. Ct. at 436 (1982). The
Court's action set off much speculation that the Court was about to adopt a "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, but the Court never used that term in its
request for supplemental briefing.
POLICE
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149

ing the fourth amendment.
As for the civil action that Wigmore thought the fourth amendment also implied, it can be argued that the purpose of the amendment was to prevent Congress from abolishing existing tort
remedies against offending officers or from disallowing the defense
of "official justification" when such officers were sued. 15 0 But such
a construction puts an inordinate burden on the language of the
amendment itself.
As Professor Thomas Atkinson pointed out more than fifty
years ago, the search provision does not, in language similar to that
used in the first amendment, merely forbid Congress to make any
law prohibiting or abridging the right to bring civil actions against
police who violate the provision. 151 Nor, as Professor Walter Dellinger noted more recently, does the amendment simply provide
that in tort actions against officers "the defense of official justification shall not be allowed if the search or seizure was unreasona15 2
ble" or "the warrant was issued without probable cause."'
The amendment speaks affirmatively and its command that
"the right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated" "suggests a corresponding duty upon government officials to refrain from behavior
which would impair that right. It therefore requires an exceedingly grudging exercise in construction to read that provision as
one whose sole function was to [preserve common law tort actions
against offending police or] to foreclose one kind of defense to a
1 53
tort action."'
Moreover, the view that the availability of compensatory remedies against the offending officers (or the government itself) allows
the government to use evidence obtained in violation of the
amendment would, as Professor Dellinger has pointed out, tempt
the police and the public "to view the Constitution as Justice
Holmes' 'bad man' viewed the obligation of contracts"' 5 4-- the duty
to obey the fourth amendment "means a prediction that you must
55
pay damages if you do not [comply with] it-and nothing else.'
Under such a reading of the fourth amendment, a defendant
149.

Cf.Burger, C.J., concurring in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500 (1976) (so

characterizing the exclusionary rule).
150. See the discussion in Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained
Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 CoLtJm. L. REv. 11, 21-22 (1925);
Dellinger, supra note 138, at 1537-40.
151. Atkinson, supra note 150, at 21.
152. Dellinger, supra note 138, at 1540.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1563.
155. Cf Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HRv.L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
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could expect no help from the Constitution in the criminal courts.
At every stage of the criminal process he would have to suffer the
consequences of a violation of his security against unreasonable
search and seizure. Once the government got hold of incriminating evidence, however it got hold of it (short of brutality or physical violence), it could use the evidence with impunity.
There is a first amendment analogy of sorts. As the late Alexander Bickel "conceive[d] the contest established by the First
Amendment, and as the Supreme Court of the United States appeared to conceive it in the Pentagon Papers case," 15 6 once the
press gets hold of newsworthy documents, even though it is aware
that they have been stolen, it may publish them "with impunity."1 57 As Professor Bickel read the first amendment[T]he presumptive duty of the press is to publish, not to
guard security or to be concerned with the morals of its
sources. Those responsibilities rest chiefly elsewhere.
Within self-disciplined limits and presumptively, the press
is a morally neutral, even an unconcerned, agent as regards the provenance of newsworthy material that comes

to hand ...

158

This approach has been called "the law of the jungle,"' 59 and if
the exclusionary rule were abolished it would govern criminal
prosecutions as well. This approach may be a defensible reading
of the first amendment, but not, I submit, of the fourth. A criminal
court is not (or at least it should not be) "a morally neutral, even
an unconcerned, agent" as regards the provenance of relevant evidence that comes before it. The responsibilities do not, or at least
60
should not, rest elsewhere.
156.

A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 81 (1975)

(referring to New York

Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)). To the same effect is Stewart, "Orof
the Press," 26 HAST. LJ. 631, 636 (1975).
157. A. BICKEL, supra note 156, at 79.
158. Id. at 81.
159. See, e.g., remarks of Professor Laurence Tribe in J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR &
L. TRmE, THE SUPREME COURT. TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1979-80 at 186 (1981).
160. Of course, Wigmore, the great antagonist of the exclusionary rule, disagreed. He and other critics of the rule relied on what has been called the "'fragmentary' model of a prosecution," Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The
Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L REV. 251, 255
(1974). According to this model, "[tihe court acts as a neutral conduit of the evidence, its self-imposed ignorance in effect 'laundering' whatever 'taint' might have
accrued from the seizure and thereby rendering all reliable and relevant evidence
homogeneous for judicial purposes. In Wigmore's words, 'It]he illegality is by no

means condoned; it is merely ignored." Id. at 255-56 (quoting Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479 (1922)). For a criticism of Wigmore's "condonation"-"ignorance" distinction, see Schrock & Welsh,
supra this note, at 330-34.
The Weeks case and the famous dissents of Brandeis and Holmes were based
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MARBURY AND WEEKS
Although the present Court seems to regard the exclusionary
rule as simply a "remedy" (or merely one of several "alternative
remedies") for dealing with the problem of illegally seized evidence, 16 1 a strong case can be made for the view-and Professors
Thomas Schrock and Robert Welsh have made it-that, at least as
originally conceived, the "exclusionary rule" (and the Court never
62
called it that until decades after it had been firmly established)1
on a different view of a court's responsibilities, what has been called the "'onegovernment' conception" or the "'unitary' model of a government and a prosecution." Id. at 257. According to this model, by excluding illegally seized evidence
"the court stops the entire government, of which it is a part, from consummating a
wrongful course of conduct-a course of conduct begun but by no means ended
when the police invade the defendant's privacy." Id. Professors Schrock and
Welsh argue at length that unlike Justice Day, author of the Weeks opinion, who
found the "unitary model" implicit in the fourth amendment, Justice Powell, author
of the opinion in United States v. Calandra,414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury witness
may not refuse to answer questions merely because these questions are based on
illegally obtained evidence), tried to read the "fragmentary model" into the fourth
amendment. Schrock & Welsh, supra this note, at 289-302.
161. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
162. According to Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 365 n.4, Justice
Frankfurter became "the first member of the Supreme Court to use the term 'exclusionary rule'" in United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 520 (1943). But this cannot
be so. Johnson, a prosecution for attempted evasion of federal income taxes, did
not even raise a search and seizure issue. Defendant argued, rather, that the expert
testimony of an accountant for the government regarding his income and expenditures invaded the jury's province. Rejecting this contention, the Court, per Frankfurter, J., observed that we should "not be too finicky or fearful in allowing some
discretion to trial judges in the conduct of a trial and in the appropriate submission
of evidence within the generalframework offamiliar exclusionary rules." 319 U.S.
at 519-20 (emphasis added).
Justice Black "was responsible for popularizing [the term 'exclusionary rule']
to describe the doctrine that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution," Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra
note 148, at 365 n.4, and in United States v. Wallace &Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 796,
798 (1949), he called the Silverthorne rule (also known as the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine), an important feature of the Weeks rule, "an extraordinary sanction"
and an "exclusionary rule." In context, however, Justice Black may have been
describing the Weeks rule itself. For a discussion of the Wallace case, see text accompanying notes 226-30 infra.
So far as I am able to tell, Wallace not only marks the first time any member of
the Court, or at least any Justice writing for the Court, used the term "exclusionary
rule" to describe the Weeks doctrine or a major feature of the doctrine, but it also
seems to be the first time that the Court suggested that the exclusionary rule is
based primarily, if not entirely, on a "deterrence" rationale and that it may not be a
command of the fourth amendment. Yet, remarkably, Wallace seems to have disappeared from search and seizure law without a trace. See text accompanying
notes 248 infra.
Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Wallace was his first statement on the
exclusionary rule, but hardly his last. In the course of his opinions on the subject,
"Black had taken nearly every possible position on the rule's derivation: that it was
required by the fifth amendment; that it was required by the fourth and fifth
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is "simply another name for judicial review."1 63 Moreover, add
Schrock and Welsh, the name of the rule "is misleading if it suggests that judicial review of executive search and seizure conduct
is at all different from judicial review of legislative conduct."1 64 According to this view, since the fourth amendment is superior to any
executive conduct, just as the Constitution is superior to "any ordinary act of the legislature," the fourth amendment, and not the ex165
ecutive conduct, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Marbury v. Madison166 is a rather complicated case 167 and admittedly a different case than Weeks, which established the federal
exclusionary rule, but a theme that resounds throughout both
opinions is the determination to take the constitution seriously, to
see that "its commands, and above all its promises, are to be trans168
lated into practice."'
In Marbury, John Marshall deemed the doctrine that "courts
must close their eyes on the Constitution and see only" the act of
Congress' 69 "subver[sive]" of all written constitutions. "It would
declare that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden,
such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality
1 70
effectual."'
In Weeks the government asked the courts, in effect, to close
their eyes on the fourth amendment and consider only the probative value of the evidence gathered by the police. The Weeks
Court, it appears, viewed such a contention as subversive of the
amendment. It would mean, the Weeks Court seemed to think,
that even though the police do what is expressly forbidden-an exclusionary rule is not expressly required, but an unreasonable
amendments in combination; or conversely, that it was not required at all by the
Constitution." Landynski, In Search of Justice Black's Fourth Amendment, 45
FORDHAM L. REv. 453, 478 (1976). "At no time during his years on the Court did
Black's fidelity to the guarantees in the fourth amendment match his devotion to
other provisions in the Bill of Rights. . .. Justice Black once told [Professor
Landynski], in the course of a discussion of the fourth amendment, that he did not
regard the method of catching a thief as very important, provided he got a fair trial
afterwards." Id. at 495.
163. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 160, at 325.
164. Id.
165. Cf.Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). See Schrock &
Welsh, supra note 160, at 324-26, 335-66.
166. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
167. See generally Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969
DUKE L.J. 1.
168. "[Llaw ... is a practical subject, and the first principle of law is that its
commands, and above all its promises, are to be translated into practice ..." C.
Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L REv. 3, 28 (1970).
169. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
170. Id.
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search is "expressly forbidden"--the prohibited police conduct
would be "in reality effectual."
Because the statute struck down in Marbury pertained to the
jurisdiction of the Court itself, it need not have come to stand for
the great principle it has. It might have been read more narrowly
as "a defensive use of constitutional review alone, acquiring considerable support from the concept of separated powers"' 71-as a
"safeguarding" of the Court's original jurisdiction from congressional enlargement. 172 Marbury, of course, may no longer be read
that way, but Weeks still can.
The courts, after all, are the specific addresses of the constitutional command that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon" certain
prescribed conditions. 173 If the police act pursuant to a defective
warrant or, as is much more often the case, act without any warrant at all, and the produce of their action is offered in evidence,
the court that reviews the legality of the search or seizure may be
said to be exercising "a defensive use of constitutional review
alone."
Because the courts are the specific addressees of the fourth
amendment's command, it seems to follow, and the Weeks Court
seemed to think it followed, that when the police come before
them with the produce of their lawless searches the courts shall
defend judicial power against law enforcement encroachment. If
"not even an order of court would have justified" the police action,
as it would not have in Weeks, then "much less was it within [the
officers'] authority" to proceed on their own "to bring [proof of
171. Van Alsytne, supra note 167, at 34.
172. Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept of AdministrativeConstitutionalLaw, 69 W. VA. L. REv.249 (1967).
173. "rhe amendment nowhere specifies that a warrant may be issued only by a
judge, not by an executive official, but this fact has been assumed from the very
beginning and is supported by its history." LANDYNSKI, supra note 50, at 47. See
generally 2 W. LAFAVE, Search and.Seizure § 4.2, at 29-41 (1978).
As the Weeks Court put it, "[t Ihe effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the
courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and
authority ... [T] he duty of giving [the protection of the fourth amendment] force
and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws." 232 U.S. at 391-92.
See also United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972): "The
Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role accords with our
basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved
through a separation of powers and division of functions among the different
branches and levels of government." Id. at 317. See also Douglas, J., dissenting in
Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961): "[Tlhe command of the Fourth Amendment implies continuous supervision by the judiciary over law enforcement officers,
quite different from the passive role which courts play in some spheres." Id. at 396.
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guilt] to the aid of the Government."' 174 And if the government's
agents did proceed on their own "without sanction of law," as they
did in Weeks, then the government should not be permitted to use
what their agents obtained. The government whose agents violated
the Constitution should be in no better position than the government whose agents obeyed it; "[t] he efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment.., are not to be aided
'75
by the sacrifice of [fourth amendment] principles."'
John Marshall to the contrary notwithstanding, a "judicial
veto" of an act of Congress is not the inevitable consequence of our
Constitution being a written one. 176 The Constitution, it has been
pointed out, does not say that when judges give a different interpretation of the Constitution than the Congress, the latter is bound
to yield to the former. 177 But a "judicial veto" of the police, it
seems to me, is an inevitable consequence of the fourth
amendment.
The "central objectionable feature" of both the general warrants and the writs of assistance was that "they provided no judicial check" on the discretion of the executing officials. 7 8 The Bill
of Rights, especially the fourth amendment, "reflects experience
with police excesses." 179 A basic purpose of the Bill of rights, especially the fourth amendment, is "subordinat[ing] police action to
legal restraints."'180 Critics of the courts, to be sure, have long criticized them for "policing the police." But as Professor Anthony Amsterdam responded, in his famous Holmes lectures on search and
seizure, "the fourth amendment is quintessentially a regulation of
the police"-"in enforcing the fourth amendment, courts must police the police."'18
I can hear the opponents of the exclusionary rule now. We are
not against subordinating police action to legal restraints, they are
saying, we are only against doing so when the government seeks to
use the fruits of the police illegality. This also happens to be the
occasion when the protagonists are in place, when the defendant
has the maximum incentive to challenge the police conduct and, if
174. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 393-94.
175. Id.
176. See Van Alstyne, supra note 167, at 16-29. See also M. COHEN, THE FAITH OF
A LIBERAL, 178-80, 182-85 (1946).
177. See M. COHEN, supra note 176, at 182-85.
178. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981).
179. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
joined by Murphy, J.).
180. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, joined by Jackson, J.).
181. Amsterdam, supra note 49, at 371.
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he is an indigent, as many criminal defendants are, the services of
court-appointed counsel. No, say the opponents of the exclusionary rule, let us have no judicial check on the discretion of government officials in a criminal prosecution against the victim of the
police illegality. Make the victim start a new proceeding in another court-if he is willing to rouse the police and able to find a
lawyer willing to take on "a team of professional investigators and
testifiers,' 82 often without fee, and risk the chance of earning a
183
reputation as "a police-hating lawyer."'
I can hear the opponents of the exclusionary rule again: We
don't want the courts to "close their eyes on the Constitution" permanently, they are saying-only long enough to convict a person
and send him to prison on the basis of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution. Only long enough, I would say, to make
the expressly forbidden act "in reality effectual."
If I may quote John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison another
time, and for the last time, "[t] he very essence of civil liberty," he
told us, "consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."'184 Presumably he meant "claim[ing] the protection of the laws" at the first
practicable opportunity.
Moreover, although it cannot be denied that this way of thinking about the fourth amendment is out of favor today, 85 when the
government tries to convict a person on the basis of an earlier violation of his fourth amendment rights, does it not seek to inflict a
second and distinct injury? To put it somewhat differently, is not
the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence in a criminal prosecution against the victim of the police illegality "an exacerbation of
a constitutional injury"? 186 Although I find the language of the
182. Id. at 430.
183. Id.
184. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
185. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), the Court, per Powell, J.,
rejected the argument that because the questions the grand jury asked respondent
were based on illegally obtained evidence, "they somehow constitute distinct violations of his Fourth Amendment rights." Id. at 353-54. Responded the Court:
The wrong condemned [by the fourth amendment] is the unjustified
governmental invasion of [certain] areas of an individual's life. That
wrong, committed in this case, is fully accomplished by the original search
without probable cause. . .. Questions based on illegally obtained evidence are only a derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search and
seizure. They work no new Fourth Amendment wrong. Whether such derivative use of illegally obtained evidence by a grand jury should be proscribed presents a question, not of rights, but of remedies.
Id. at 354.
186. See Comment, ForfeitureSeizures and the WarrantRequirement, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 960, 987 (1981) (describing, but not accepting, the argument that "unlike the
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opinion more ambiguous than do Schrock and Welsh, 8 7 at places
the Weeks decision does seem to recognize "two violations [of the
amendment], one by the marshal and one by the court, neither of
which was regarded as 'more' or 'less' unconstitutional than the
other."' 88 Moreover, although so far as I can tell his observation
has been completely overlooked in the vast literature of the exclusionary rule, Justice Holmes observed, a dozen years after Weeks:
"If the search and seizure are unlawful as invading personal rights
secured by the Constitution those rights would be infringed yet
further if the evidence were allowed to be used."' 89
The view that the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence is a distinct constitutional wrong (or a distinct infringement
of the fourth amendment) also finds support in-of all placesChief Justice Taft's opinion for the court in Olmstead.190 It is well
known that the Olmstead Court, per Chief Justice Taft, held that
(1) wiretapping fell outside the protection against unreasonable
search and seizure and (2) that the wiretap evidence should not be
excluded merely because federal agents violated a state statute in
the course of gathering the evidence. It is less well known, however, that Chief Justice Taft did not challenge the Weeks rule or
deny that it was a command of the fourth amendment.' 9' It is still
less well known how Taft contrasted the use of evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment with the use of evidence obtained "unethically." He rejected "the suggestion that the courts
have a discretion to exclude evidence,-the admission of which is not
unconstitutional, because unethically secured."' 92 And he insisted that "the exclusion of evidence should be confined to cases
[ such as Weeks ] where rights under the Constitution would be viouse of illegally seized evidence, the forfeiture of illegally seized property is not an
exacerbation of a constitutional injury").
187. See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 160, at 295-302.
188. Id. at 301 (emphasis in the original). The Weeks Court, per Justice Day,
concluded that "there was involved in the [lower court's] order refusing [defendant's] application [for a return of the illegally seized letters] a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused, and that the court should have restored these letters
to the accused. In holding them and permitting their use upon the trial, we think
prejudicial error was committed." 232 U.S. at 398 (emphasis added). See also id. at
391-93 (neither the courts nor law enforcement officials may violate the fourth
amendment in "bring[ing] the guilty to punishment").
189. Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926) (contrasting the forfeiture of
property seized by unauthorized local agents).
190. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
191. The striking outcome of the Weeks case and those which followed it was
the sweeping declaration that the Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or
limiting the use of evidence in courts, really forbade its introduction if obtained by
government officers through a violation of the Amendment." Id. at 462.
192. Id. at 468 (emphasis added).
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lated by admitting it."'193
Even if the use of the unconstitutionally seized evidence is not
deemed a violation of the fourth amendment, the unreasonable
search or seizure is. When should the courts address that issue? If
the courts may test the legality of the police conduct some time,
isn't the logical time to do so during the criminal process, "a process initiated by government for the achievement of basic governmental purposes"; 1 9 4 "a process that has as one of its
consequences the imposition of severe disabilities on the persons
proceeded against?" 195 After all, American criminal procedure
"imposes procedural regulations on the criminalprocess by constitutional command. '196 Why should the fourth amendment be an
exception?
"The survival of our system of criminal justice and the values
which it advances," observed the Attorney General's Committee
on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice
twenty years ago, "depends upon a constant, searching, and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of authority at
all stages of the process."' 197 It is plain that the Attorney General's
Committee meant the criminalprocess. If fast-developing situations and other exigencies of law enforcement work preclude
meaningful challenge at the earliest stages of the criminal process,
why does it follow, how does it follow, that no meaningful challenge should be permitted at any stage of the criminal process?
Challenging the legality of a search or seizure at some stage of the
criminal process-when it is practicable to do so-means the exclusionary rule. That's all the exclusionary rule means.
In a number of recent non-criminal procedural due process
cases, the Court has reminded us that "[tI he constitutional right to
be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair
process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his
possessions. ' 198 Although the Court has expressed a clear preference for pre-seizure hearings, it has recognized that there are "'extraordinary' situations"-" 'truly unusual' situations"-that justify
postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing."'19 9 "Only with
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194.

REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMrIrEE ON POVERTY AND THE AD-

MINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 9 (1963). The Report is often called THE

ALLEN
195.
196.
197.
198.

REPORT, after the Chairman of the Committee, Professor Francis A. Allen.
Id.
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
Id.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). See generally W. LOCKHART, Y.

KAmiSAR & J. CHOPER, CONsTrrr ONAL LAw 626-48 (5th ed. 1980).
199. Fuentes, 407 U.S. 90 (emphasis added).
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great reluctance," however, "has [the] Court approved the seizure
even of refrigerators or washing machines without notice and a
'20 0
prior adversary hearing.
Because a search warrant and, as is much more often the case,
the execution of a search or seizure without a warrant serve "a
highly important governmental need" 20 1 and because "the danger
is all too obvious that a criminal will destroy or hide evidence or
fruits of his crime if given any prior notice," 20 2 a search or seizure
by the police is plainly one of those "extraordinary situations" that
"justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing." But as
the need for the police to act swiftly and by surprise creates the
exception, "so it limits [or should limit] its duration. '20 3 Once the
suspect is in custody and once the evidence has been seized, what
justifies dispensing with an adversary hearing at every subsequent
stage of the criminal process? Yet that would be the result if the
"exclusionary rule" were to be abolished.
THE LATE ARRIVAL OF THE "DETERRENCE"
. RATIONALE 2 04
Why, Judge Richard Posner recently asked, was the exclusion200. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 581 n.9 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
201. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 93 n.30.
202. Id.
203. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866).
204. Although throughout this article I frequently use the terms "'deterrent'
effects" or "'deterrence' rationale," because this language is so popular in judicial
opinions and legal literature, these terms are quite misleading. "Deterrence"
suggests that the exclusionary rule is supposed to influence the police the way the
criminal law is supposed to affect the general public. But the rule does not, and
cannot be expected to, "deter" the police the way the criminal law is supposed to
work. The rule does not inflict a "punishment" on police who violate the fourth
amendment; exclusion of the evidence does not leave the police in a worse position
than if they had never violated the Constitution in the first place. Because the
police are members of a structural governmental entity, however, the rule
influences them, or is supposed to influence them, by "systemic deterrence," i.e.,
through a department's institutional compliance with fourth amendment standards.
See notes 526-36 and accompanying text itqfra.
It may be preferable to abolish the "deterrence" terminology altogether,
despite its popularity. It seems more accurate and more useful to call the rule a
"disincentive"--a means of eliminating significant incentives for making illegal
searches, at least where the police contemplate prosecution and conviction. See
text accompanying notes 537-45. "[E Inforcing the exclusionary rule does not deter
the police from making unconstitutional searches," observes Professor Phillip
Johnson, "but repealing the rule would positively encourage such unconstitutional
activity." See note 529 infra. Professor Anthony Amsterdam calls the rule "a
counterweight within the criminal justice system," one that prevents the system
"from functioning as an unmitigated inducement to policemen to violate the fourth
amendment." See note 539 and accompanying text infra.
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ary rule ever adopted?20 5 "The answer," he asserted, "is consistent
with economic analysis: the rule was adopted because until recently there was no alternative sanction for violations of the fourth
amendment that did not cause severe underterrence. ' 20 6 For Posner and other critics of the exclusionary rule, the urge to explain
the origin of the rule this way is understandable. But, if I may
borrow language used in a different context, "[there is only one
trouble with 7this attractive theory-the lack of any evidence to
'20
support it."
Nowhere in Weeks is the exclusionary rule called a "remedy"
and nowhere in the opinion is there any discussion, or even mention, of the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule versus the effectiveness of tort remedies, internal self-discipline or other
alternatives. Although few would suspect this from the arguments
of the rule's opponents or from recent majority opinions of the
Supreme Court, the Weeks opinion "contains no language that expressly justifies the rule by reference to a supposed deterrent ef'20 8
fect on police officials.
Indeed, no less formidable a critic of the exclusionary rule
than Chief Justice Burger recognized, before ascending to his present post, that the Weeks case "rest [sI on the Court's unwillingness
to give even tacit approval to official defiance of constitutional provisions by admitting evidence secured in violation of the Constitulurking between the lines of
tion. The idea of deterrence may be
20 9
the opinion but is not expressed."
. Nor, so far as I have been able to tell, is the idea of deterrence
expressed for the next thirty-five years-in the interim between
Weeks and the year of the Wolf case. 2 10 The Court that decided
Weeks and the Courts that adhered to its doctrine in subsequent
205.

Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal

Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 638 (1982).

206. Id. See also Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SuP. CT. REV.
49. For forceful criticism of Judge Posner's views, see A. Morris, The Exclusionary
Rule, Deterrence and Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 57 WASH. L. REV. 647
(1982).
207. Cf. H. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Brandeis-The Quest for Reason, in
BENCHMARKS 291, 292 (1967).
208. F. Allen, Th7e Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
CriminalCases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 536 n.90. See also A. Morris, supra note 206, at
649; Oakes, The ProperRole of the FederalCourts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 935-36 (1979); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 160, at 281-82, 296-307.
Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of ConstitutionalPrinciple,69
J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 141, 143 (1978).
209. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U.L REV. 1, 5 (1964).
210. This is not a new discovery. See Cann & Egbert, The Exclusionary Rule: Its
Necessity in ConstitutionalDemocracy, 23 HOWARD LJ. 299, 302-07 (1980); McKay,
Mapp v. Ohio, the Exclusionary Rule and the Right of Privacy, 15 ARIZONA L REV.
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decades may have expected, or at least hoped, that law enforcement officials would not be so "impervious, uncaring or ignorant of
the search and seizure rules hammered out in our courts" as to be
unaffected by them 2 1 1-no doubt the Court had the same expectations, or at least hopes, about local public school officials when it
decided Brown v. Board of Education2 12 -but there is no suggestion in Weeks or in the search and seizure cases handed down over
327, 330 (1973); Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 379-80. But the point is
worth recalling at a time when the "'deterrence' rationale" dominates the scene.
The commentators who have stressed the late arrival of the "deterrence" rationale, and properly so, seem to have overlooked United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., discussed in the text accompanying notes 242-48 infra. This is
inderstandable, because ever since it was decided every member of the Court
seems to have forgotten Wallace, including Justice Black, who wrote the opinion of
the Court in that case. See text accompanying notes 242, 248 infra. But Wallace,
handed down less than two months before Wolf was decided, appears to be the first
time the Court injected the instrumental rationale of deterrence into its discussion
of the exclusionary rule. Even so, this does not detract from the basic point that the
"deterrence" rationale is of relatively recent vintage.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (overturning the "silver platter" doctrine), has been called "the first case to be decided explicitly on the deterrence
rationale," Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 381, but deterrence was only
one of several rationales discussed in that case. See Cann & Egbert, supra this
note, at 304-05. The Elkins Court did observe that the exclusionary rule "is calculated to prevent, not to repair" and that "its purpose is to deter," 364 U.S. at 217, but
it did so in specific response to the rule's great critics, Cardozo and Wigmore, that
excluding illegally obtained evidence lets both the aggrieved defendant and the offending officer "go free." See id. at 216-17. The Elkins Court went on to call attention to "the imperative of judicial integrity." Id. at 222. It recalled that'the Court
had applied this principle in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943),
where it had held that a conviction based on violations of federal law could not
stand "without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of
law." See Elkins at 223. Added the Elkins Court: "Even less should the federal
courts be accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn
to uphold." Id. In any event, Elkins was not a "Fourth Amendment decision," but
an invocation of "the Court's supervisory power over the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts." Id. at 216.
211. Cf. Letter from Judge Herbert Stern to Senator Charles McC. Mathias, May
12, 1982:
I have spent my entire career working within the criminal justice system. . .. There is no doubt in my mind that the exclusionary rule does in
fact deter law enforcement misconduct at every level. It is simply incredible to suggest that the police, the FBI, the District Attorney and the United
States Attorney are impervious, uncaring or ignorant of the search and
seizure rules hammered out in our courts. It is, I think, a slander to suggest
that our law enforcement authorities are either so stupid or uncaring that
they are unaffected or-if you will-undeterred by what the courts say they
must do, and what they must not do.
Reprinted in Exclusionary Rule Hearings,supra note 112, at 806-08.
212. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). But ten years after Broum, precious little school desegregation had been accomplished. By the 1963-1964 school year, "the eleven states of
the old Confederacy had a mere 1.17 per cent of their black students attending
schools with white students." Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67
MICH. L. REV. 237, 247 (1968). See also Kamisar, Introduction: The School Desegregation Cases in Retrospect, in THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN
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the next thirty-five years that the exclusionary rule's survival depends on proof that it is significantly influencing police behavior.
The fourth amendment is not as specific and detailed as many
would like, but that does not make the fundamental public values
it embodies "any less real, nor any less important." 2 13 The Weeks
Court did not engage in "economic analysis." It did what courts
are supposed to do--give meaning to constitutional values. 214 "Interpretation is a process of generating meaning and one important
(and very common) way of both understanding and expressing the
'2 15
meaning of a text is to render it specific and concrete.
As the Weeks Court saw it, if a court could not "sanction" a
search or seizure before the event (because, for example, the police lacked adequate grounds to make the search) then a court
could not, or at least should not-by admitting the evidence gathered by the lawless police-"affirm" or "sanction" the search or
seizure after the event. 216 As the Weeks Court saw it, one might
say the "cost-benefit analysis" had already been worked out when
the fourth amendment was written-the amendment embodies the
conclusion that the "benefits" of privacy, liberty and personal freedom and security outweigh the "costs" incurred when the government is unable to bring the guilty to punishment either
(a) because its agents lack sufficient cause to seek evidence of
crime and therefore never make the search or seizure that might
have produced the evidence 217 or (b) because the government cannot use the evidence its agents obtained when, lacking the requisite grounds, they carriedout a search or seizure they never should
have made: "The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring
the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be
aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years
of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodi218
ment in the fundamental law of the land."
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, xiii, xxiii (L. Friedman ed.

1969).
213. Fiss, Foreword: The Formsof Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 11 (1979) (general
discussion of constitutional provisions).
214. See id.
215. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 743 (1982).
216. See 232 U.S. at 392-94.
217. As Cooley said of the fourth amendment 115 years ago, "it is better oftentimes that crime should go unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to
have his premises invaded, his trunks broken up, [or] his private books, papers,
and letters exposed to prying curiosity." T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTrrUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 306 (1st ed. 1868). Why is this view any less valid when the
citizen's premises have been invaded or his constitutional rights otherwise
violated?
218. 232 U.S. at 393.
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In the thirty-five years following Weeks the Court had little to
say about the rationale of the exclusionary rule and absolutely
nothing to say about the relative merits of the exclusionary rule
and alternative methods of enforcing the fourth amendment.
Often the Court remarked only that the evidence had to be excluded because it was obtained by violating rights secured to the
defendant under the fourth and/or fifth amendments or because
the use of the evidence would violate one or the other or both of
these amendments. 2 19 Sometimes the Court simply declared that
a conviction based on evidence acquired by a violation of the
fourth amendment "cannot stand" 220 or that the use of such evi219. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946); Gambino v. United
States, 275 U.S. 310, 316 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30, 33-34 (1925);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 148-49 (1925) (describing earlier cases);
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1921).
Although Weeks rests on the fourth amendment itself, a quarter of a century
earlier the Court had perceived an "intimate relationship" between the protection
against unreasonable search and seizure and the privilege against self-incrimination, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886), a relationship that many Justices relied on, long after Weeks seemed to render such an analysis unnecessary, to
explain the exclusionary rule. In my first article on the subject, more than twenty
years ago, I criticized Boyd's conceptual basis for the exclusionary rule on various
grounds and at some length. See Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal
State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L REV. 1083, 1088-90 n.16
(1959). See also F. Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American Law of Search
and Seizure, in POLCE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 77, 82 (C. Sowle ed. 1962);
Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure Practices,
34 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 150, 160-61 & n.60 (1962). In light of such recent decisions as
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)
and Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), there is even less to be said for the
self-incrimination-illegally obtained evidence merger now than before. See Halpern, FederalHabeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule after Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1982); Kuhns, The Concept of PersonalAggrievement
in Fourth Amendment Standing Cases, 65 IOWA L. REV. 493, 508 (1980).
A proponent of the exclusionary rule might say of the Boyd case's merger of
the fourth and fifth amendments, however, that "it was less than a harmless error"
for
it was part of the process through which the Fourth Amendment, by means
of the exclusionary rule, has become more than a dead letter in the federal
courts. Certainly this putative relationship between the guarantees is not
to be used as a basis for a stinting construction of either-it was the Boyd
case itself which set what might have been hoped to be the spirit of later
construction of these Amendments by declaring that the start of abuse can
'only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for
the security of person and property should be liberally construed.' 116 U.S.
635.
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 248, 255-56 (1960) (Brennan, J., joined by Warren,
C.J., and Black and Douglas, J.J., dissenting).
220. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948). See also McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). Although the Court, per Frankfurter, J., excluded the
incriminating statements "quite apart from the Constitution," id. at 341, it agreed
"as the petitioners assert, that a conviction in the federal courts, the foundation of
which is evidence obtained in disregard of liberties deemed fundamental by the
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dence in a criminal prosecution cannot be "tolerated under our
'22 1
constitutional system.
In one case, the Court stated that the use of evidence obtained
in violation of the fourth amendment was banned because "otherwise the policy and purpose of the amendment might be
thwarted. 2' 22 The dissenters in the same case opined that as a result of Weeks and its progeny "this Court has refused to make itself a participant in lawless conduct by sanctioning the use in open
court of evidence illegally secured. '223 In another case the Court
characterized the exclusionary rule as "a sanction against" 22 -and a concurring opinion viewed it as a "condemnation of"22 5-the
flouting of the protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
Three years before Wolf, the Court summarized the Weeks
doctrine as follows: "As explained in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States,226 the evidence [obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search and seizure] is suppressed on the theory that the
'2 27
government may not profit from its own wrongdoing.
Silverthorne, the genesis of the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine," as it came to be called, 228 is one of the Court's very few postWeeks, pre-1949 search and seizure cases to illuminate the thinking behind the exclusionary rule at any length. Speaking for seven
members of the Court (including Brandeis, who had joined the
Court since Weeks, and Day, author of the Weeks opinion), Justice
Holmes observed:
The Government now, while in form repudiating and
condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right
to avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that means
which otherwise it would not have had.
The proposition could not be presented more nakedly.
It is that although of course its seizure was an outrage
which the Government now regrets, . . . [it] may use the
knowledge that it has gained [from the unconstitutional
seizure]; that the protection of the Constitution covers the
physical possession but not any advantages that the GovConstitution, cannot stand"-citing Weeks and six other federal search and seizure
cases. Id. at 339.
221. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29-30 (1927).
222. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 120 (1942).
223. Id. at 128 (Murphy, J., joined by Stone, C.J., and Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
224. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948).
225. Id. at 457, 461 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter joined in both
the Court's opinion and Justice Jackson's concurring opinion.
226. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
227. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946).
228. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), a wiretapping case which
relied heavily on Silverthorne, first used the phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree."
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ernment can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing
the forbidden act . . .. [Such a contention]
reduces the
229
Fourth Amendment to a form of words.
In Silverthorne, the Court, per Justice Holmes, also invoked
what I think Holmes would call the "plain meaning" of the fourth
amendment:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition
of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it
shall not be used at all. . .. If knowledge of [the unconstitutionally obtained facts] is gained from an independent
source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's0 own wrong--cannot be
23
used by it in the way proposed.
Some years later, speaking for the Court in the famous Olmstead case, 23 1 Chief Justice Taft recognized that the meaning of
the Weeks-Silverthorne doctrine-if not the fourth amendment itself-was plain. "The fourth amendment, although not referring to
or limiting the use of evidence in courts, really forbade its introduction if obtained by government officers through a violation of
the Amendment." 232 Taft did not challenge the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule; he confined it. Rejecting the argument that "unethically," as well as unconstitutionally, secured evidence should
be barred,233 he concluded that "the exclusion of evidence should
be confined to cases where rights under the Constitution would be
'234
violated by admitting it."
The Holmes-Brandeis dissents in Olmstead are more memorable than Taft's opinion for the Court. Although often invoked by
proponents of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, the most
famous passages in the Holmes-Brandeis dissents, however, were
actually arguments for extending the Weeks-Silverthorne doctrine
to situations where the federal government had not violated the
Constitution, or even federal law, but only a state anti-wiretapping
statute. Holmes thought, "as Mr. Justice Brandeis says, that apart
from the Constitution the Government ought not to use evidence
obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act. '23 5 "[T]he reason
for excluding evidence obtained by violating the Constitution,"
229.
230.
231.
States,

232.
233.
234.
235.

251 U.S. at 391-92.
Id. at 392.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in Katz v. United
389 U.S. 347 (1967).

277 U.S. at 462.
See id. at 468.
Id. at 468 (emphasis added).
Id. at 469-70. See also id. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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maintained Holmes, "seems to me logically to lead to excluding evidence obtained by a crime of the officers of the law.

' 236

Nevertheless, these famous dissents shed light on the original
bases and purposes of the exclusionary rule. For they are essentially embellished restatements of the Weeks-Silverthorne reasoning. Thus by maintaining that it is "a less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble
part,"237 that "the existing code ... does not permit the judge to
allow such inequities to succeed, '238 that the Court should not
"ratify" or "sanction" the lawless conduct of the executive 239 and
that the Court's aid should be denied "in order to maintain respect
for law [and] to preserve the judicial process from contamination, '' 240 and by warning that "[t]o declare that in the administra-

tion of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that
the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution," 241 the
Holmes-Brandeis dissents underscore that the exclusionary rule is
based on principle--one might also say that it has an important
symbolic quality-not on estimates of how substantially the exclusion of evidence affects police behavior.
One pre-Wolf case remains to be considered-United
States v.

Wallace & Tiernan Co. 242 So far as I have been able to tell, this all-

but-forgotten case, decided less than two months before Wolf,
marks the first time the Court indicated that the exclusionary rule
is based on a "deterrence" rationale and the first time it suggested
that the rule may not be a command of the fourth amendment. It
is plain, however, that the Wallace Court was speaking primarily
of the "Silverthorne exclusionary rule"--the "fruit of the poisonous
2 43
tree" doctrine-not the Weeks rule.

In Wallace, the district court, relying heavily on Silverthorne,
had prohibited the use of documentary evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas issued by an illegally constituted grand jury,
viewing the subpoenas as the equivalent of "unreasonable
236. Id. at 471.
237. Id. at 470 (Holmes J., dissenting).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 483 (Brandeis J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 484.
241. Id. at 485.
242. 336 U.S. 793 (1949).
243. Twice the Wallace Court refers to "the Silverthorne exclusionary rule," id.
at 798, and twice it refers to "the Silverthorne rule." On the other hand, the Court
never refers to "the Weeks exclusionary rule," the "Weeks rule," or for that matter,
the exclusionary rule. Silverthorne is discussed or quoted at considerable length;
Weeks is only cited.
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searches and seizures." A unanimous Court, per Justice Black, (in
his first opinion on the subject of the exclusionary rule) "de'2
cline [d] to extend the Silverthorne rule to such an extent:" "
The rule announced [in Silverthorne] was that evidence or
knowledge 'gained by the Government's own wrong' is not
merely forbidden to be 'used before the Court but that it
shall not be used at all.' Other cases in this Court have
applied the same rule [citing numerous search and
seizure cases, including Weeks]. It is an extraordinary
sanction,judicially imposed, to limit searches and seizures
to those conducted in strict compliance with the commands
of the Fourth Amendment.
245 The effect of the District
Court's holding here was to add to [the] requirement for
dismissal of the indictment a further extraordinarysanction devised by this Court to prevent violations of the
FourthAmendment. For here there was no official culpability in issuance
or service of the subpoena duces
24 6
tecum....
...
The Fourth Amendment, important as it is in our
society, does not call for imposition of judicial sanctions
where enforcing officers have followed the law with such
punctilious regard as they have here. We hold that dismissal of the grand jury because no women were on it is
no sufficient reason for holding that the Government247is
barred from making use of the summoned documents.
Surprisingly, the Wallace case has never been heard from
again. Neither its author, Justice Black, nor any of his colleagues
ever cited the case in any of the opinions in Wolf or in Mapp. Nor
has Wallace once been cited, let alone quoted, in any search and
seizure case decided by the Burger Court. Perhaps because it
dealt with the "Silverthorne rule" rather than the "Weeks rule" or
because, when all is said and done, it is not really a "search and
seizure case" at all,248 Wallace seems to have vanished without a
trace.
244. 336 U.S. at 800.
245. Id. at 796 (emphasis added).
246. Id. at 798 (emphasis added).
247. Id. at 800 (emphasis added).
248. See id. at 798, 799:
The sole ultimate reason for the District Court's application of the
Silverthorne rule was that no women were on the grand jury, a circumstance that bears only a remote if not wholly theoretical relationship to
search and seizure ...
There is no claim that the subpoena was obtained
or served in an improper manner or that any Government officer committed a wrong in the way the documents were handled or returned ...
That
there were no women on the grand jury did not contribute to any invasion
of appellee's privacy.
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Not so a decision handed down the following month, Wolf v.
Colorado. Indeed, by implicitly assuming-without citing any authority, without attempting to reconcile the language to the contrary in Weeks, Silverthorne and other cases-that the
exclusionary rule is based exclusively on a "deterrence" rationale,
and that "other methods, . .. if consistently enforced, would be

equally effective," 249 Wolf significantly changed our way of thinking about the rule-and probably for all time.
THE SEDUCTIVE QUALITY OF THE WOLF OPINION
Although today it is settled that the Court does not apply a
"watered-down" version of the fourth amendment to the states,
but rather one that applies to the same extent it has been interpreted to apply to the federal government, 250 at the time of Wolf it
was unclear whether or not the case stood for the proposition that
every "unreasonable search or seizure" within the meaning of the
fourth amendment also constituted a violation of fourteenth
amendment due process.

251

Although even before ElkinS252 and

Mapp I argued at considerable length to the contrary,25 3 the Wolf
case could conceivably have stood, or have come to stand, for the
more limited proposition that only certain "gross" or "aggravated"
or "outrageous" unreasonable searches or seizures offend due
process.
In any event, all members of the Wolf court seemed (a) to
agree that many an unreasonable search or seizure by state police
ran counter to the guaranty of the fourteenth amendment and
(b) to assume that the warrantless search of Dr. Wolf's office fell
into this category. (If not, if the Wolf Court had not believed, or
assumed, that the Colorado police had violated the petitioner's
"basic right to protection against arbitrary intrusion by the police," 254 a right "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as
249. See note 274 infra.
250. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 179 n.14 (1968); Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33-34-1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
650-51, 654-56 (1961).
251. A decade later, Justice Frankfurter maintained that Wolf did not mean that
every search or seizure violative of the fourth amendment, if committed by federal
officials, offended the fourteenth amendment, if carried out by state officials. See
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 233, 237-40 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., joined by
Clark, Harlan and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting). But a majority of the Court did read
Wolf as equating the substantive scope of the two amendments. See Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court, id. at 212-15.
252. See note 251 supra.
253. See Kamhisar, supra note 219, at 1101-08.
254. Wof, 338 U.S. at 28.
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such enforceable against the States," 255 why would the Court have
reached the hard-fought issue of whether "the basic right... demands the exclusion of logically relevant evidence" 256 when it is
violated?) 257 Thus, the crucial issue in Wolf was whether, as a
matter of federal constitutional law, the Court should require the
state courts to exclude evidence obtained in violation of federal
constitutional law. That issue could have been framed in various
ways. It might, for example, have been put as follows:
The question presented is whether "a decent regard for
the duties of courts as agencies of justice and custodians of
liberty" forbids that defendants should be convicted on the basis of evidence obtained in violation of rights deemed fundamental by the Constitution. 258 OrThe question for consideration is whether a state conviction resting on evidence secured in violation of a right so important as to be deemed "basic to a free society" and "implicit
in 'the concept of ordered liberty'" may be allowed to stand
without making the courts themselves "accomplices" in diso255. Id. at 27.
256. Id. at 28.
257. No facts about the search are given, let alone discussed, in Wolf. None of
the five opinions indicates who Wolf was (a practicing physician) or the crime of
which he was convicted (conspiracy to commit abortion) or what evidence was
seized (appointment books from his office). As Justice Jackson later pointed out in
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), "[t]he opinions in Wolf were written entirely in the abstract. . .." Id. at 13.
This is one of the factors that led me to conclude that Wolf (which, so far as I
can tell, involved not an "offensive" or "aggravated" illegal search, but a "routine"
one) did stand for the proposition that every search that would have violated the
fourth amendment if made by federal officers offended the fourteenth amendment
when made by state officers. Otherwise, whether a state search violated due process would turn on the particular facts of the search. Otherwise, the first order of
business in Wolf would have been to decide whether the illegal search by the Colorado police constituted the kind of illegal search that violates due process. See
Kamisar, supra note 219, at 1101-02.
258. Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943):
We are not concerned with law enforcement practices except in so far as
courts themselves become instruments of law enforcement. We hold only
that a decent regard for the duty of courts as agencies of justice and custodians of liberty forbids that men should be convicted upon evidence secured under the circumstances revealed here. In so doing, we respect the
policy which underlies Congressional legislation.
Id. at 347 (Frankfurter, J., for the Court).
It will not do to dismiss McNabb as merely an instance of the Court's exercise
of its supervisory power over federal criminal justice. If a court which allows the
use of evidence obtained in violation of a federal statute becomes an "instrument"
of such illegal law enforcement, how can it be less so when a court allows the use of
evidence obtained in violation of due process? If a court's duty as an "agency of
justice" or a "custodian of liberty" forbids that persons should be convicted upon
evidence secured in violation of a law, how can it be less so when the evidence has
been secured in violation of the Constitution?
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bedience of the constitutional command. 259 OrThe State of Colorado has exceeded the bounds of due
process in the administration of its criminal laws. The question we must answer is whether the government whose agents
have violated the Constitution may avail itself of the knowledge gained by the forbidden act or whether it should stand in
no better position than the government whose agents have
obeyed the Constitution. 260 OrIn three other cases decided today, 26 1 we have reversed
state convictions based on "involuntary" confessions without
disputing the assertion that "[clhecked with external evidence, [the confessions in each case] are inherently believable, [and] not shaken as to truth by anything that occurred at
the trial."2 62 In these cases we have "appl[ied] the Due Process Clause to its historic function of assuring appropriate procedure before liberty or life is taken" 263 without regard to how
259. Cf.McNabb, 318 U.S. at 345:
Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant
disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law. Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of
evidence so procured. But to permit such evidence to be made the basis of
a conviction in the federal courts would stultify the policy which Congress
has enacted into law.
Id.
If a federal court cannot allow a conviction resting on a federal statutory violation to stand without making itself an "accomplice" in the police misconduct, then
even less should state or federal courts be accomplices in the disobedience of a
Constitution they are sworn to uphold. Cf.Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223
(1960). If permitting the use of evidence obtained in disregard of a statute would
"stultify the policy" underlying the statute, then how can it be maintained that permitting the use of evidence obtained by violating the fourth and fourteenth amendments does not "stultify the policy" embodied in the Constitution?
See also the observation in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942), that
as a result of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule "this Court has refused to
make itself a participant in lawless conduct by sanctioning the use in open court of
evidence illegally secured." Id. at 128 (Murphy, J., joined by Stone, C.J., and Frankfurter, J., dissenting.
260. Cf. Weeks, discussed in text accompanying notes 174-75 supra;
Silverthorne, quoted in text accompanying notes 229-30 supra; Zap, quoted in text
accompanying note 227 supra.
261. Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.); Turner v.
Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
(1949) (Frankfurter, J.).
262. Jackson, J., concurring in the result in Watts and dissenting in the companion cases, 338 U.S. at 58. See also id. at 60: "In these cases before us, the verification
is sufficient to leave me in no doubt that the admissions of guilt were genuine and
truthful." Id.
263. Id. at 55. The confessions in Watts and in many other state cases reviewed
by the Supreme Court over the next twenty-five years were held to be inadmissible
not because state police violated the privilege against compelled self-incrimination,
but because their interrogation practices offended what might be called "straight
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"relevant and credible" the evidence produced by impermissible methods might be. 264 The question presented is whether
we should regard the coerced confession cases as "sports in
our constitutional law" or "only instances of the general requirement that States in their prosecutions respect certain decencies of civilized conduct. ' 265 OrAs a long line of confession cases demonstrates, the demands of federalism have not been deemed sufficient to deny
this Court the power to review the interrogation methods of
state police officers. 2 6 6 And when, in such cases, "the practices
due process" or the basic requirement of "fundamental fairness." The privilege was
not deemed applicable to the states until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Moreover, even if the privilege had applied to the states much earlier, the law pertaining
to "coerced" or "involuntary" confessions probably would have developed without
it. For until Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the prevailing view was that
the privilege did not extend to the police station. See Y. KAmisAR,A Dissent From
the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old
"Voluntariness" Test, in POuCE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW
AND POLICY 41, 46, 59-64 (1980), Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 657, 668-69, 674 (1966).
264. Cf.Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952):
It has long since ceased to be true that due process of law is heedless of the
means by which otherwise relevant and credible evidence is obtained. This
was not true even before the series of recent cases enforced the constitutional principle that the States may not base convictions upon confessions,
however much verified, obtained by coercion.
Id. at 172-73 (Frankfurter, J.).
265. Cf.Id. at 173: "[The confession decisions] are not sports in our constitutional law but applications of a general principle. They are only instances of the
general requirement that States in their prosecutions respect certain decencies of
civilized conduct." Id. Continued Frankfurter.
To attempt in this case to distinguish what lawyers call 'real evidence' from
verbal evidence is to ignore the reasons for excluding coerced confessions.
Use of involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained
in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions
-offend the community's sense of fair play and decency.
Id.
Do not searches which violate "ItI
he security of one's privacy against arbitrary
intrusion by the police," Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27, also violate "fair play and decency"?
How can police conduct which violates a right "implicit 'in the concept of ordered
liberty'" do anything less?
266. See Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism,and Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950):
In both [the coerced confession and unreasonable search and seizure] situations the perils [to an 'accusatorial system of justice'] arise primarily out
of the procedures employed to acquire the evidence rather than from dangers of the incompetency of the evidence so acquired. Furthermore, if the
demands of federalism are not such as deny to the Court power to supervise the interrogatory practices of state police officers in the interest of procedures most likely to preserve the integrity of basic individual
immunities, such supervision of police practices in the interest of preserving basic rights of privacy seems likewise justifiable.
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of the prosecution, including the police as one of its agencies,"
have fallen "below the Plimsoll line of 'due process,' "267 we
have not hesitated to set aside a state court's judgment of conviction. The question confronting us is whether the demands
of federalism require this Court to stay its hand in a case
before us when state police practices have dipped below "the
Plimsoll line" not because of impermissible interrogation
methods but as the result of a search or seizure that violates a
right we have ranked as fundamental. Can this Court play a
passive role with respect to unreasonable searches or seizures
without relegating "the very essence of constitutional liberty" 268-a
protection "second to none in the Bill of
Rights" 269-to a deferred position? 270 OrThe State of Colorado has urged us, in effect, to treat separately-for purposes of fourteenth amendment due processthe problem of coerced confessions and the problem of unreaId. at 29.
267. Cf.Frankfurter, J., concurring in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957):
I cannot escape the conclusion [that] in combination [the circumstances
surrounding the obtaining of this confession] bring the result below the
Plimsoll line of 'due process.' A state court's judgment of conviction must
not be set aside by this Court where the practices of the prosecution, including the police as one of its agencies, do not offend what may fairly be
deemed the civilized standards of the Anglo-American world. This record
reveals a course of conduct that ... clearly falls below those standards.
Id. at 199.
268. See the oft-quoted statement in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)
that the protection against unreasonable search and seizure and the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination "are to be regarded as of the very essence of
constitutional liberty." Id. at 304.
269. Justice Frankfurter made plain that he would assign the fourth amendment
a place "second to none" when, two years before Wolf, he pointed out that "[a]
decision may turn on whether one gives that Amendment a place second to none in
the Bill of Rights, or considers it on the whole a kind of nuisance, a serious impediment to the war against crime." Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., joined by Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting). In his Harris dissent, Justice Frankfurter also called the protection afforded by the fourth amendment "an indispensable need for a democratic society," id. at 161, and "[the]
provision of the Bill of Rights which is central to enjoyment of the other guarantees
of the Bill of Rights," id. at 163.
270. Cf.Jackson, J., dissenting in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)
(a case decided the same day as Wolf): "We cannot give some constitutional rights
a preferred position without relegating others to a deferred position; we can establish no firsts without thereby establishing seconds. Indications are not wanting that
Fourth Amendment freedoms are tacitly marked as secondary rights to be relegated to a deferred position." Id. at 180.
Justice Jackson was not troubled by the inconsistency between the Wolf rule
and the Weeks rule (both of which he supported), "for local excesses or invasions of
liberty are more amenable to political correction, the Amendment was directed
only against the new and centralized government [didn't Wolf, in effect, hold to the
contrary?], and any really dangerous threat to the general liberties of the people
can only come from this source." Id. at 181.
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sonable searches or seizures. But the question is whether we
may do so without establishing an indefensible double standard in defining the requirements of due process as they relate
271
to state criminal proceedings.
It might be objected that these formulations of the question
are so appealing, from the defendant's vantage point, that they
leave little doubt of the answer. But none of these formulations
are the product of an inventive imagination. Indeed most are
based closely on how the author of the Wolf opinion, Justice
Frankfurther (usually writing for the Court, sometimes filing a
separate opinion), has on other occasions viewed the question of
admitting unconstitutionally or illegally obtained evidence. And if
the foregoing questions effectively impel the reader to want to answer them as the writer wished him to, that is no less true of the
questions actually asked in Wolf.
In the Wolf case, the Court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter-who "often adjured as to attend well to the question: 'On
the question you ask depends the answer you get' " 272-posed very
different questions than those I have suggested might (and
should) have been asked. The questions Frankfurter asked in effect were:
Can we "regard it as a departure from basic standards to
remand such persons [those convicted on the basis of unconstitutional searches or seizures], together with those who
emerge scatheless from a search, to the remedies of private
actions and such protection as the internal discipline of the po273
lice, under the eyes of an alert opinion, may afford"?
Is it for this Court "to condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon other methods [than the exclusion of evidence]
274
which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective"?
271. Cf.Allen, supra note 266, at 29: "[T]he consequence of the decision of the
Court in the Wolf case is rigidly to separate the two problems [searches and confessions] and to create a dubious double standard in the definition of the requirements
of due process as they relate to state criminal proceedings."
272. H. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in BENCHMARKS 318, 319 (1967). See
also Frankfurter, J., joined by Jackson, J., dissenting in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950): "It is true also of journeys in the law that the place you
reach depends on the direction you are taking. And so, where one comes out on a
case depends on where one goes in." Id. at 69.
273. Cf. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31: "We cannot... regard it as a departure from basic
standards to remand such persons, together with those who emerge scatheless
from a search, to the remedies of private action and such protection as the internal
discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion, may afford." Id.
274. Id.:
Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way
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Can we "brush aside the experience of States which deem
the incidence of [unreasonable search and seizure] too slight
to call for a deterrent remedy not by way of disciplinary meas275
ures but by overriding the relevant rules of evidence"?
Why assume that the states that permitted the use of illegally
seized evidence did so because the incidence of illegality was too
slight? According to the best available evidence, the incidence
was widespread 276 and surely at least as plausible an assumption
as the one made in Wolf is that the States which admitted illegally
obtained evidence did so because the incidence of illegality was too
great.
Why did the Wolf Court place so much reliance on "other
methods" of enforcing the protection against unreasonable search
and seizure? Neither in the three confession cases decided the
same day as Wolf 2 77 nor in any other confession case did the Court
consider it constitutionally relevant that the states whose police
had obtained (and whose courts had allowed into evidence) "involuntary" but independently corroborated and hence trustworthy
confessions had not left the guaranty against unconstitutional interrogation practices without other means of protection.
Various state statutes, for example, made it a crime to deny a
lawyer the opportunity to meet with an arrestee or to prevent an
arrestee from consulting with counsel or to fail to notify a suspect's
relatives that he had been arrested.27 8 Other state laws penalized
police who attempted to obtain confessions by violence, threats of
violence or other impermissible means. 279 And, of course, false imprisonment and assault are torts.
The exclusion of evidence, to be sure, "is a remedy which directly serves only to protect those upon whose person or premises
something incriminating has been found. '280 But it is no less true
of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as
falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a
State's reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would
be equally effective.
275. Id. at 31-32: "We cannot brush aside the experience of States which deem
the incidence of such conduct by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy
not by way of disciplinary measures but by overriding the relevant rules of
evidence."
276. See Foote, Law and Police Practice: Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52
Nw. U.L. REV. 16 (1957); Hall, The Law ofArrest in Relation to Contemporary Social

Problems, 3 U. CH. L. REV. 345 (1936); Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 493 (1952); Note,
100 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1952); Note, 58 YALE L.J. 144 (1948).
277. See notes 261, 262 and accompanying text supra.
278. For a sampling of these state statutes see Justice Frankfurter's plurality
opinion in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 586-87 n.29 (1961).
279. See id. at 586 n.28.
280. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31 (emphasis added).
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that the prohibition against the use of "involuntary" confessions
directly serves only to protect the victim of police lawlessness who
actually confesses. That most victims of impermissible interrogation practices never do confess (or never make a confession that
leads to a prosecution) is underscored by the most careful study
281
ever made of "arrests for investigation."
Suppose five suspects are "brought in for questioning." Suppose further that after each is held incommunicado overnight and
subjected to a long stretch of intensive questioning, two of the suspects confess, but only one confession "checks out." Why not admit the verifiable confession and remand the defendant-together
with those who were mistreated but never confessed and the one
who confessed but was released when his confession did not
"check out"-"to the remedies of private action, and such protection as the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an
alert public opinion, may afford"?
That illegal searches or seizures are typically less offensive
and less dangerous than impermissible interrogation practices, at
least the practices of the 1940s and 1950s, might have been a valid
reason for concluding that the protection against unreasonable
search and seizure is not so "basic to a free society" as to be enforceable against the states, but it is a strange reason for relying on
tort actions, criminal prosecutions and internal police discipline
for enforcement of this right even though it is deemed "implicit in
the 'concept of ordered liberty.'" It is precisely because (unlike
more brutal or more brazen police misconduct) unreasonable
searches or seizures rarely attract media attention or arouse the
community--"[n]o other constitutional guarantee is so openly
flouted with so little public outcry" 282 -that courts should not rely
on "other methods" of enforcement when the search and seizure
guarantee is flouted.
281. Surely there are worse police departments than those who protect the nation's capital. But twenty years ago, a special District of Columbia committee of
three distinguished lawyers, after a sixteen-month study of the problem, reported
that about seventeen out of every eighteen persons "arrested for investigation"
were ultimately released without charge. See DisTricT OF COLUMBIA COMMISSIONERS' COMMITTEE ON POLIcE ARRESTS FOR INVESTIGATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-

TIONS 34 (1962). (The Report is often called The Horsky Report, after the Chairman
of the Committee, Charles A. Horsky). Almost always the "investigation" proceeded without benefit of counsel to the arrestee and without knowledge on the
part of anyone that the suspect had been taken into custody. Id. at 40. Generally,
the longer a person was held, the less likely he was to be charged. Thus, of the 1,356
persons held for eight hours or more in 1960, only sixteen, or one-and-one fifth percent were charged; of the 690 held for more than twelve hours that year, only
seven-a shade under one percent-were charged. See id. at 39.

282.

Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 493 (1952).
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Why, three years after Wolf was handed down, did the Court
bar the obviously trustworthy evidence produced by the "stomach
pumping" in Rochin ?283 Had the state court that sustained the admissibility of the morphine capsules (obtained by forcing an
emetic solution into Rochin's stomach) left the constitutional guarantee against such police misconduct without other means of protection? Certainly not. It had specifically noted that those
involved in the "stomach pumping" incident "were guilty of unlawfully breaking into and entering defendant's room [and] of unlawfully assaulting, battering, torturing and falsely imprisoning the
defendant at the alleged hospital." 284 Moreover, the state court had
left little doubt that discipline of the lawless deputy sheriff and
28 5
physician by their respective professions seemed appropriate.
Why, then, did the Rochin Court, per Justice Frankfurter, reverse
the conviction without any discussion of alternative methods of enforcement? Why, then, did violation of the constitutional right in
Rochin, but not in Wolf, "demand the exclusion of logically relevant evidence"? 286 Why would admitting the evidence in Rochin
(but not in Wolf) "sanction" the police misconduct that produced
287
it and afford that misconduct "the cloak of law"?
283. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
284. People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 140, 143, 225 P.2d 1, 3 (1950).
285. Id.
286. Cf. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28: "[Tlhe immediate question is whether the basic
right to protection against arbitrary intrusion by the police demands the exclusion
of logically relevant evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure because, in a federal prosecution for a federal crime, it would be excluded."
The inconsistency between Wolf and Rochin is discussed in Allen, Due Process
and State CriminalProcedures:Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L REV. 16, 26-27 (1953) and,
less kindly, in Kamisar, supra note 219, at 1121-24. More recently, Professor Richard
Danzig has pointed out that in first amendment cases, as well as in the criminal
procedure area, Justice Frankfurter "produced contradictory opinions . . . by a
technique that might be called 'differential focussing' "---directing attention to different questions in each case. Danzig, How Questions Begot Answers in Felix
Frankfurter'sFirst Flag Salute Opinion, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 257, 258. According to
Danzig, "[t]he tendency to ask a question about remedies in some cases and about
rights in others is so frequently exhibited in Justice Frankfurter's opinions that differential focusing might fairly be said to be a process central to the functioning of
his jurisprudence." Id. at 259.
287. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173: "[Coerced confessions I are inadmissible under
the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions offend the community's sense
of fair play and decency. So here, to sanction the brutal conduct ... would be to
afford brutality the cloak of law."
Dissenting, in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 142, 148 (1954), Justice Frankfurter did explicitly discuss "other methods" of enforcing a basic right, but quickly
dismissed them. In Irvine the police made several illegal entries into the petitioner's home to install a secret microphone, in order to listen to the conversations
of the occupants-for more than a month. In upholding a conviction based on the
fruits of this police misconduct, the Court, per Jackson, J., observed that "admission
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Of course, Rochin's conviction had, as the Court put it, "been
obtained by methods that offend the Due Process Clause. ' 288 But
so had Wolf's (or at least so the Wolf Court had assumed). Of
course, Rochin's conviction had been "brought about by methods
that offend 'a sense of justice,' "289 but was that any less true of
Wolf's? Don't all police methods that violate due process "offend a
sense of justice"?
The police conduct in Rochin may have been worse, but the
police conduct in Wolf had also violated a right "basic to our free
society," a right "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty.'" Isn't
that bad enough? Isn't that the worst that a court can say, or
should have to say, about police methods?
The unconstitutional police conduct in Wolf may strike many
as "mild" when compared to the outrageous facts in Rochin, but if I
may repeat what I asked some twenty years ago:
Can there really be such a thing as a 'bare' or 'mild' violation of due process? How do you mildly violate what is
'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' even 'for the
290
lowliest and the most outcast'?
"The function of an advocate," Justice Frankfurter once observed, "is to seduce, to seize the mind for a predetermined end,
not to explore paths to truths. ' 291 Frankfurter was an outstanding
scholar, but he could also be a skillful advocate. And none knew
better than he how powerful a form of advocacy the articulation of
the "questions presented" could be.2 9 2 By framing the issues and
shaping the analysis the way he did in Wolf Frankfurter, I think,
seduced many of us.
of the evidence does not exonerate the officers and their aides if they have violated
defendant's constitutional rights. It was pointed out in Wolf. . . that other remedies are available for official lawlessness ... " Id. at 137. Dissenting Justice Frankfurter retorted:
Nor can we dispose of this case by satisfying ourselves that the defendant's
guilt was proven by trustworthy evidence and then finding, or devising,
other means whereby the police may be discouraged from using illegal
methods to acquire such evidence ...
If, as in Rochin, '[the conviction] has been obtained by methods that
offend the Due Process Clause. . .,' it is no answer to say that the offending policeman and prosecutors who utilize outrageous methods should be
punished for their misconduct.
Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
288. 342 U.S. at 174.
289. Id. at 173.
290. Kamisar, supra note 219, at 1123-24. See also Allen, Federalism and the
Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 9; Traynor, Mapp v.
Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 326.
291. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Jackson, in FELIX FRANKFURTER AND THE SUPREME
COURT 509, 511 (P. Kurland ed. 1970).
292. See generally Danzig, supra note 286.
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By "driving a wedge between [the protection against unreasonable search and seizure] and the exclusionary rule,"293 "inject[ing] the instrumental rationale of deterrence of police
misconduct into [the Court's] discussion of the exclusionary
rule," 294 and "using the empirically-based, consequentialist rationale of deterrence as support for [the Court's] refusal to apply the
exclusionary rule to the states," 295 the Wolf opinion not only made
the result reached in that case seem more palatable, but it planted
the seeds of destruction for the exclusionary rule-in federal as
296
well as state cases.
293. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 380.
294. Id. at 379.
295. Id.
296. Although the Wolf Court said, 338 U.S. at 28, "that it 'stoutly adhere [d] to'
the exclusionary rule in Weeks, it never adequately explained why, if the rule was
unnecessary for the enforcement of fourth amendment rights in state courts, it was
indispensable in federal courts." Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 380. In
a federal search and seizure case decided the same day as Wolf, Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), dissenting Justice Jackson, joined by Frankfurter and
Murphy, JJ., did attempt to reconcile Wolf with Weeks: "[Llocal excesses or invasions of liberty are more amenable to political correction, the [Fourth] Amendment
was directed only against the new and centralized government, and any really dangerous threat to the general liberties of the people can come only from this source."
Id. at 181. But Wolf had held that the protection against unreasonable search and
seizure, although not the exclusionary rule, was directed against the states as well
as the "centralized government," and the view that "local" violations of the search
and seizure guarantee "are more amenable to political correction" had little, if any,
empirical support. See Kamisar, supra note 219, at 1094-1100.
Morever, although the Wolf Court told us that it "stoutly adhere [d]" to the federal exclusionary rule, it could not resist taking a sideswipe at the rule:
[T]hough we have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to forbid the admission of [evidence obtained by unreasonable searches or seizures], a different question would be presented if Congress under its legislative powers
were to pass a statute purporting to negate the Weeks doctrine. We would
then be faced with the problem of the respect to be accorded the legislative
judgment on an issue as to which, in default of that judgment, we have
been forced to depend upon our own.
338 U.S. at 33.
Concurring in Wolf, Justice Black agreed "with what appears to be a plain implication of the Court's opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is not a command
of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate." 338 U.S. at 39-40. The implication of the Court's opinion, however, is anything but plain. Less than a year later, dissenting in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), Justice Black seemed to recognize that pre-Wof federal search and seizure cases had been "decided on the unarticulated premise that
the Fourth Amendment of itself barred the use of evidence obtained by what the
Court considered an 'unreasonable' search," id. at 66, but maintained that, in light
of Wolf, the exclusionary rule should no longer be regarded "a constitutional command, but rather an evidentiary policy adopted by this Court in the exercise of its
supervisory powers over federal courts. Cf.McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
[1943]." Id. at 67.
As Justice Black indicated, "[w ] hat is now called the supervisory power is generally regarded as having had its origin [in the McNabb case], where it was envisioned as comprehending oversight of the administration of criminal justice in the
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At the time of Wolf many commentators had already called attention to the woeful inadequacy of tort remedies, criminal prosecutions and internal police discipline as checks on police
misconduct.297 But this may only have contributed to the seducfederal courts." Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L.
REV. 181, 193 (1969). But in barring confessions obtained from an illegally detained
person in the exercise of its supervisory powers over the federal courts-and "quite
apart from the Constitution"-the McNabb Court, per Frankfurter, J., contrasted
what it was doing with what it had done in the fourth amendment area. "[A] conviction in the federal courts, the foundation of which is evidence obtained in disregard of liberties deemed fundamental by the Constitution," observed the Court,
"cannot stand" (318 U.S. at 339)-citing Weeks and six other search and seizure
cases-but, added the Court, "the scope of our reviewing power over convictions
brought here from the federal courts is not confined to ascertainment of Constitutional validity." Id. at 340. It then went on to exclude the confessions [q Iuite apart
from the Constitution." Id. at 341.
The McNabb rule came within one vote of being toppled in Upshaw v. United
States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948). The four Upshaw dissenters (Reed, J., joined by Vinson,
C.J., and Jackson and Burton, JJ.,) again contrasted the McNabb rule with the
Weeks rule (and the "coerced" confession doctrine):
[Exclusion of confessions obtained in violation of the commitment statute]
is now made analogous to the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of
the Bill of Rights through unreasonable search and seizure or through compulsion or by denial of due process.
When [evidence I is the direct result of an unconstitutional act such as a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, this Court has said, in federal cases,
that to permit its use would impair the protection of this major guaranty of
a free country. When, as in the McNabb case, there are confessions after
failure to observe statutory directions not shown to have coerced the confessions the rule as to evidence extracted in defiance of the Constitution
does not apply.
Id. at 424-26.
There is not the slightest suggestion in McNabb or Upshaw (decided only a
year before Wolf), or in Weeks or Silverthorne or their pre-1949 progeny, that the
search and seizure exclusionary rule is merely "an evidentiary policy adopted by
this Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers" (Black, J., dissenting in Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 677). Nor is there any suggestion in any of these cases that the
Court was "forced" to resort to the exclusionary rule in "default" of Congressional
action (Wolf, supra). Nevertheless, four members of the Court seem to have taken
this position in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 240-41 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
joined by Clark, Harlan and Whittaker, JJ.), and this may now be the prevailing
view. See especially United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), discussed in text at
notes 425-34 infra and 507-13 infra, where a.5-3 majority, per Blackmun, J., observed:
"There comes a point at which courts, consistent with their duty to administer the
law, cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches."
Janis, 428 U.S. at 459. Cf. Monaghan, Foreword: ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1975). See also Hill, supra this note, at 182-85.
If the view that the Weeks rule is merely an exercise of the Court's supervisory
power over federal courts, or otherwise a rule "which Congress might negate," now
commands five votes, it proves once again "how a hint becomes a suggestion, is
loosely turned into dictum and finally elevated to a decision." Cf. Frankfurter, J.,
joined by Jackson, J., dissenting in Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950).
297. See, e.g., A. CORNELIuS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 42-46 (2d ed. 1930); L. ORFELD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 28-31 (1947); Hall, The Law of Arrest
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tiveness of the Wolf opinion. Although Wolf s reliance on "other
methods" of enforcement was not as far-reaching as Cardozo'shis list of "other remedies" in the famous Defore case had included
resisting the officer! 298-the Wolf opinion, too, "smelled of the
lamp." Thus the temptation to attack, and to defeat, Justice Frankfurter on his own battleground must have been strong. Justice
Murphy, who wrote the principal dissent in Wolf, yielded to that
temptation. 299 So did many commentators-and I was one of
3 00
them.
I continue to believe that despite its weaknesses, the excluin Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. CI. I REV. 345, 346 (1936);
Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 Cornell L.Q. 337, 386-88 (1939). Comment,
Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 146-50 (1948).
Although Chief Justice Vinson joined the opinion of the Court in Wolf, nine
years earlier, when a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, he had disparaged other methods of enforcing the fourth amendment than
the exclusionary rule. See Nuelslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 695 (D.C.
Cir. 1940).
298. "The officer might have been resisted, or sued for damages, or even prosecuted for oppression. . .. He was subject to removal or other discipline at the hands
of his superiors." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 19, 150 N.E. 585, 586-87 (1926) (declining to adopt the exclusionary rule as a matter of state law). The Wolf Court, or at
least the author of the Wolf opinion, seems to have been heavily influenced by
Judge Cardozo's opinion in Defore.
299. Justice Murphy, joined by Rutledge, J., discussed the efficacy (or inefficacy) of "other remedies" at considerable length and reached the "inescapable"
conclusion "that but one remedy exists to deter violations of the search and seizure
clause"-the exclusionary rule. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 44.
Justice Douglas's separate dissenting opinion was very brief and somewhat
cryptic: "I agree with Mr. Justice Murphy that the evidence obtained in violation of
[the Fourth Amendment] must be excluded in state prosecutions as well as in federal prosecutions, since in absence of that rule of evidence the Amendment would
have no effective sanction." Id. at 40. In a third dissenting opinion, Justice Rutledge, joined by Murphy, J., did not rest solely on the ground that exclusion was the
only effective deterrent. "The view that the Fourth Amendment itself forbids the
introduction of evidence illegally obtained in federal prosecutions," he pointed out,
"is one of long standing and firmly established." Id. at 48 (emphasis added). Since
state legislators and judges are also subject to the fourth amendment, maintained
Rutledge, they, too, "may not lend their offices to the admission in state courts of
evidence [seized in violation of the amendment]." Id.
300. As my friend Wayne LaFave recently recalled, and is determined not to let
me forget, I once commented:
Whatever may be said for the courts 'preserving the judicial process from
contamination' or against the government playing 'an ignoble part' or about
it being the 'omnipresent teacher,' I, for one, would hate to have to justify
throwing out homicide and narcotic and labor racket cases if I did not believe that such action significantly affected police attitudes and practices.
LaFave, supra note 148, at 317-18 n.65, quoting Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual
Liberties: Some "Facts"and "Theories," 53 J. CRI.

L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.

171, 179 (1962). I made this statement in the context of a section of an article
designed to meet the contention that the Court's then recent confession and search
and seizure rulings were merely "an exercise in futility" because, as one critic of
the courts had put it, so far as the average policeman is concerned, "[t] he clearance
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sionary rule is a more effective means of enforcing the guarantee
of a case by arrest. . . is all that really matters." Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in
the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. 461-62 (1948).
I sought to refute this contention by pointing to statements by the then Attorney General of California and the then United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia that as a result of recent judicial rulings police officers in their jurisdictions were engaging in "more intensive pre-arrest work" and "making better cases
from the evidentiary standpoint." See Kamisar, supra this note, at 179-80. I also
reported how the District of Columbia police had undergone "training and retraining in the field of search and seizure," id. at 181, and how, according to the U.S.
Attorney for the District of Columbia, "our policemen are thinking in terms of these
[recent] decisions and our lectures [lectures developed for the police by the U.S.
Attorney's Office on the basis of questions about search and seizure solicited from
the police], and to that extent their work has materially improved." Id. Although I
had never heard of the term at the time, I now realize that I was describing how
judicial rulings affect individual police officers by means of "systemic deterrence."
See note 204 supra and text accompanying notes 526-36 infra.
Because I am convinced that court decisions do affect police behavior through a
department's institutional compliance with judicially articulated standards, asking
whether I would justify the exclusion of probative, but unconstitutionally obtained,
evidence even if I did not believe that exclusion had any significant effect on the
police "would be similar to asking whether 'if it snowed all summer would it then be
winter?'" Cf Matter of Storar, 52 N.Y. 363, 380, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73 (1981). But if I
had to answer, for reasons I have already adverted to at notes 156-75, 216-18, 258-70
supra, I would answer in the affirmative. I would say that what Professor J. Patrick
Green has called "the preservation of legality" is a sufficient justification for the
exclusion of unconstitutionally (or unlawfully) obtained evidence. See Green,
Stone v. Powell: The Hermeneutics of the Burger Court, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 655
(1977):
A legal rule honored only in the breach loses its character as a law.
When a court rejects unlawfully seized evidence, it preserves the fourth
amendment. It reannounces that the fourth amendment is part of the Constitution, and that the values contained in the fourth amendment are worth
preserving. It speaks on behalf of the legal system to authoritatively disavow the unlawful act.
Id. at 659 n.20.
See also Canon, Ideology and Reality in the Debate over the Exclusionary Rule:
A Conservative Argument for its Retention, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 559, 580 (1982) ("exclusionary rule should be preserved for its symbolic value, not because of any impact
it might be having on society"; the rule "serves as a symbolic reassurance that the
police do not behave lawlessly and that the courts do not condone such lawless
behavior as occasionally occurs"). Cf Linde, Judges, Critics,and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 238-42 (1972) (criminal process whereby police violate a defendant's constitutionally guaranteed rights is "not the 'due process' of the
Constitution"); Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRnM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 141,150, 158-59 (1978) (at
least where substantial violations of protection against unreasonable search and
seizure occur, due process requires exclusionary rule).
For some time now, the more relevant question may be not the symbolic value
of the rule, but the symbolic effect of its abolition. "How," asked Professor Lawrence Tiffany a decade ago, "would the police react if the Supreme Court overruled
Mapp v. Ohio?" Tiffany, JudicialAttempts to Control the Police, CURRENT HISTORY,

July, 1971, at 13, 52. See also 1 LAFAVE,

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 29 (1978); Canon, supra this note, at 580. Recently Professor

Milton Loewenthal, who teaches police officer students at John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York, offered an answer. On the basis of
many interviews with police commanders on all levels, as well as with his police
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against unreasonable search and seizure than tort actions, internal
self-discipline or any other presently existing method. And I think
30 1
it all too plain that many law enforcement officials think so too.

But I now believe it was a mistake for proponents of the exclusionary rule to assume, or to imply, that the reach of the rule-indeed
its very life--depends on an empirical evaluation of the rule's efficacy in "deterring" police misconduct.
(To the extent that I have done so in the past, I can only say
that when I started thinking about and writing about the exclusionary rule in the 1950s I took as my starting point the Wolf case,
especially the Frankfurter-Murphy exchange in that case. I should
have spent less time mulling over Wolf and more time reading and
rereading Weeks and its progeny.)
The "deterrence" rationale, as I shall discuss in the next section, has spawned cost-benefit analyses of the rule in various setofficer students, and after being a participant-observer on forty tours of duty concerning various phases of police work, Professor Loewenthal concluded that regardless of what "substitute remedies" may be provided, the police "are bound to view
the elimination of the exclusionary rule as an indication that the fourth amendment
is not a serious matter, if indeed it applies to them at all." Loewenthal, Evaluating
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REv. 24, 30 (1980).
"[T] he American constitutional tradition is such," noted Loewenthal, "that our police have great difficulty believing that standards can have any real meaning if the
government can profit from violating them." Id. at 39. Moreover, "[s] ince the rule
has been functionally identified with the fourth amendment," police doubts about
the importance and applicability of search and seizure standards "are likely to be
stronger now [if the rule is abolished] than they would be if [the rule] had never
been imposed." Id. at 30.
301. See Kamisar, supra note 219, at 1101-08; Kamisar, supra note 300, at 179-82;
Kamisar, On the Tacticsof Police-ProsecutionOriented Criticsof the Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436, 440-46 (1964); Kamisar, How We Got the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule and Why We Need It, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHics 3, 10-11 (Summer/Fall
1982); Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical"or "Unnatural"Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDIcATURE 66, 69-73 (1978).

It is worth recalling that in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), in urging
the Court not to apply Mapp retroactively to previously closed cases, the amicus
curiae Brief for the National District Attorneys' Association came close to saying
that the police had 'relied" on the inadequate alternatives to the exclusionary rule.
Pointed out the brief:
[IIf, on the issue of 'fairness' prosecutions of pre-Mapp prisoners are to be
treated as though they had occurred today under the Mapp rule, it appears
likely that in the great bulk of such cases the evidence would be admissible, and the convictions secure. While the police-as distinguished from
the trial court and prosecutor-may have been on notice before Mapp that
their conduct was unlawful, [lawfulness] was not a necessary condition of
securing and admitting the evidence. In the instant case, for example, a
warrant to search the premises easily could have been obtained.
Id. at 18.
I am indebted to Professor James Haddad for calling this part of the amicus
brief to my attention. See Haddad, "Retroactivity Should be Rethought'" A Callfor
the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CnIM. L, CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 417, 435

n.173 (1969).
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tings. But "[tJhe costs of the exclusionary rule are immediately
apparent; its benefits are only conjectural." 30 2 Moreover, "it is
never easy to prove a negative" 30 3 and "[p]olice compliance with
the exclusionary rule produces a non-event which is not directly
' 30 4
observable-it consists of not conducting an illegal search.
Moreover, and more fundamentally, how does one go about deciding whether the exclusionary rule can "pay its way" in a particular setting without giving free play to one's own views of policy?
How does one "price" the beliefs, values and ideals in the fourth
amendment as if they were consumer benefits? 30 5 Is not the point
of the fourth amendment that "efficiency" in suppressing crime is
several and "not a meta-value that compreonly one value among
30 6
hends all others"?
DID MAPP REST THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON AN
EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION OR DID IT REAFFIRM
THE "ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING" OF
THE RULE AS SET FORTH IN
WEEKS AND ITS PROGENY?
When, twelve years later, Mapp 30 7 overruled Wolf, it seemed
to repair the damage caused by the earlier case. But four of the
strongest defenders of the exclusionary rule disagree. I shall discuss the views of Professors Schrock and Welsh first. They
comment:
[Justice Clark, author of the plurality opinion in
Mapp 1308 says that the exclusionary rule is "a clear, spe302. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 394.
303. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
304. A. Morris, The ExclusionaryRule, Deterrenceand Posner'sEconomic Analysis of Law, 57 WASH. L. REV. 647, 653 (1982). Continues Professor Morris: "Although empirical research is theoretically neutral, the simple truth is that some
kinds of phenomena can be measured more easily than others, which in turn means
that direct observation, or its impossibility, aids only one side. And that is the case
with the exclusionary rule." Id. See also Canon, Ideology and Reality in the Debate
over the Exclusionary Rule: A Conservative Argumentfor this Retention, 23 S. TEX.
L.J. 559, 563-64 (1982) (quoted in note 522 infra); LaFave, supra note 148, at 318-19.
305. Cf.Costle, The Decision Maker's Dilemma, in TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, July,.
1981, at 10. See also G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 18-20 (1970).
306. Cf.Sagoff, Economic Theory and EnvironmentalLaw, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393,
1417 (1981). Compare also Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems:
A Critique, 33 STANFORD L. REV. 387 (1981).
307. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
308. Although Justice Clark's opinion was denominated the "opinion of the
Court" it was really only an opinion for four Justices. Justice Black remained unpersuaded that an exclusionary rule could be inferred from the fourth amendment.
He concurred on the ground that "when the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amend-
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cific, and constitutionally required-even if judicially implied-deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which
the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to 'a
form of words.' "309 This passage is incorrigibly ambiguous, mixing in about equal portions vague constitutional
references, deterrence rationale, and empirical generalization. Justice Clark does not make clear whether the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required as such or is
required only because it is a deterrent. Nor does he make
clear whether, if it is constitutionally required as a deterrent, it is required because of its deterrent intention, or
because it actually works as a deterrent. If the exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated as, but only as, an
actual deterrent, Justice Clark does not vouchsafe the
constitutional theory that would make a requirement of
the fourth 3 10amendment depend on this kind of
contingency.
I can appreciate Schrock and Welsh's irritation. Justice Clark
did scramble the analysis and cause some confusion by calling the
exclusionary rule a "constitutionally required ...

deterrent safe-

guard." But Clark had not spent hundreds of hours, as had
Schrock and Welsh, thinking about the exclusionary rule and
pondering the different consequences that flowed from its various
rationales. He was not writing the definitive article, as did Schrock
and Welsh, on the constitutional bases for the rule. Rather Clark
was trying to secure maximum approval for the decision overruling Wolf. 311 Evidently he thought he could do so by advancing as

ment's ban against compelled self-incrimination, a -constitutional basis emerges
which not only justifies but actually requires the exclusionary rule." Id. at 662.
309. Id. at 648.
310. Schrock &Welsh, supra note 160, at 319.
311. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 648. When Justice Clark observed that without
the exclusionary rule "the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to 'a form
of words,"' he was quoting from Holmes's opinion in Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392. It
is plain that Holmes was not making an "empirical generalization " but construing
what he deemed "the essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way." See text accompanying notes 229-30.
Absent clear evidence to the contrary I think one is entitled to assume that a
Justice who quotes language from an earlier case is not distorting its meaning. Unfortunately, there is strong evidence that Justice Clark did distort the meaning of
Silverthorne when he discussed it four years later in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965). See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 368-69 infra. But I
see no reason why what I would call the misuse of Silverthorne in Linkletter should
be applied "retroactively" to Clark's discussion of Silverthorne in Mapp. A number
of things said in Linkletter are inconsistent with what was said in Mapp. See text
accompanying notes 360-72 infra.
I see no reason to conclude that when Clark quoted Silverthorne he was saying,
or meant to say, that because the exclusionary rule is the only effective (or the most
effective) deterrent against police misconduct, its absence would reduce the fourth
amendment to "a form of words." Indeed, immediately after quoting from
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many reasons for the exclusionary rule as he could find, whether
constitutional or pragmatic-perhaps because he concurred in the
view of Pliny the Younger that "since different minds may be persuaded by different arguments, the advocate ought to develop and
present them all, neglecting none. '312 Evidently Clark also
thought he could further his objective by refuting the various arguments the rule's antagonists had made over the years 313-one of
which, of course, was that the rule was not an effective deterrent or
not markedly superior to "other methods" in this regard.3 14 Thus,
Clark made numerous points in his opinion; unfortunately he did
not always cleanly separate them.
If the passage quoted by Schrock and Welsh is not free from
doubt, the message-in light of the totality of Clark's opinion-is
fairly clear: We reaffirm the "original understanding" of the exclusionary rule, as explained in Weeks and its progeny, that (anything
to the contrary in Wolf notwithstanding) it is a constitutionally required rule, although not explicitly provided for in the text of the
fourth amendment 3 15-and moreover (again, anything to the contrary in Wolf notwithstanding), it is the most effective (or the only
presently available effective) means of deterring police conduct.
To state the message somewhat differently, the exclusionary rule
is a command of the Constitution-whether or not it is a more effective deterrent than "other means of protection" (although Clark
maintained that, it was),316 whether or not it "fetters law enforcement" (although he doubted that it did),317 whether or not the federal rule was "too strict or too lax" (although he contended that it
no longer was "too lax"), 3 18 whether or not "it also makes very
Silverthorne, Clark continues: "[The exclusionary rule] meant, quite simply, that
'conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions. . . should find
no sanction in the judgments of the courts, . . .' Weeks, and that such evidence
'shall not be used at all.' Silverthorne." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648.
312. The younger Pliny's advice is so described in Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30
N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 158 n.17 (1955). Along these lines, Justice Clark's opinion in
Mapp, one might say, "ultimately fastened the exclusionary rule on the states in
reliance upon all the rationales thus far proposed." Yackle, The Burger Court and
the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN.L. REV. 335, 426 (1978).
313. Only a year earlier, the Court had noted in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960): "The exclusionary rule has for decades been the subject of ardent controversy. The arguments of its antagonists and of its proponents have been so
many times marshalled as to require no lengthy elaboration here." Id. at 216.
314. Indeed, this was a major premise of Wolf. See 338 U.S. at 28-29, 30-31.
315. "Original understanding" of the exclusionary rule is my phrase, not Justice
Clark's, but I think this is a fair characterization of what he said. See text accompanying notes 331-35, 372-73 infra.
316. 367 U.S. at 651-53.
317. Id. at 659-60.
318. Id. at 653.
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good sense" (he maintained at some length it did, by eliminating
needless conflict between state and federal courts and removing
"inducement to evasion" by "working arrangements" between
state and federal officials), 3 19 and whether or not a significant reappraisal of the rule's value and importance had occurred in the
3 20
states since Wolf (he claimed that it had).
The passage quoted by Schrock and Welsh appears in Part I of
Clark's opinion and the whole thrust of this part is that the exclusionary rule is not a "mere rule of evidence" or an exercise of the
Court's supervisory powers over federal criminal justice, but a
command of the Constitution.3 2 1 Moreover, as I shall discuss below, at other places in his opinion Clark states and reiterates that
322
the exclusionary rule is a command of the Constitution.
Professors Mertens and Wasserstrom are also unhappy with
Justice Clark's treatment of the exclusionary rule in Mapp. They
do not think Mapp healed the wound the rule received in Wolf.
They observe:
[Wihere the Court had once perceived a kind of natural,
immutable affinity between the fourth amendment and
the [exclusionary] rule, since Wolf the Court has seen the
relationship between them as the product of judicial artifice, and the rule itself as a judicial construct requiring explicit, pragmatic justification if it is to survive. Thus,
although the Court in Mapp invoked a concatenation of
normative principles to support the extension of the exclusionary rule to the states, the bulk of its opinion was devoted to a defense of the rule on the empirical basis that it
has proved to be the only effective means of enforcing the
323
fourth amendment.
If I could substitute "since Linkletter v. Walker" 324 for "since
Wolf' I would agree wholeheartedly with the first sentence in the
quoted passage. As for the second sentence, I must strongly
disagree.
319. Id. at 657-58.
320. Id. at 651.
321. See id. at 646-50. Clark specifically and emphatically contrasted the search
and seizure exclusionary rule, based on the notion that a conviction resting on evidence obtained by violating the Constitution "cannot stand," with the Court's exercise of its supervisory powers over the federal judicial system. See id. at 649-50.
322. See text accompanying notes 331-35 infra.
323. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 381-82.
324. 381 U.S. 618 (1965), discussed in text accompanying notes 345-80 infra. As
Professors Mertens and Wasserstrom point out in the paragraph immediately following the quoted passage, in Linkletter "the Court identified deterrence as the preeminent purpose of the exclusionary rule." Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 148,
at 382.
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The only discussion of the inadequacy of "other means" of enforcing the right to privacy appears in Part II of the plurality opinion. In this part Justice Clark, as have others, yielded to the
temptation to meet the author of the Wolf opinion on the latter's
own battleground. Clark maintained that the "factual considerations" asserted in support of the Wolf result--one of which was
"that 'other means of protection' have been afforded 'the right to
privacy' "32 5-were no longer persuasive. 326 But he stated at the
outset of his discussion of the continuing validity of these factual
considerations that "they are not basically relevant to a decision
that the exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of the Fourth
Amendment as the right it embodies is vouchsafed against the
States by the Due Process Clause. '327 All that Clark had to say
about "other remedies" in Part II is the following:
Significantly, among those [states which have adopted the
exclusionary rule since Wolf] is California, which, according to its highest court, was 'compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies have completely failed to
secure compliance with the constitutional provisions. ...'
In connection with this California case, we note that the
second basis elaborated in Wolf in support of its failure to
enforce the exclusionary doctrine against the States was
that 'other means of protection' have been afforded 'the
right to privacy.' The experience of California that such
other remedies have been worthless and futile is buttressed by the experience of other States [no citation].
The obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment
to the protection of other remedies has, moreover, been
recognized by this Court since Wolf. See Irvine v.
California.328
325. 367 U.S. 651-52.
326. See id. at 651-53.
327. Id. at 651 (emphasis added). One of the exclusionary rule's strongest critics, Professor Steven Schlesinger, has recognized that in Mapp, the deterrent effect
of the rule

was clearly only a factual consideration as opposed to a logical deduction
from constitutional language. ...
[Justice Clark] was only trying to
counter Wo~/'s claim that the exclusionary rule was bad lawfrom a policy
standpoint. The only reason Justice Clark engaged in that factual discussion was that he read Wolf to be 'bottomed on factual considerations,' as
opposed to constitutional analysis, and out of respect for the precedent he
was overturning, he felt obliged to meet and defeat it on its own grounds
first, before moving to the basis of his own position.
Schlesinger & Wilson, Property,Privacy and Deterrence: The Exclusionary Rule in
Search of a Rationale, 18 DUQUESNE L. REV. 225, 235-36 (1980).

328. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651-53, referring to Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137
(1954). The citation to Irvine is puzzling. The Irvine Court, relying on Wolf, af-

firmed a conviction based on egregious police misconduct. Obviously the Court did
not consider "other remedies" so futile as to require the exclusion of the evidence.
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Sixteen lines in an eighteen page opinion do not seem to warrant the conclusion that "the bulk" of Justice Clark's opinion in
Mapp was devoted to a defense of the exclusionary rule on an empirical basis.329 Of course, it is not simply a matter of counting
lines. It is a matter, rather, of reading these lines in light of the
totality of the opinion. As already indicated, Part I of the Mapp
opinion is devoted to the proposition that the exclusionary rule is
not a "mere rule of evidence" or a product of the Court's "supervisory powers," but a "constitutionally required" doctrine.330 Part
III concludes: "We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
'33 1
inadmissible in a state court."
The main thrust of Part IV is that Wolf had downgraded the
protection against unreasonable search and seizure by "conditioning" its "enforcement" in a manner that no other basic constitutional right's enforcement had been, and that henceforth the right
to privacy is to be enforced as "strictly against the States" as are
other fundamental rights-such as "the right not to be convicted
by use of a coerced confession, however logically relevant it be,
and without regard to its reliability. '332 Part IV concludes with the
assurance that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional
'333
evidence.
The fifth and last part of the opinion begins by referring to
What the Court, per Jackson, J., said in Irvine was: "[AI dmission of the evidence
does not exonerate the officers and their aides if they have violated defendant's
constitutional rights. It was pointed out in Wolf that other remedies are available
for official lawlessness, although too often those remedies are of no practical avail."
347 U.S. at 137.
329. One might also count another short passage in Mapp:
To [admit the evidence] is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the
incentive to disregard it.' Elkins v. United States, 1364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) 1.
367 U.S. at 656. But in the two sentences immediately preceding the passage quoted
above, the Mapp opinion observed:
[I]n extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was logically and constitutionallynecessary that the exclusion doctrine-an essential part of the
right to privacy-be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the
right newly recognized by the Wolf case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its
most important constitutionalprivilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused has been forced to give by reason of the unlawful
seizure.
Id. at 655-56 (emphasis added).
330. See note 321 and accompanying text supra.
331. 367 U.S. at 655 (emphasis added).
332. Id. at 656.
333. Id. at 657.
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"our holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. '334 It ends with the observation that "[b]ecause [the fourth amendment] is enforceable
in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who ... chooses to suspend
its enjoyment. Our decision ... gives to the individual no more
than that which the Constitution guarantees him . ... 335
Professors Schrock and Welsh wrote about Mapp some
thirteen years after it was decided. Professors Mertens and Wasserstrom did so more than twenty years after the event. I venture to
say they were operating under what in this instance might be
called the handicap of hindsight. They were looking back on Mapp
through the filter of post-Mapp cases that have misread or distorted that landmark case.
Justice Harlan, who dissented in Mapp, recognized that
"[e] ssential to the majority's argument against Wolf is the proposition that the [fourth amendment exclusionary rule] .. . derives
not from the 'supervisory power' of this Court ... but from Constitutional requirement." 336 Nor did Professor Francis Allen, who
wrote a major article on the Mapp case the year it was decided,
seem to have much trouble understanding the basic reasoning of
the Clark opinion. Although the opinion "does not confine itself to
the statement of a 'syllogism,'" Justice Clark's "essential position," reported Allen, "is that the exclusionary rule is part of the
Fourth Amendment; the Fourth Amendment is part of the Fourteenth; therefore, the exclusionary rule is part of the
337
Fourteenth."
THE "DETERRENCE" RATIONALE, AND COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS, COME TO THE FORE
Although the Court's refusal, in Linkletter v. Walker, 338 to give
Mapp full retroactive effect was "novel and totally without prece334. Id.
335. Id. at 660.
336. Id. at 678 (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting).
337. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961
SuP. CT. REV. 1, 26. See also id. at 23-24. Cf. Weinstein, Local Responsibilityfor
Improvement of Search and Seizure Practices, 34 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 150 (1962):

"[Mapp I put to rest-at least temporarily-the question of whether the Weeks rule
represented a rule of evidence which could be modified by Congress or whether it
was embalmed as a constitutional imperative. For if due process requires its application by the states, then surely it is embodied in the due process clause of the fifth
amendment." Id. at 155.
338. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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dent in the United States Reports" 339-never before had the
Supreme Court decided against retroactivity for a newly adopted
constitutional criminal procedure ruling34 0-the decision should
have come as no surprise. Mapp contributed nothing to the reliability of the guilt-determining process; "[a ll that petitioner attacks is the admissibility of evidence, the reliability and relevancy
of which is not questioned . ..
"341 Yet to apply the exclusionary
rule announced in Mapp to cases which had become "final" (beyond direct review) before its rendition "would tax the administra''342
tion of justice to the utmost.
A claim that a state's allocation of responsibility between
judge and jury failed to afford a reliable determination of the voluntariness of a confession 343 or a claim that an indigent defendant
was denied the right to counsel at trial or to a transcript on appeal 3 " "usually can be tested promptly by looking at a few documents. '345 But the record would often be inconclusive or silent on
the search and seizure issues lurking in thousands of cases "finalized" in the many states that admitted illegally seized evidence
prior to Mapp.
The Court might have given Mapp full retroactive effect, but
denied relief to a prisoner simply because his lawyer-"relying on
contemporaneous decisions of the Supreme Court unambiguously
indicating the constitutional issue to be frivolous and unsubstantial" 346 -had failed to raise the search and seizure claim at trial or
on direct review. I share Professor Francis Allen's view, however,
that "[i]t would surely be better frankly to restrict the Mapp holding to prospective application than to select those who may assert
the right on any such capricious and inequitable basis. 3 47 Even if
the record in a case prosecuted in a pre-Mapp "admissibility" jurisdiction did contain some reference to an alleged illegal search or
seizure it is unlikely that the point would have been pressed or
developed (or that the court would have permitted defense coun339. Haddad, supra note 301, at 417-18.
340. See id. at 424-26.
341. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 639.
342. Id. at 637.
343. As the Linkletter Court noted, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), was
"applied to the petitioner who was here on a collateral attack." 381 U.S. at 628-29
n.13.
344. As the Linkletter Court also noted, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) were given full retroactive effect. 381
U.S. at 628-29 n.13.
345. Brief for the National District Attorneys' Association at 27, Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (amicus curiae).
346. Allen, supra note 337, at 45.
347. Id. Cf.Weinstein, supra note 337, at 172.
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sel to do so). Why bother? If Mapp had been given full retroactive
effect, therefore, evidentiary hearings as to the merits of the search
and seizure claim "frequently would produce unreliable results.
In many cases, passage of time fades memories, renders witnesses
and tangible evidence unavailable, and therefore precludes accurate assessment of Fourth Amendment claims, which usually turn
on closely contested questions of fact. . ...348
Linkletter may be viewed as an effort to curtail the impact of
Mapp 349 and to dampen the criticism that the Court was "turning
loose" too many "criminals"35 0-Mapp, after all, "had overturned
an important and often fiercely defended policy, a policy that the
Court had explicitly validated only a dozen years earlier ..."351
But Linkletter may also be viewed as "a liberating force that allowed a majority of the Court to render decisions effecting fundamental changes in criminal procedure without concern that the
prison doors would be opened as a result. '352 "tTlhe final laugh,"
maintains Professor James Haddad, "is at the expense of the District Attorneys"-who, perhaps "with tongue-in-cheek," had argued in Linkletter that reform in constitutional-criminal procedure
would be slowed down unless the prospective-only technique were
adopted. 35 3 The District Attorneys "may, if they wish," observes
Haddad, "boast that their success in Linkletter played an impor'354
tant part in making possible the Miranda and Wade decisions.
It is by no means clear, therefore, which "side" really "won" in
Linkletter. It is plain, however, that the exclusionary rule "lost."
My quarrel is not with the result in Linkletter, a subject of vigorous debate, 35 5 but with the manner in which the Court dispar348. Brief for the National District Attorneys' Association, supra note 345, at 20.
349. Cf. Harlan, J., dissenting in Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 222 (1969):
"As one who has never agreed with the Miranda case but nonetheless felt bound by
it, I now find myself in the uncomfortable position of having to dissent from a holding which actually serves to curtail the impact of that decision." Id. at 222. Jenkins
declined to apply Miranda to a retrial of a defendant whose first trial commenced
prior to the date of that landmark decision.
350. See, e.g., Cann & Egbert, The Exclusionary Rule: Its Necessity in Constitutional Democracy, 23 HOWARD L.J. 299, 306 (1980).
351. Allen, The JudicialQuestfor PenalJustice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 529 n.52.
352. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal,61 VA.
L. REV. 1557, 1562 (1975). See also Allen, supra note 351, at 530; Haddad, supra note
301, at 420, 428-29, 439-40.
353. Haddad, supra note 301, at 439.
354. Id., referring to the landmark lineup case, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967).
355. Compare, e.g., Mallamud, Prospective Limitation and the Rights of the Accused, 56 IowA L. REV. 321 (1970) and Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great
Writ, and the Due Processof Time and Law, 79 HARv. L REV. 56 (1965) with, e.g.,
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aged the exclusionary rule in reaching the result it did. The
Linkletter Court might, for example, have recalled Holmes's view
in Silverthorne that "the essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way" is that evidence so acquired
shall not be used to convict a person 3 6-but added that state prosecutors and judges could hardly be blamed for rejecting this view
when they had been told by the highest authority that the exclusion of such evidence was not "an essential ingredient of the
right."35 7 Or the Linkletter Court might have recognized that a primary basis for the exclusionary rule was the notion that violations
of the protection against unreasonable search and seizure "should
find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, '358 that permitting
the use of evidence so obtained "would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions
of the Constitution" 3 59-but added that state courts could hardly
be faulted for admitting unconstitutional evidence when the
Supreme Court had explicitly "sanctioned" such a course.
Instead, the Linkletter Court passed over the notion that a
court should not ratify or make itself a participant in lawless conduct-thereby loosening, if not breaking, the "link between exclusion and the rule of law" 3 6 -and rested the exclusionary rule
almost entirely on an empirical basis. One might say that Linkletter applied Wolf s way of thinking about the exclusionary rule
"retroactively" to Mapp. One might also say that Linkletter did to
Mapp what subsequent decisions were to do to Griffin v. California,361 Miranda362 and the 1967 lineup cases 363-"undermine the
Haddad, supra note 301, and H. Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to ProfessorMishkin, 33 U. CHi. L. REv. 719 (1966).
356. See text accompanying note 230 supra.
357. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29.
358. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
359. Id. at 394.
360. Cf H. Schwartz, supra note 355, at 751.
361. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Griffin held that the fifth and fourteenth amendments
banned comment by either the prosecution or the court on a defendant's failure to
take the stand at a state trial. Id. at 615. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382
U.S. 406, 419 (1966), declined to give Griffin full retroactive effect.
362. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719
(1966), not only denied general retroactivity to Miranda, but refused to apply it to
cases still on direct appeal if the trials had begun before Miranda had been handed
down.
363. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242-43 (1967) and Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263, 272-74 (1967) held inadmissible testimony relating to pre-trial identifications made at a lineup where the defendant was not represented by counsel and
also barred any courtroom identifications based on observations made at such a
lineup. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1967), held that the new rules affect only
cases involving confrontations that took place after the date on which both Wade
and Gilbert were decided.
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original decision by depriving it of the supporting reasons that are
'364
minimized in the retroactivity decisions.
The Linkletter Court recalled that in Mapp it had re-examined
the factual grounds upon which Wolf was based and had concluded that they were no longer persuasive, e.g., other means of
enforcing the fourth amendment had proved "worthless and futile. '365 But the Linkletter Court, per Justice Clark, neglected to
mention, as the Mapp Court, per Justice Clark, had been quick to
point out, that the continuing validity of the factual considerations
asserted in support of the Wolf result "are not basicallyrelevant to
a decision that the exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of
the Fourth Amendment. ' 36 6 Indeed, the Linkletter Court strongly
implied that nothing could be more relevant-that the exclusionary rule is "an essential ingredient" of the fourth amendment only
364. The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 123, 139 (1966):
[Tlhe Court's professed inability in Shott to define clearly the values
served by the privilege against self-incrimination is in striking contrast to
the self-confident opinion in Griffin, which relied almost exclusively on the
many reasons why an innocent person might not wish to take the stand as
grounds for condemning an inference of guilt from silence.
Id. at 138. See also Beytagh, supra note 352, at 1564; Haddad, supra note 301, at 434;
Comment, Linkletter, Shott and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 832, 838, 854 (1966).
In declining to give Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Miranda retroactive effect, the court in Johnson, made the remarkable statement that "While Escobedo and Miranda provide important new safeguardsagainst the use of unreliable
statements at trial, the nonretroactivity of these decisions will not preclude persons
whose trials have already been completed from invoking the same safeguards as
part of an involuntariness claim." 384 U.S. at 730 (emphasis added). But Escobedo
and Miranda "indicate[d] dissatisfaction with-and lack of confidence in-the actual operation of the voluntary-involuntary test, just as Gideon [which was given
full retroactive effect] manifest[ed] dissatisfaction with and lack of confidence in
the [pre-GideonI 'special circumstances' and 'prejudice' standards [for indigent defendants convicted without counsel]." L. HALL & Y. KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 503 (2d ed. 1966). "[S]hunting a petitioner off into [the inadequate preEscobedo, pre-MirandaI track would seem little more than a gesture towards correcting constitutional injury." Hasler, Retroactivity Rethought: The Hidden Costs,
24 ME. L. REV. 1, 16 n.68 (1972).
[B]y finding that the effect of counsel's presence on the accuracy of lineup
identifications does not outweigh the cost of having to re-examine the convictions of prisoners whose guilt may have been erroneously determined,
the Court in Stovall [388 U.S. 293 (1967)] weakened the force of its argument in Wade and Gilbert that the lineup is fraught with 'hazards of serious unfairness to the criminal accused.' Furthermore, whether or not
attack under the due process clause is a viable alternative to Miranda, as
Johnson suggested it was, it appears to be virtually meaningless in the
Stovall context.
The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69, 179 (1967). See also Haddad,
supra note 301, at 429, 434.
365. See text accompanying note 328 supra.
366. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added). See text accompanying
note 327 supra.
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because, and only so long as, it is "the only effective deterrent to
3 67
lawless police action."
Justice Clark's opinion for the Court in Linkletter leaves much
to be desired, but perhaps the most confusing sentence of all is the
following[J] ust as other cases had found the exclusionary rule to be
a deterrent safeguard necessary to the enforcement of the
Amendment, Silverthorne, Mapp bottomed its rule on its
necessity as 'a sanction upon which [the Fourth Amendment's] protection and enjoyment had always been
deemed dependent
under the Boyd, Weeks and
368
Silverthorne cases.'
First of all, Silverthorne had not found the exclusionary rule to
be "a deterrent safeguard necessary to the enforcement of the
Amendment"; at no point did it even discuss whether the exclusionary rule was the only effective deterrent or a more effective
deterrent than other methods. Silverthorne, rather, regarded the
government's refusal to "avail itself of the knowledge obtained by
[unconstitutional] means" as the only meaningful way for the government to "repudiate" or "condemn" the unconstitutional
369
means.
As for the second half of the sentence quoted above, what rationale(s) Mapp "bottomed its rule on" is not as clear as it ought to
be, but the exclusionary rule's "necessity as a sanction," i.e., the
rule's necessity as the most effective (or the only effective) "penalty" or "remedy, 37 0 can hardly be regarded as the dominant rationale. More prominent, surely, is the notion that the
exclusionary rule is an indispensable and inseparable part of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments' protection against unreasona367. Mapp had as its prime purpose the enforcement of the fourth amendment through the inclusion of the exclusionary rule within its rights. This,
it was found, was the only effective deterrent to lawless police action. Indeed, all of the cases since Wolf requiring the exclusion of illegal evidence
have been based on the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police
action.
381 U.S. at 636-37. "In light of [Justice Clark's] own opinion in Mapp, this statement
is patently false. But it ssrved its purpose." Schlesinger & Wilson, supra note 327,
at 237.
368. 381 U.S. at 635. For the context in which this quotation from Mapp appears
see text accompanying note 373 infra.
369. See text accompanying note 229 supra.
370. Of course, "sanction" has several meanings. Justice Clark used the term to
signify a "penalty" or "remedy" for noncompliance with a rule. But the Weeks
Court used the term to mean "approval" or "authorization." See text accompanying
notes 358-59 supra. In the Weeks sense, exclusion of the evidence is not a "sanction" but its negative exclusion is the necessary consequence of refusing to "sanction" a violation of the fourth amendment by admitting evidence so obtained.
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ble search and seizure, just as an "exclusionary rule" is an essential and integral part of the protection against "coerced" or
"involuntary" confessions 37 1-and thus the "right of privacy" could
not be declared enforceable against the states without declaring
the exclusionary rule enforceable against them as well. 372 "Were it

otherwise," pointed out Justice Clark in Mappthen just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against
unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be 'a
form of words,' valueless and undeserving of mention in a
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too,
without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severedfrom its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's
high regard as a freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' . . . The right to privacy, when conceded

operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon
which its protection and enjoyment had always been
deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and
Silverthorne cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was logically and
constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine-an
essential part of the right to privacy-be also insisted
upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate
denial of its most important constitutional privilege,
namely, the exclusion of the evidence.

...

373

How the Linkletter Court looked back on the exclusionary rule
is not as important as how it looked forward. Whatever one thinks
of the manner in which Linkletter read Mapp and the Weeks line
of cases, one must consider the way it has affected the future of the
exclusionary rule.
Long before the Supreme Court got around to the question,
the lower courts had developed the doctrine that a defendant lack371. See text accompanying notes 331-32 supra. After relying on the analogy to
coerced confessions in Mapp, however, the Court disparaged that analogy in Linkletter: "[TJhere is no likelihood of unreliability or coercion in a search-andseizure case." 381 U.S. at 638.
372. "Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the
Federal Government." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
373. Id. at 655-56 (emphasis added).
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ed "standing" to challenge evidence seized in violation of a third
party's constitutional rights. 374 "Since the rule was early based on
the joint foundation of the Fourth Amendment and the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth, its protection was said to be limited to
the accused. 3 75 The rule was also "based on the theory that the
evidence is excluded to provide a remedy for a wrong done to the
defendant, and that accordingly, if the defendant has not been
wronged he is entitled to no remedy. ' 376 Thus, this seemed to be
one occasion when the "deterrence" rationalefavored the defendant. As Judge Traynor pointed out:
The emphasis in our state on the deterrence of lawless law
enforcement has given direction to our rules. As a result
we have departed from long-entrenched federal rules on
standing to object to illegally obtained evidence. Those
rules have rested on property concepts, with an admixture
377
of tort concepts.
The United States Supreme Court, however, was unmoved by
the ascendancy of the deterrence rationale. "The necessity" for
the limitation, it told us, "was not eliminated by recognizing and
acknowledging the deterrent aim of the rule. '378 Why not? Because "we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify
further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting
those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on
the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth. ' 379 One can
just as easily assert, I submit, that "we are not convinced that the
benefits of applying the exclusionary rule to anybody justifies encroachment upon the public interest. ..."
How does one convince the Court that the additional benefits
of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants justifies
further encroachment upon the public interest? Dissenting in
Goldstein v. United States,38o which had tacitly accepted the
"standing" limitation, Justice Murphy, joined by Chief Justice
Stone and Justice Frankfurter, thought it "evident that to allow the
374. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 50, at 73-74. Comment, Judicial Control of
Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 154-58 (1948).
375. Comment, supra note 374, at 156. See also Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and
Seizure, Federalism,and the Civil Liberties, 45 W. L. REV. 1, 22 (1950).
376. People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 760, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955) (Traynor, J.).
See also Allen, supra note 375, at 22.
377. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 335
(referring to People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955), and other cases
cited therein).
378. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
379. Id. at 174-75.
380. 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
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Government to use evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment against parties not victims of the unconstitutional
search and seizure is to allow the Government to profit by its
wrong and to reduce in large measure the protection of the
Amendment. '38 1 The California Supreme Court, which had
scrapped the "standing" requirement six years before Mapp,
stressed that "such a limitation virtually invites law enforcement
officers to violate the rights of third parties and to trade the escape
of a criminal whose rights are violated for the conviction of others
382
by the use of the evidence illegally obtained against them."
California's abolition of the "standing" requirement was "enthusiatically endorsed by most commentators. '383 Francis Allen
had called the requirement "[p Ierhaps the least justifiable of the
limits on the scope of the exclusionary rule. '384 Albert Beisel had
regarded it "an effective and practical means by which the harvest
of an illegal search and seizure (or illegal wiretap) can be
reaped." 385 "To the extent that the police and the prosecutors are
familiar with the [standing] rule," the Yale Law Journal had observed, "they will then know that they may rummage everywhere
for evidence concerning a suspect except among his belongings or
in his house. No motion to suppress at the trial stage need be
feared, there being no one who can successfully make the motion."386 Convinced that there are recurring situations when "the
police can often predict which searches will turn up evidence
against persons other than the victim" and that "[a] system of
classification based on 'victimness' provides no deterrence against
these searches," the Chicago Law Review had concluded, two
years after Linkletter, that "the standing requirement is inconsistent with the presently accepted general deterrence theory of the
exclusionary rule.

'387

381.
382.

Id. at 127 n.4.
People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d at 760, 290 P.2d at 857.

383.

3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-

MENT, 609 (1978) (citing thirteen commentators). See also ALI MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURES §SS290.1(5) (Official Draft, 1975), Commentary at 561:
' The logic of the exclusionary rule, and the deterrence objectives on which it is
based, apply equally whether or not the search itself 'aggrieved' the defendant."
Although the Reporters for the Pre-Arraignment Code favored complete abolition
of "standing," the ALI Council was unwilling to go quite so far. The'matter was
resolved by "greatly relax[ing] the present standing requirements, without completely abandoning them." Id. at 562.
384. Allen, supra note 375, at 22.

385. A. BEISEL, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 18 (1955). "
386. Comment, supra note 374, at 158.
387. Note, Standing to Object to an UnreasonableSearch and Seizure, 34 U. CH.
L. REV. 342, 358 (1967). For illustrative situations where the police can often predict
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As we have seen, however, the Alderman Court reached a different conclusion: When an unlawful search or seizure does not
violate the defendant's own constitutional rights the exclusionary
rule has reached the point of diminishing returns. But it is no difficult feat to assert or to assume that this is so at any point. One
need only say that the additional "benefits" of any extension of the
exclusionary rule are too marginal or speculative to justify the
"costs" (or that the "benefits" of any curtailment of the rule are
worth the "costs"). It is especially easy to do when one is skeptical
about the benefits of the rule in the first place, but388convinced that
it "exacts a costly toll" upon the search for truth.
Even accepting the primacy of the "deterrence" rationale and
the need to balance additional deterrence against the competing
interest in trying defendants on the basis of all relevant evidence,
"the standing requirement seems unrelated to the factors relevant
in such a balancing process, such as the relative egregiousness of
police infractions of privacy, the relative susceptibility of police
practices to judicial deterrence [and] the relative ease of acquiring
evidence by other means ..."389 A decade later, in the face of a
3 90 the standing requireshocking case, United States v. Payner,
ment remained unrelated to the factors relevant in a balancing
process.
Payner arose as follows: The IRS launched an investigation
into the financial activities of American citizens in the Bahamas.
Suspicion focused on a certain Bahamian bank. When an official of
that bank visited the United States, IRS agents stole his locked
briefcase for a time. More than 400 documents were removed from
the briefcase and photographed. On the basis of evidence acwhich searches will produce evidence against persons other than the victim, or
when the police may make searches primarily to obtain evidence against "nonvictims," see id. at 342; Burkoff, The Court that Devoured The Fourth Amendment: The
Triumph of an Inconsistent ExclusionaryDoctrine, 58 OR. L. REv.151, 176-77 (1979);
White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
333, 347-48, 351-52 (1970).
388. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980).
There is, of course, considerable disagreement about how much "deterrence"
the exclusionary rule achieves and about how many "guilty criminals" it allows to
go unpunished. See the various authorities collected and summarized in Kamisar,.
Does the Exclusionary Rule Affect Police Behavior?, 62 JUDICATURE 70-73 (1978).

Compare IMPACT

OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

(Comptroller General of the United States, Rep. No. GGD-79-45, 1979) with THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA (National Institute of

Justice, 1982). But even if we could agree on what the effects of the rule are as an
empirical matter, I suspect there would still be much disagreement about whether
the "benefits" of the rule (whatever they are) are "worth the price" (whatever it is).
389. The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7, 169 (1969).
390. 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (6-3 majority, per Powell, J.).
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quired as a result of this "briefcase caper," defendant Payner was
convicted of federal income tax violations. Payner, of course, was
precisely the kind of violator the IRS agents were seeking when
they violated the bank official's rights.
Hemmed in by the standing requirement (although an effort
might have been made to carve out an exception on the basis of
these special circumstances), 91 the federal district court invoked
its supervisory power to exclude the tainted evidence. The district
court found, and these findings were undisturbed by the higher
courts, that[Iun its desire to apprehend tax evaders ... the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth
Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of
one individual in order to obtain evidence against third
parties who are the real targets of the governmental intrusion, and that the IRS agents in this case acted, and will
act in the future, according to that counsel. Such governmental conduct compels the conclusion that [the IRS
agents] transacted the 'briefcase caper' with a purposeful,
bad faith hostility toward the Fourth Amendment rights of
[the bank official]3 92in order to obtain evidence against persons like Payner.
In holding the "briefcase caper" evidence admissible, a 6-3 majority, per Justice Powell, cautioned that exclusion of evidence in
every case of illegality must "be weighed against the considerable
harm that would flow from indiscriminateapplication of an exclusionary rule"3 93 and that "unbending application of the exclusionary sanction ... would impede unacceptably the truthfinding
functions of judge and jury. '394 What case was the majority talking
about?
As the Payner dissenters pointed out, the district court had
deemed it proper to use its supervisory power to exclude evidence
obtained by violating a third party's rights only where there had
391. Cf.MODEL CODE, .upra note 383, §SS290.1(5) (1975), specifying five categories of defendants, in addition to the defendant whose own rights have been violated, who have "standing" to move to suppress evidence. The categories include
family members, co-conspirators and "targets" of police investigations. As the
Commentary to the Model Code notes, the "target" provision is in accord with the
proposal in White & Greenspan, supra note 387, at 349-54 that those defendants who
were the "targets" of third party searches should have standing to challenge the
legality of the evidence so obtained. Id. at 562 n.19.
392. 434 F. Supp. 113, 132-33, quoted in 447 U.S. at 743 (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
393. 447 U.S. at 734 (emphasis added).
394. Id. (emphasis added).
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been "purposefully illegal" conduct by the government or where
the government conduct was "motivated by an intentional bad
faith hostility" toward the constitutional rights of the third
party. 395 The relevant question in Payner, then, was not whether
the exclusionary rule should always be applied when police illegality is somewhere in the picture, but whether it should ever be
applied-taking into account the seriousness or flagrancy of the illegality-when the defendant lacks "standing." The question was
not whether the exclusionary rule should be given "unbending application," but whether the "standing"requirement should be. By
deciding that even in a case like Payner a federal court is unable to
exercise its supervisory powers to bar the evidence-by holding
that "judicial impotency is compelled in the face of such scandalous conduct" 396 -the Court gave us its answer.
Even assuming that Payner should have been decided solely
on the basis of interest-balancing, 397 the majority opinion leaves a
good deal to be desired. The Payner Court seemed content to recall, and to rely on, the balance it had struck in the early standing
cases. 398 But because it grew out of special and outrageous circumstances, the interests to be balanced in Payner were different.
The question presented was not the one raised in Alderman but a
different and more pointed one: When the government has intentionally manipulated the standing requirement of the fourth
amendment-when it has deliberately and patently violated the
constitutional rights of a third party in order to obtain evidence
against its real targets, and defendant is one of those targets, does
the interest in discouraging (or reducing the incentive) to make
such searches justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the victim of the challenged practice? The Payner Court never really spoke to this issue because it
never really asked this question.
The "deterrence" rationale and its concomitant "interest-bal395. Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting.).
396. The Court's holding that judicial impotency is compelled in the face of
such scandalous conduct is almost beyond belief, especially when it is considered that the responsible governmental agency manifested little interest
in deterring such actions. It took a congressional investigation to force the
IRS to 'call off' the entire enterprise; even then the IRS responded with
half-hearted measures; and apparently no action was ever taken against
any IRS agent who was knowingly involved in the criminal and unconstitutional actions.
3 LAFAVE, supra note 383, at 1983 Pocket Part 216.
397. The Payner dissenters stressed the imperative of "judicial integrity"--the
need for the federal court to avoid becoming "the accomplice of the Government
lawbreaker." See 447 U.S. at 747-48. See generally id. at 744-50.
398. See 447 U.S. at 731, 735-36 & n.8.
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ancing" bloomed in United States v. Calandra.3 99 The Weeks rule
and the famous Brandeis-Holmes Olmstead dissents, which illuminated the rationales for the Weeks rule (although they did not succeed in extending the rule to police behavior that was merely
unlawful or "unethical," not unconstitutional), appear to have
been based on what has been called the "'one-government' conception" or the "'unitary' model of a government and a prosecution."4 0 This model "sees all the events in a criminal prosecution
as parts of a single transaction for which government is ultimately
responsible." 4 1 According to this model, "[i]t is just as important
to the fourth amendment whether a court takes account of the
fruits of a search as it is whether the intrusion that discovered the
evidence was lawful. ' '4° 2 But in ruling that a grand jury witness
may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are
based on evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment,4 ° 3 the Calandra Court embraced what has been called the
"'fragmentary' model of a prosecution. 4 °4 This model "separates
the police intrusion against which the individual has a fourth
amendment right from the proceedings at trial in which the question is merely one of remedy-not a personal remedy for the victim
but a collective remedy for the broader social problem. ' 405 According to this model, a court acts as "a neutral conduit of the evidence"; 4° 6 it is under no duty to exclude evidence merely because
it has been unlawfully, or even unconstitutionally, obtained.
Thus, the Calandramajority, per Justice Powell, characterized
the exclusionary rule as "a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
399. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
400. See note 160 supra. See also the discussion of, and the quotations from, the
Olmstead dissents in text accompanying notes 235-41 supra.
401. Yackle, supra note 312, at 417. As Professor Yackle is quick to point out, his
comments are based on the models identified by Professors Schrock and Welsh.
See note 160 supra.
402. Yackle, supra note 312, at 417. See also Oakes, J., concurring in Tirado v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 689 F.2d 307, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1982); Oakes, The
Exclusionary Rule-A Relic of the Past?, in CONSTrrTTIoNAL GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA 151-52 (R. Collins ed. 1980).
403. Calandra built on the view taken in earlier cases that the validity of an
indictment is not affected by the competency or the legality of the evidence considered. For a crisp discussion of Calandra'santecedents, see Areneila, Reforming the
FederalGrandJury and the State PreliminaryHearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 487-94 (1980).
404. See note 160 supra.
405. Yackle, supra note 312, at 418 (emphasis in original).
406. See note 160 supra. See also Yackle, supra note 312, at 418.
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aggrieved. ' 40 7 As is the case with any remedial device, pointed out
Justice Powell, the rule's application "has been restricted to those
areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served" (referring to the "standing" cases). 40 8 Grand jury questions based on evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment, maintained Powell, "work no new Fourth Amendment
wrong. Whether [they] should be proscribed presents a question,
not of rights, but of remedies" 40 9 -a question to be answered by
weighing the "potential injury" to the functions of the grand jury
against the "potential benefits" of the exclusionary rule in this context.410 Not surprisingly, upon reading Calandratwo of the exclusionary rule's staunchest friends lamented that the process of
4 11
"deconstitutionalizing" the rule had been completed.
As is no secret to the reader who has come with me this far, I
share the Calandra dissenters' way of thinking about the exclusionary rule. I believe that the goals "uppermost in the minds of
the framers of the rule" were "enabling the judiciary to avoid the
taint of partnership in official lawlessness" and "assuring the people ...

that the government would not profit from its lawless be-

havior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular
trust in government." 4 12 I think, too, that curtailment of fourth
amendment violations "was at best only a hoped-for effect of the
exclusionary rule," 4 13 not (nor should it be) its raison d'etre. But
even if one accepts the Calandramajority's way of thinking about
the exclusionary rule-even if one agrees that the case should
have been decided solely on the basis of interest-balancing--one
may strongly challenge the Calandra majority on its own battlefield. For Calandra'sinterest-balancing is based on a shaky-one
might even say "nonexistent"-empirical foundation.
It was "evident" to the Calandra Court that applying the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings would "seriously impede" that body's historic role and functions. 41 4 But the Court
407. 414 U.S. at 348.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 354.
410. See id. at 349.
411. See Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91
HAv. L. REv. 1117, 1119 (1978). See also Mertens &Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at
384-88. But the Court may have "'constitutionalize[d ] ' deterrence," i.e., there may
now be "a constitutional requirement to impose the exclusionary rule in cases
where the failure to do so would demonstrably encourage unconstitutional police
conduct." Id. at 386 n.100.
412. 414 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
413. Id. at 356.
414. 414 U.S. at 349.
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disparaged any benefits that might have been achieved by applying (or extending) the rule to such proceedings-any benefits
would be "uncertain at best" or "speculative and undoubtedly minimal."4 15 Why? Because banning grand jury use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence would add little, if anything, to the
disincentive already provided by the inadmissibility of such evidence at the trial. 416 But, retorts lawyer-political scientist Donald
417
Horowitz, "What trial?"
For the overwhelming majority of defendants who plead
guilty to some offense and hence are punished without going to trial, indictment may be tantamount to conviction.
There may be, therefore, a very strong incentive for the
police to obtain evidence illegally which can be used in
grand jury proceedings, even if that evidence would be
inadmissible at a trial if one were ever held. Most of the
time, indictment leads to a plea of guilty. Because the deterrence reasoning in Calandra is based on the criminal
trial as the implicit norm, ignoring the way in which most
criminal cases are actually disposed of, the opinion takes
as given a structure of police and prosecution
incentives
418
that may prove to be purely fictitious.
To be sure, if he is in a jurisdiction that has a procedure for
filing a pre-trial motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence
(not all states provide such a procedure), 4 19 a defendant can seek
an "advance evaluation" of the admissibility of the evidence on
which his indictment was based. But if the defendant files and
loses the pre-trial motion, "his problems may just be beginning":4 0
The prosecutor's offer of leniency may itself have been
based on his uncertainty about the admissibility of the evi415. Id. at 351-52.
416. The incentive to disregard the requirement of the Fourth Amendment
solely to obtain an indictment from a grand jury is substantially negated by
the inadmissibility of the illegally seized evidence in a subsequent criminal
prosecution of the search victim. For the most part, a prosecutor would be
unlikely to request an indictment where a conviction could not be obtained.
414 U.S. at 351.
417. D. HoRowrrz, Mapp v. Ohio: PoliceBehaviorand the Courts, in THE CoURTs
AND SociAL PoucY 220, 239 (1977).
418. Id. at 240. See also Arenella, supra note 403:
In a system of justice where guilty pleas are the norm and trials are the
exception, we can no longer view the prosecutor's and grand jury's decisions to indict as mere interim screening decisions. Since guilty pleas have
supplanted trials as our primary method of securing convictions, we cannot
assume that the trial will necessarily deter prosecutors from seeking indictments against defendants whom they could not convict at trial.
Id. at 498.
419. D. HOROwrrz, supra note 417, at 241.
420. Id. at 240.
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dence. Once the uncertainty is cleared away, the prosecutor may become much less disposed to negotiate. Perhaps
filing the motion is not such a good idea after all. Perhaps
it is better
to accept the prosecutor's offer and plead guilty
42 1
now.
For those defendants who do plead guilty to some charge, the
admissibility of the illegally obtained evidence before the grand
jury counts for a good deal more than the inadmissibility of the
evidence at trial. And if this is how the exclusionary rule works in
practice, and it appears to be, the incentive for police officers to
gather evidence illegally, "even when their purpose is prosecution
and conviction,' 422 is not "substantially negated" 42 3 by the inadmissibility of the evidence at the trial. Calandra to the contrary
notwithstandingGiven the prevalence of guilty pleas, the only sure way to
prevent illegally obtained evidence from forming the basis
of a conviction [it will often be a conviction of a lesser
crime than the defendant is believed guilty, but it is still
more than should have been obtained under Mapp I424is to
prevent it from being used to secure an indictment.
Does interest-balancing, at least when applying the exclusionary rule, turn largely, if not entirely, on how one identifies the competing interests and how one "weighs" them? How does one go
about doing this? How, for example, does one "quantify" the "privacy" or "individual liberty" the fourth amendment is supposed to
protect and the exclusionary rule is supposed to effectuate? Is interest-balancing the "real" basis for judgment in the exclusionary
rule cases or is it merely a stylish way to write an opinion once a
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. See note 416 supra.
424. D. HORowrrz, supra note 417, at 241. Nor is that all:
[Pirosecutorial screening may be the most effective way of enforcing the
Mapp rule. The causal connection between the illegal search and the decisio'n not to prosecute is as clear as it is when dismissal of an indictment
follows the granting of a motion to suppress evidence. Equally important,
the exact grounds of the decision not to prosecute are likely to be explained
to police officers somewhat more often, more fully, more informally, and in
more understandable terms than they are by judges granting motions and
dismissing the indictments.
Id. at 247. ButCalandra makes it more difficult for a prosecutor to say 'No' to the police.
He can no longer blame his inability to predicate a prosecution on illegally
seized evidence on the exclusionary rule, for that rule does not come into
play unless and until there is a trial-an event the rarity of which the police
may be presumed to understand, even if they do not understand all of the
nuances of Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Id. at 249.
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judgment has already been reached on the basis of individual, subevijective values? If the answers to these questions are not yet
25
dent, one more case should suffice-United States v. Janis.4
Janis arose as follows: Acting pursuant to a warrant (which
turned out to be invalid), Los Angeles police seized from defendant some $5,000 in cash and certain wagering records. The police
then contacted IRS agents, who, based solely on their examination
of the illegally seized records, made an assessment against defendant for wagering taxes under federal law in the amount of some
$90,000. In a subsequent state criminal proceeding, the search warrant was quashed because it was based on a defective affidavit.
But the IRS levied upon the $5,000 in cash in partial satisfaction of
the assessment against defendant. The defendant then brought a
federal action for refund of the cash. The government counterclaimed for the unpaid balance of the assessment. The lower federal courts ruled that defendant was entitled to the refund and that
the tax assessment should be quashed because based on illegally
A 5-3 majority, per Justice Blackmun,
obtained 42evidence.
6
disagreed.
Justice Blackmun reiterated that "the 'prime purpose' of the
[exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful
police conduct.'"427 He also reiterated that the rule "imposes a
substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its
proscription of what concededly is relevant evidence. '428 He then
reasoned that whether or not the rule is an efficient deterrent, its
application was not justified in the federal civil proceeding:
Assuming [the rule is a substantial and efficient deterrent], the additional marginal deterrence provided by forbidding a different sovereign from using the evidence in a
civil proceeding surely does not outweigh the cost to society of extending the rule to that situation. If, on the other
hand, the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable
deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is
unwarranted. Under either assumption, therefore, the ex425. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
426. At the outset, Justice Blackmun stated that the case presented the question whether "evidence seized by a state criminal law enforcement officer in good
faith, but nonetheless unconstitutionally, [was) inadmissible in a civil proceeding
by or against the United States?" Id. at 434 (emphasis added). See also id. at 447.
But the Court never explained what it meant by "good faith" and it dropped this
qualification in articulating its "conclusion" and its "holding." See id. at 454, 459-60.

Moreover, its reasoning seems to apply whether or not the state police acted in
good faith.
427. Id. at 446.
428. Id. at 448-49.
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tension of the rule is unjustified. 429
In short, Justice Blackmun thought Janis was a very easy interestbalancing case. So did Justice Stewart-the other way.
Justices Brennan and Marshall adhered to their earlier views
that "the exclusionary rule is a necessary and inherent constitu430
tional ingredient of the protections of the Fourth Amendment,"
but, in a separate dissent, Justice Stewart joined battle with the
Janis majority on its own "cost-benefit" grounds. As he had done
a decade and a half earlier, when writing the opinion of the Court
overturning the "silver platter" doctrine, 431 Stewart underscored
the close relationship between federal and state authorities in law
enforcement and auxiliary matters. "The pattern," he observed "is
one of mutual cooperation and coordination, with the federal wagering tax provisions buttressing state and federal criminal sanctions. '432 That the old "silver platter" doctrine had involved state
and federal criminal proceedings "is irrelevant," maintained Stewart, "where, as here, the civil proceeding serves as an adjunct to
'433
the enforcement of the criminal law.
According to the Janis Court, per Justice Blackmun, the illegally obtained state evidence should be admissible in a federal
civil proceeding because the "costs" of excluding it from such a
proceeding would clearly outweigh whatever marginal deterrent
"benefits" might be gained by keeping it out. According to Justice
Stewart, however, the evidence should have been excluded because one of the "costs" of admitting it in the federal proceeding
was the wiping out of whatever deterrent "benefits" had been
achieved by excluding it from the state prosecution. Where Blackmun deemed the exclusion of the evidence in the federal proceeding not worth the "costs," Stewart blamed the Court for rendering
the exclusion of the evidence in the state prosecution all "costs"
and no "benefits":
[U] nder the Court's ruling, society must not only continue to pay the high cost of the exclusionary rule (by foregoing criminal convictions which can be obtained only on
the basis of illegally seized evidence) but it must alsoforfeit the benefit for which it has paid so dearly.
429. Id. at 453-54.
430. Id. at 460 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
431. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The "silver platter" doctrine
stated that evidence of a federal crime obtained by state police in the course of an
illegal search while investigating a state crime could be turned over to federal authorities and used in a federal prosecution so long as federal agents had not participated in the state search, but had simply received the evidence on a "silver platter."
432. 428 U.S. at 462.
433. Id. at 463.
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If state police officials can effectively crack down on
gambling law violators by the simple expedient of violating their constitutional rights and turning the illegally
seized evidence over to Internal Revenue Service agents
on the proverbial 'silver platter,' then the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is wholly frustrated. 'If, on
the other hand, it is understood that the fruit of an unlawful search by state agents will be inadmissible in a federal
trial, there can be no inducement to subterfuge and evato federal-state cooperation in criminal
sion with respect
434
investigation.'
4 35
As suggested in the next, and last, section of this article,
Justice Stewart's point may be made somewhat differently. It may
be stated in terms of "incentives" and "disincentives" rather than
"deterrence": By ruling that evidence obtained unconstitutionally
by state police is admissible in a federal civil proceeding in Janistype circumstances, the Court failed to eliminate a significant incentive to violate the fourth amendment when state and federal
authorities are working closely together. The failure negates the
force of the exclusionary rule as a "disincentive" to violate the
Constitution in these kinds of cases, i.e., it ruins any chance that
excluding the evidence in the state prosecution will significantly
discourage unreasonable searches and seizures. The only way to
prevent the exclusion of evidence in the state prosecution from becoming "wasted effort" is to bar the evidence from the federal civil
proceeding as well. Otherwise, the "benefits" of the exclusionary
rule as a disincentive (in the state prosecution) are reduced to the
vanishing point and thus easily "outweighed" by the rule's "societal costs."
Whether or not Justice Stewart's views should have prevailed
in Janis (and, as might be expected, I believe they should have),
he certainly demonstrated that one who would exclude illegally
seized evidence can play the "'cost-benefit' game" too. Indeed,
anyone can play it. Anyone can convert the process into something that merely gives him back whatever answer he feeds into
it.

436

SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
In a number of recent search and seizure cases the Court has
434. Id. at 463-64 (emphasis added), quoting from Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. at 222.
435. See text accompanying notes 539-51 infra. See also note 204 supra.
436. Cf. Frantz, Is the FirstAmendment Law?-A Reply to ProfessorMendelson,
51 CALjF. L. REV. 729, 746 (1963).
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"'narrow[ed] the thrust' of the exclusionary rule" 437 by "balancing
the competing interests" and concluding that the "benefits" of the
rule's application in various settings are "outweighed" by the
"costs" it imposes on society. It is very difficult to come away from
these cases, however, without the impression that the Court is
"balancing by assumption" or "intuition," or worse, "balancing by
predisposition."
If one is supposed to "balance" the "competing interests"
before deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule, how does
one do so without measuring imponderables or comparing incommensurables? How does one balance "privacy" (or "individual liberty" or "personal dignity," or call it what you will) against the
interest in suppressing crime (or "law and order" or the "general
welfare," or call it what you will)?
How does one "balance" the interests in furthering an important governmental objective "against a constitutional statement
that the government may not employ a certain means for the attainment of any of its objectives"? 438 Inasmuch as "privacy" (or
"individual liberty") and "efficiency" in the suppression of crime
are different kinds of interests, how can they be compared quantitatively unless the judge has "some standard independent of
both to which they can be referred"?439 If the standard is not to be
437. C.

WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:

AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL

CASES AND CONCEPTS 20 (1980). In addition to Alderman, Payner, Calandra and
Janis, discussed in text accompanying notes 378-79, 390-416 and 425-34 supra, see
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (illegally obtained evidence may impeach not only direct testimony of defendant but also statements first elicited from
him on cross-examination, if prosecutor's questions were "reasonably suggested"
by the direct testimony); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (exclusionary rule "should be invoked with much greater reluctance" where defense seeks to
suppress live-witness testimony rather than an inanimate object); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976) (state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief
on search-and-seizure grounds unless he has been denied an opportunity for "full
and fair litigation" of his claim in the state courts). See also the "standing" cases
discussed in note 548 infra.
Stone is forcefully criticized in Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Green, supra note 300;
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977). But cf. Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule after Stone v. Powell, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1982); Israel, CriminalProcedure,The Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1404-08 (1977). Havens is forcefully
criticized in Bradley, Havens, Jenkins, and Salvucci, and the Defendant's "Right"to
Testify, 18 AM. CRni. L. REV. 419 (1981). Ceccolini is examined closely in 3 LAFAVE,
supra note 383, at §11.4(i).
438. Cf. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1441
(1962); cf. Note, Specifying the ProceduresRequired by Due Process: Toward Limits
on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1510, 1525, 1527 (1975).
439. Cf. Frantz, supra note 436, at 749. See also R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978), at, e.g., 13, 133, 139-40, 191-95, 200.
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the fourth amendment-which embodies the judgment that securing all citizens "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures" 440 "outweighs" society's interest in apprehending and convicting criminals-then
what is it to be?" 1
Many proponents of the exclusionary rule, of course, would argue that the rule is an essential ingredient of the right against unreasonable search and seizure-and "[t] here would be no point in
the boast that we respect individual rights unless that involved
some sacrifice"442-that "It]he Bill of Rights and the fourth
amendment in particular" deny to government "desired means, efficient means, and means that must inevitably appear from time to
time throughout the course of centuries to be the absolutely necessary means, for government to obtain legitimate and laudable
objectives."'443 They would argue that "law and order" are no more
to be preserved by depriving criminal suspects of their constitutional rights than "by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights.""4 But a proponent of the exclusionary rule may
also argue that "on balance" the public does "benefit" from the
rule.
The suppression of crime contributes to "individual security,"
but, of course, the effectuation of the protection against unreasonable search and seizure also contributes to "[slecurity in one's
home and person.""45 A police department that achieves a "high
clearance" rate is "efficient" in one sense, but in a democracy "police efficiency" is, or ought to be, "measured even more by what the
police do not do than by their positive accomplishments." 446 Thus,
440. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
441. Cf. Frantz, supra note 436, at 749. See also Linde, Judges, Critics,and the
Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 240-42 (1972).
442. R. DWORKIN, supra note 439, at 193.
443. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
353 (1974).
444. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).
445. '"The vice of a system of criminal justice that relies upon a professional
police and admits evidence they obtain by unreasonable searches and seizures is
precisely that we are all thereby made less secure in our persons, houses and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." Amsterdam, supra note 443, at
433. See also Canon, Ideology and Reality in the Debate over the Exclusionary Rule:
A Conservative Argument for its Retention, 23 S. TEX. UJ. 559, 579-80 (1982); Roger
Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. LJ. 329, 330-31 (1973); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct
by the Police, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 87, 97 (C. Sowle ed. 1962).
446. Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?,
in POLICE POWER, supra note 445, at 29, 32. See also P. MmRum & T. PLATE, COMMISSIONER: A VIEW FROM THE Top OF AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT 111-12 (1977). The

senior author, Patrick Murphy, is former head of the New York, Detroit, Washington, D.C. and Syracuse police departments.
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a police department that scrupulously honors individual rights
may be regarded as more "efficient" than a department that
"catches more crooks" but breaks more rules. It all depends
against what standard one measures "police efficiency."
The exclusion of reliable evidence does impose a "cost" on society, but so do unreasonable searches and seizures-and the perception, by the public and the police alike, that our courts do not
take seriously the constitutional protection against such police
misconduct. A basic problem of any society, to be sure, is the problem of controlling crime, but "[t]he basic political problem of a
free society," it has well been said, "is the problem of controlling
' '447
the public monopoly of force.
Thus, when one goes about balancing interests in order to determine whether the exclusionary rule should be applied, it is not
only far from clear how the competing interests are to be
"weighed," but in which scale they should be placed. Depending
upon how one defines the term, the exclusionary rule either impairs "police efficiency" or furthers it. Depending upon what kind
of "security" one has in mind, the exclusionary rule either contributes to "individual security" or diminishes it. Depending on what
"problem" one is concerned about, the exclusionary rule either
ameliorates a basic problem of society or exacerbates one.
Even if one is persuaded that the exclusionary rule imposes a
substantial cost on society, how one measures the "net cost" turns
on whether one considers the fourth amendment "on the whole a
kind of nuisance, a serious impediment in the war against
crime" 44 8 or "that provision of the Bill of Rights which is central to
enjoyment of the other guarantees of the Bill of Rights," 4 9 or what
value one assigns the amendment on the spectrum between these
two poles. It also depends on whether one believes that law en447. Paulsen, supra note 445, at 97. Continues Professor Paulsen: "All the other
freedoms, freedom of speech, of assembly, of religion, of political action, presuppose that arbitrary and capricious police action has been restrained. Security in
one's home and person is the fundamental without which there can be no liberty."
Id. See also note 449 and accompanying text infra; Amsterdam, supra note 443, at
377-78.
448. Frankfurter, J., joined by Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting in Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (of course, rejecting this notion).
449. Id. at 163. Continues Justice Frankfurter: "How can there be freedom of
thought or freedom of speech or freedom of religion, if the police can, without warrant, search your home and mine from garret to cellar merely because they are
executing a warrant of arrest? How can men feel free if all their papers may be
searched, as an incident to the arrest of someone in the house, on the chance that
something may turn up, or rather, be turned up?" Id. See also Amsterdam, supra
note 443, at 377-78; Landynski, In Search of Justice Black's Fourth Amendment, 45
FORDHAM L. REv. 453-54 (1976).
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forcement authorities are not doing a satisfactory job unless the
rate of crimes solved and offenders convicted approaches 100% or
whether one accepts the fact that a very substantial portion of all
crimes cannot be solved 450 and is persuaded that it is not "necessary that they be solved in order to maintain reasonably orderly
'45 1
and secure communities.
Thus, here, perhaps even more so than in the first amendment
area, because the crime may be so heinous and the relevance of
the evidence so overwhelming, 452 interest-balancing "almost requires the judge to intrude his individual values into the case. 45 3
Here, perhaps even more so than in the first amendment area,
when the government seeks power in the name of the "public interest" or the "general welfare" or "the good of society," balancing
tests "inevitably become intertwined with the ideological predispositions of those doing the balancing-or if not that, at least with
450. I know of no reason to revise the conclusion I reached a decade ago, on the
basis of the Rand Institute Study (see GREENWOOD, AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPREHENSION ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW YORK CITY POUCE DEPARTMENT (1970)) and earlier
studies conducted for the National Crime Commission (see THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT (1967)), that, sadly, "absent personal

observations of the offense by a police officer or personal identification by a victim
or witness, the great bulk of crimes are no4 never have been, and (at least for the
foreseeablefuture) are not going to be solved-in most of these cases no arrests are
ever made." Kamisar, How to Use, Abuse-and Fight Back with--Crime Statistics,
25 OKA. L. REv. 239, 254 (1972).
Indeed, the former Executive Director of the National Crime Commission,
James Vorenberg, now Dean of the Harvard Law School, testified, on the basis of
data gathered by the commission, that "[aIbout three-fourths of the crime committed in this country is not reported and only one-fourth or one-fifth of the crime that
is reported leads to an arrest" (quoted in Kamisar, supra this note, at 254). See also
P. MURPHY & T. PLATE, supra note 446, at 183-88 (discussion of astonishingly low
percentage of crimes referred to the detective bureau that are ever "solved");
Bazelon, The Crime Controversy: Avoiding Realities, 35 VAND. L REv. 487, 493
(1982) (criminal justice system prosecutes, convicts and imprisons a larger proportion of those arrested for felonies than it did fifty years ago, but only about six percent of serious crimes result in arrest); Vorenberg, Is the Court Handcuffing the
Cops?, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1969 (Magazine) in CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 82 (D.
Cressey ed. 1971).
451. Weisberg, Police Interrogationof Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, in
POLICE POWER, supra note 445, at 153, 171. See also L. Schwartz, On CurrentProposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1954): "A penal system gives
us about all we can get out of it if apprehension and punishment are pursued and
inflicted with sufficient determination that a would-be law violator must count them
as substantial risks." Id. at 158.
452. In his early years on the California Supreme Court, recalls Judge Traynor,
"[f] ugitive misgivings about admitting illegally obtained evidence gave way to the
overwhelming relevance of the evidence." Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the
Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 321.
453. Kalven & Steffen, The BarAdmission Cases: An Unfinished Debate between
Justice Harlanand Justice Black, 21 LAw IN TRANSITION 155, 178-79 (1961).
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the relative confidence or paranoia of the age in which they are
'454
doing it."
"One doesn't have to be much of a lawyer," concedes Dean
John Ely, "to recognize that even the clearest verbal formula can
be manipulated. ' 455 But, he hastens to add, "it's a very bad lawyer
who supposes that manipulability and infinite manipulability are
'45 6
the same thing.
Forty-three years ago, in what is now known as "the first flagsalute case," 45 7 the Court denied relief to the children of Jehovah's
Witnesses who had been expelled from the public schools for refusing to salute the national flag, a ceremony they conscientiously
believed to be forbidden by command of Scripture. How did the
Court purport to justify the result it reached? It is worth recalling
that it did so by utilizing what may fairly be called an interest-balancing test. An 8-1 majority held in effect that the children's freedom from compulsory violation of religious faith was "outweighed"
'458
by "an interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values.
And, pray tell, what was that? "National unity," said the Court,
"the basis of national security. '4 59 'The ultimate foundation of a
free society," we were reminded, "is the binding tie of cohesive
sentiment";460 without it, we were admonished, "there can ulti'46 1
mately be no liberties, civil or religious.
It is worth recalling, too, that the same year the first flag-salute
case was handed down, a leading criminal procedure expert, Sam
Bass Warner,4 2 suggested how we might "balance" "interests" in
454. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1501 (1975). See
also Frantz, supra note 436, at 746-49; Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HA.v. L. REv. 673, 716-20 (1963).
455.

J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 112 (1980).

456. Id.
457. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled, West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
458. 310 U.S. at 595 (Frankfurter, J.). The term "outweighed" is mine, not the
Court's, but I think it is a fair description of the Court's reasoning. Only Justice
Stone dissented, but he was vindicated three years later in Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
459. 310 U.S. at 595. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in Gobitis "was
written against the backdrop of his perceptions of the need to mobilize America for
war and of the psychological problems in doing so.. .. To Frankfurter it was apparent that America would have to fight Germany. But in May of 1940 Americans were
neither united nor prepared to fight." Danzig, How Questions Begot Answers in Felix Frankfurter'sFirst Flag Salute Opinion, 1977 SuP. CT. REv. 257, 266-67.

460.

310 U.S. at 596.

461. Id. at 597.
462. Professor Warner was the principal draftsman of the Uniform Arrest Act.
He was said to be one of the few professors who had "accompanied the police on
their tours of duty in order to learn and report the true facts." Wilson, PoliceArrest
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the police interrogation room. If the fifth amendment (and presumably its state constitutional counterparts) prohibits "a two or
three hour examination during which several police officers urge
[a suspect] to confess and do their best to confuse and entrap him
into a confession," then, conceded Professor Warner, "the Fifth
Amendment is violated in every city in the United States."' 4 3 But
he suggested a way out: "[I]t may well be that a proper balance
between the individual interest in freedom from compulsory selfincrimination and the social interest in the discovery of crime re'464
quires that suspects be subjected to such a cross-examination.
This of course was the "balance" that had been struck in the
interrogation room-one that was to persist until the 1960s.4 5 So
long as the "cross-examination" stopped short of "the third degree" and constituted only "a severe grilling for a few hours, 46 6
the "benefits" of the judgment embodied in the fifth amendment,
one might say, were deemed "outweighed" by the "costs" that society would suffer if it were applied to police questioning. Among
the forces at work, of course, was "one of society's most effective
analgesics-'necessity,' real or apparent. '467 "Necessity," real or
apparent, seems to be the mother of interest-balancing.
It is also worth recalling that twenty-five years ago, when a
federal district court suspended the Little Rock School Board's desegregation plan for two and one-half years, returning black children to segregated public schools for that stretch of time,4 8 the
court did so by "balancing" competing interests. The black children's right to equal protection of the laws was characterized as "a
personalinterest in being admitted to the public schools on a nondiscriminatory basis" 9 -an interest to be "balanced against the
public interest, including the interest of all students and potential
students in the district, in having a smoothly functioning educaPrivileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization, in POLCE POWER, supra
note 445, at 21, 26.
463. Warner, How Can the Third Degree Be Eliminated?, I BIL OF RIGHTS REV.
24, 25 (1940).
464. Id. (emphasis added).
465. See Y. KAMISAR, supra note 103, at xii-xiii, 2-4, 13-14, 30-34, 69-76; 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 4-8, 10; 15-16, 31-62 (1973);
Weisberg, supra note 451, at 157-58.
466. Warner, supra note 463, at 25.
467. Y. KAmIsAR, supra note 103, at 60. See also Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL LQ. 436, 446-54 (1964)
(discussion of claims of "necessity" by the military and law enforcement that turn
out to be more "convenient" than "necessary").
468. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark. 1958), rev'd, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.
1958), reversal affd, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
469. 163 F. Supp. at 27 (emphasis added).
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tional system" and the interest in "eliminating, or at least ameliorating, the unfortunate racial strife and tension [existing] in Little
Rock." 47 0
The public interest-"the larger interests of both
races" 47 1-- concluded the district court, should prevail.
Of course, constitutional provisions are not self-defining. But
the "defining" approach "narrows and structures the issue for the
courts"; 472 it "emphasiz [es] that the entire question of reconciling
social values and objectives is not reopened." 4 73 The "definer"
gives the constitutional provision at issue "a certain amount of
content which he regards as being obligatory on the court"; 47 4 his
task is different than "balancing" the "interest" represented by the
' 47 5
provision against "law and order" or other "societal interests.
The "balancer's" constitutional guarantee "is empty until the court
decides what to put into it";476 it "does not speak until the court
'477
speaks for it."
"A right against the government," points out Ronald Dworkin,
"must be a right to do something even when the majority thinks it
would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would be
worse off for having it done. '478 Adds Professor Dworkin:
It cannot be an argument for curtailing a right, once
granted, simply that society would pay a further price for
extending it. There must be something special about that
further cost, or there must be some other feature of the
case, that makes it sensible to say that although great social cost is warranted to protect the original right, this particular cost is not necessary. Otherwise, the
Government's failure to extend the right will show that its
recognition of the right in the original case is a sham, a
promise that it intends to keep only until that becomes
479
inconvenient.
That individual rights can be "annihilated" by being made to
yield to the purported needs of the government or the purported
"'rights' of the majority, '480 a.k.a., the "general welfare," "the public interest" or "the interests of society," did not escape the Court
470.
471.
472.
877, 914
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. But cf.R. DWORKIN, supra note 439, at 138-39.
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J.
(1963).
Id.
Frantz, supra note 438, at 1435.
See id. at 1434-35.
Id. at 1435.
Id. See also Linde, supra note 441, at 238-44.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 439 at 194.
Id. at 200.
See id. at 194-97.
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that decided the second flag-salute case. If "the strength of government to maintain itself" were to prevail over the freedom asserted
by the Jehovah's Witnesses' children, the asserted governmental
interest, observed Justice Jackson in Barnette, "would resolve
every issue of power in favor of those in authority and would require us to override every liberty thought to weaken or delay execution of their policies."'' 1
'The very purpose of the Bill of Rights," added Jackson, in an
oft-quoted passage, "was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts. '482 The purpose of the Bill of Rights, I
would add, was to place certain subjects beyond the reach of costbenefit analysis (except for the most extraordinary
circumstances).
I can already hear the howls of protest: You have grossly exaggerated the impact of the Court's recent decisions. True, the present Court no longer regards the exclusionary rule "a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved" 4 3-- only a "judicially
created" "remedial device" 484 whose application turns on a "pragmatic analysis of [its] usefulness in a particular context. ' 485 But
this "deconstitutionalization" of the rule,486 if you want to call it

that, has worked no new substantial injury to the rule, let alone
"annihilated" it or the fourth amendment guarantee it is supposed
to effectuate. The only consequence of the Court's current way of
thinking about the rule has been its nonapplication (or nonextension) in "peripheral" or "collateral" areas where "the deterrent effect of the exclusion of evidence is highly attenuated."' 4 7 But the
'488
Court has not "abandon[ ed] the rule in its central application.
Quite the contrary, although Stone v. Powell restricted the rule's
489
application in federal habeas corpus review of a state conviction,
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court "contains a startling reaffirmation of Mapp-a reaffirmation so powerful that it elicited a separate opinion from the Chief Justice, perhaps the Court's most
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.

Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 636.
Id. at 638.
See text accompanying note 407 supra.
United States v. Calandra,414 U.S. at 348.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 407-11 supra.
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976).

488. Mertens &Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 387 n.104.
489. See note 436 supra.
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'49
ardent critic of the exclusionary rule.
The Chief Justice may have found the Stone Court's "reaffirmation" of Mapp a bit disquieting, but I must say that I find it
something less than exhilarating. 491 Observed Justice Powell:
Despite the absence of supportive empirical evidence, we
have assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will
be to discourage law enforcement officials from violating
the Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. More importantly, over the long term, this demonstration that our society attaches serious consequences
to violation of constitutional rights is thought to encourage
those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the ofFourth Amendficers who implement them, to incorporate
4 92
ment ideals into their value system.
We adhere to the view that these considerations support the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial
on direct appeal of state-court
and its enforcement
493
convictions.
I welcome the Court's reaffirmation of the exclusionary rule as
applied to criminal trials, but I share the Chief Justice's view that
the Court did so "somewhat hesitantly" 49 4-- especially when one
takes into account what else the Court had to say that day.495 The
second sentence in the passage quoted above is particularly welcome, because it seems to be a rare recognition by the present
Court of the "systemic deterrence" worked by the rule, i.e., its "effect on individual police officers through a police department's institutional compliance with judicially articulated fourth
amendment standards. '496 But at this point, Justice Powell refers,
and refers only, to the "postscript" to Dallin Oaks's famous article,
in which Professor (now Judge) Oaks argues that "[t]he exclusionary rule should be abolished, but not quite yet" 497-not "until
0

490. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in CriminalProcedure, 80 CoLuM. L REv. 436, 452-53 (1980).
491. But I took into account what else was said in the opinion and what was said
in United States v. Janis (see text accompanying notes 425-35 supra), decided the
same day. See text accompanying notes 503-13 infra.
492. At this point, Justice Powell cited, and cited only, Professor (now Judge)
Dallin Oaks's oft-quoted article, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 756 (1970).
493. 428 U.S. at 492-93.
494. 428 U.S. at 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also Note, Formalism,Legal
Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REV. 945, 982 n.233 (1977).
495. See text accompanying notes 503-13 infra.
496. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 394.
497. Oaks, supra note 492, at 755. Now a member of the Utah Supreme Court,

Judge Oaks, whose name is often misspelled "Oakes," is not to be confused with
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98
there is something to take its place. '4
Oaks does recognize that by "magnif[ying] the moral and educative force of the law" the rule "may integrate some fourth
amendment ideals into the value system or norms of behavior of
law enforcement agencies. '499 He goes on to say, however, that the
exclusionary rule is not the only way, nor even a good way, to do
so.50 0 It "should be replaced," therefore, "by an effective tort rem'50 1
edy against the offending officer or his employer.
In his opinion for the Court in Stone, Justice Powell alludes to
the "hope" and the "assumption" that the exclusionary rule will
discourage fourth amendment violations. 50 2 He is a good deal
more explicit about the "costs" of the rule.5 0 3 These are "well
known" and "long-recognized'-"even at trial and on direct review. '50 4 Application of the rule "deflects the truthfinding process
and often frees the guilty. '50 5 Moreover, "[t] he disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police officer and
the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule
is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the
'50 6
concept of justice.
Some proponents of the exclusionary rule may be more heartened than I by the passage in the Stone opinion reaffirming the
rule in its basic setting. And it may well be that I have made too
much of Powell's citation to the Oaks article. But, however one
reads that passage in splendid isolation, Powell's opinion, in its entirety, is hardly a ringing endorsement of the exclusionary rule in
its central application.
Nor is Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in United
States v. Janis,50 7 handed down the same day. "No empirical re-

Judge James Oakes of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, a strong
defender of the rule. See note 402 supra.
498. Oaks, supra note 492, at 756.
499. Id. In the body of his article, however, Judge Oaks does not discuss what
might be called "systemic deterrence," but relies chiefly on the analogy between
the deterrent effect of criminal law and the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule
to discredit the exclusionary rule, an analogy that fails, maintain Mertens and Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 399, "because the exclusionary rule operates through
mechanisms that simply have no analogy in the penal law." Id.
500. Oaks, supra note 492, at 756.
501. Id.
502. 428 U.S. at 492.
503. "The Court's opinion today," observes concurring Chief Justice Burger, "eloquently reflects something of the dismal social costs occasioned by the rule." 428
U.S. at 501.
504. Id. at 489.
505. Id. at 490.
506. Id.
507. See text accompanying notes 425-35 supra.
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searcher, proponent or opponent of the rule," notes Blackmun,
"has yet been able to establish with any assurance whether the
rule has a deterrent effect even in the situations in which it is now
applied. ' 50 8 On the other hand, observes Blackmun, there is unanimity that the rule "imposes a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what concededly is
relevant evidence. '509 "In the past this Court has opted for exclusion in the anticipationthat law enforcement officers would be deterred from violating Fourth Amendment rights,"5 10 but "[t] hen, as
now," it has "acted in the absence of convincing empirical evidence." 5 11 In the case before the Court-the use of evidence obtained illegally by state officers in a federal tax proceeding--"we
do not find sufficient justification for the drastic measure of an exclusionary rule. '5 12 Continues Justice Blackmun: "There comes a
point at which courts, consistent with their duty to administer the
law, cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the
pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the Execu' '513
tive and Legislative Branches.
If the Court is pursuing "a supervisory role that is properly the
duty of the [other branches]," why should it "balance" the "costs"
and "benefits" of the exclusionary rule in any context? Why
shouldn't the other branches do so everywhere? In Janis, Justice
Blackmun comes close to articulating what is implicit in the
Court's cost-benefit analysis of the exclusionary rule in settings
other than the trial.
If not even the victim of an unconstitutional search or seizure
has a "constitutional right" to exclude the evidence-if the use of
such evidence "presents a question, not of rights, but of remedies" 5 1 4-- does not our system of government "provide a good reason for leaving that decision to more democratic institutions than
courts"?5 15 If the rule's application turns on a '"pragmatic analy508. 428 U.S. at 450-52 n.22. Nor is the Court unwilling to entertain the possibility that, even at trial, "the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence." Id. at 454.
509. Id. at 448-49.
510. Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
511. Id.
512. Id. (emphasis added).
513. Id. (emphasis added).
514. See note 409 and accompanying text supra.
515. Cf.R. DWORKIN, supra note 439, at 140. After calling the exclusionary rule

"not a constitutional mandate, but a policy choice by our Supreme Court," one of
the rule's strongest critics continues: "Usually the people's representatives decide

issues of public policy, especially when those decisions require a balancing of social
values and the justices so sharply disagree ..." Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule:
Why Suppress Evidence? 62 JUDICATURE 215 (1978).
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sis" of its usefulness in a particular setting, 516 why not "replace
judicial with legislative pragmatism"?5 17 When the Court acknowledges, as it seems to have done, that "it has no constitutional business excluding evidence" obtained in violation of the protection
against unreasonable search and seizure, why does it have any

business at all doing so?518
After all, "[t] he balancing of conflicting interests would seem
to be inherently a legislative question for which the judicial process is very ill-adapted. It requires evaluating vast arrays of facts
of a kind which are not to be found in the ordinary judicial record-and which will be extremely difficult for the litigants to put
5 19
there.,
Indeed, in Janis, after a careful examination of the relevant
literature, the Court concluded that "each empirical study on the
subject [of the rule's deterrent effect], in its own way, appears to
be flawed. '5 20 Thus, the Court found itself "in no better position"
than it had been sixteen years earlier, when it had observed:
"Since as a practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative, it
is hardly likely that conclusive factual data could ever be
52
assembled." 1
The Court's pessimism seems well-founded. Only last year, after discussing various strategies of (and obstacles to) gathering information about the extent to which the exclusionary rule inhibits
police misconduct, one of the leading empiricists in the area, political scientist Bradley Canon, concluded:
All the methods discussed have their drawbacks, whether
in logistics, reliability of the data or in the inability to connect the data with the events in which we are interested.
There is no way to demonstrate that the rule works or that
it does not work ... or even that it works 35% of the time
or 68% of the time or whatever. . .. We have bits and
pieces of evidence and we will probably add to them over
time, but I do not foresee any dramatic breakthrough in
the next few years that will come anywhere close to convincing us all beyond a reasonable doubt. Those who want
rigorous proof must be disappointed, unless, of course,
they have assigned the burden of proof to their opponents.
5 22
Then they will be delighted.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.

See note 485 and accompanying text supra.
Cf.Linde, supra note 441, at 241.
See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 160, at 269-70.
Frantz, supra note 438, at 1443-44.
428 U.S. at 449-50.
Id. at 453 (quotingfrom Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960)).
Canon, supra note 445, at 572. Oaks had noted similarly, a decade earlier,

HeinOnline -- 16 Creighton L. Rev. 657 1982-1983

CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

I do not think the life of the exclusionary rule should depend
on an empirical demonstration of its effects on police behavior anymore than the continued vitality of Brown v. Board of Education
should depend on empirical data concerning the harmful effects of
school segregation on black children.5 23 Nor do I think that Weeks
or Mapp-any more than Brown-"can be defeated simply by the
relevant official's refusal to be deterred." 524 But even if one agrees
that the exclusionary rule should be retained or abolished on the
basis of its effects on police behavior, whether or not the rule
"works" or has ever "really worked" 525 depends on how one thinks
it is supposed to work.
In a "postscript" to his study of the exclusionary rule, Oaks
asserts (and he is careful to note that his assertion is "an argument, not a conclusion")5 26 that "[aIs a device for directly deterring illegal searches and seizures by the police, the exclusionary
rule is a failure. 15 27 That is hardly surprising. Indeed, it would be
that "it presently appears to be impossible to design any single test or group of tests
that would give a reliable measure of the overall deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule on law enforcement behavior." Oaks, supra note 492, at 716. See also A. Morris,
The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence and Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 57
WASH. L. REV. 647, 652-56 (1982); Sunderland, Liberals, Conservatives, and the Exclusionary Rule, 71 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sm. 343, 365-68 (1980); Critique, On the Limitationsof EmpiricalEvaluations of the ExclusionaryRule, 69 Nw.
U.L. REV. 740, 758-64 (1974). It should not be forgotten, however, that critics of the
exclusionary rulecan always find evidence of police misconduct. It is inherent in any successful motion to suppress. What is more, incidences of police misconduct
are more visible--dramatically so-than are incidences of police compliance with the fourth amendment, even though the latter behavior might be
by far the more frequent form of behavior.
Canon, supra note 445, at 564. Thus, on the empirical battlefield, "the terrain favors
the [exclusionary rule's] critics, who through the guerilla warfare of pointing to
sporadic incidents, can create the dataless impression that the rule fails to deter
police misconduct." Id. See also A. Morris, supra this note, at 653 (quoted in note
304 supra). Moreover, requiring the exclusionary rule's proponents to make a
"clear demonstration" of the rule's effectiveness, see Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), seems like "little
more than the adoption of an old 'debater's trick' where when nothing can be
proven either way, the first debater vigorously asserts that it is incumbent upon the
second debater to prove his arguments." Canon, supra note 445, at 564. See also
Roger Dworkin, FactStyle Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of
Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 332-33 (1973).
523. See Cahn, Jurisprudence,30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157-58 (1955); Linde, supra
note 441, at 241-42.
524. Linde, supra note 441, at 240.
525. Cf.Burger, C.J., dissenting in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 424 (1971): "In a country that prides itself on innovation, inventive genius,
and willingness to experiment, it is a paradox that we should cling for more than a
half century to a legal mechanism that was poorly designed and never really
worked."
526. Oaks, supra note 492, at 755.
527. Id. (emphasis added). Earlier in his article, Oaks admits that his findings
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startling if the rule were a great success as a direct deterrent. As a
device for directly deterring burglaries a rule that burglars only
had to give up their ill-gotten gains on those occasions when they
were caught would be a failure, too. 528 Burglars and would-be burglars would not desist for fear of punishment because there would
not be any "punishment" to fear. They would soon realize they
were in a "no-lose" situation. They would have nothing to lose to
which they were entitled and much to gain to which they were not
529
entitled.
If the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule were to influence police behavior (and I have maintained at length that this
was not the rule's basis nor, for much of its life, its principal purpose), surely it was not "designed" to do so this way. 530 Surely the
Justices who sat on the Weeks and Silverthorne Courts, among
them Day, Holmes, Hughes and Brandeis, and their many successors who adhered to the rule, were not that shallow-minded.
How, then, does the rule influence the police? Fortunately,
whatever may be said for burglars and many other criminals, police officers are not independent entrepreneurs. Rather, they are
"obviously fall short of an empirical substantiation or refutation of the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule" and "also fall short of demonstrating a research
method by which that important question could be determined." Id. at 709. For
thoughtful criticism of both Oaks, supra, and Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An EmpiricalStudy of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243
(1973), in many respects a continuation of the Oaks study, but a less scholarly effort, see e.g., D. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 220-54 (1977); Canon, Is
the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a
PrecipitousConclusion, 62 Ky. LJ. 681 (1974); Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have
Critics Proven that It Doesnt Deter Police? 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979); Critique, 69
Nw. U.L. REV. 740 (1974).
528. See Amsterdam, supra note 443, at 431-32; Note, Standing to Object to an
UnreasonableSearch and Seizure, 34 U. CH. L. REv. 342, 357 (1967).
529. As Professor Phillip Johnson has observed, New Approaches to Enforcing
the Fourth Amendment 4 (Working Paper, Sept. 1978) (on file in the University of
Michigan Law Library), the exclusionary rule
does not deter the police from making a search ... because suppression
does not leave them in a worse position than if they had never searched in
the first place. The exclusionary rule is a disincentive because excluding
the evidence removes one of the incentives for making illegal searches. Put
another way, enforcing the exclusionary rule does not deter the police from
making unconstitutional searches, but repealing the rule would positively
encourage such unconstitutional activity.
(Emphasis in the original). See also Amsterdam, supra note 443, at 431-32; Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and
Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1218-19, 1221 n.93 (1971);
LaFave, The FourthAmendment in an Imperfect.World: On Drawing "BrightLines"
and "Good Faith," 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 307, 319-20, 346-47 (1982); Schlag, Assaults on
the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitationsand Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sm. 875, 881-83 (1982); Note, supra note 528, at 357.
530. Cf. Burger, CJ., at note 525 supra.
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members of a law enforcement agency, a structural governmental
entity. Thus, the rule controls police behavior not the way the
criminal law seeks to control the behavior of the general public,
e.g., by "special deterrence" or "general deterrence, '531 but
"through a police department's institutional compliance with judicially articulated fourth amendment standards," i.e., by "systemic
deterrence. '532 Consequentlyeven if a particular constable is indifferent to whether his
arrests and seizures result in convictions, those who run
the police department are concerned with successful prosecutions. Further, although individual officers might entertain hostility toward fourth amendment rights, police
departments are not likely to share such a view, at least
officially. Thus, at least the more professional police
forces can be expected to encourage fourth amendment
compliance through training and such guidelines as the
department provides for conducting searches, seizures,
and arrests. . .. Even if prosecutors cannot always find

the time to explain the fourth amendment to the police,
many of the larger police departments hire legal counsel
to make legal standards intelligible to the policeman on
5 33
patrol.
A good example of "systemic deterrence" is the swift reaction
of at least two police departments (and presumably many more
not surveyed) to the recent ruling in Delaware v. Prouse,534 striking down "random stops" of cars for license or registration checks
in the absence of articulable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot. Although District of Columbia Metropolitan Police had been conducting such stops on the basis of a local court
decision, when the Supreme Court handed down its ruling "[t] he
Chief of Police issued an immediate telex message to his officers,
531. "Special deterrence" is the effect of a sanction on an individual who has
already experienced it. The exclusionary rule is not aimed at this kind of deterrence, Oaks readily admits, because "it does not impose any direct punishment on a
law enforcement official who has broken the rule." Oaks, supra note 492, at 709-10.
"The exclusionary rule is aimed at affecting the wider audience of all law enforcement officials and society at large" and is thus aimed at "general deterrence." Id. at
710. One "kind of effect" of "general deterrence" is "direct deterrence," which is
"the compliance induced by the threat of the sanction. It is of course dependent
upon effectively communicating the rule and the nature of the sanction to the individuals supposed to be affected by it." Id. According to Mertens and Wasserstrom,
supranote 148, at 394, 399, Oaks "overlooks" a third form of deterrence, "systemic
deterrence." See text accompanying notes 532-33 infra. But Oaks does not overlook
it completely. I would say he underplays it.
532. Mertens &Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 394. See also id. at 399; LaFave,
.upra note 529, at 319-20, 350-51; Schlag, supra note 529, at 882-83.
533. Mertens &Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 399.
534. 440.U.S. 648 (1979).
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advising them to desist from the practice" and then "incorporat[ed] the change in procedures in the Department's General Orders, a set of regulations issued to each officer and with
which each officer must be familiar. '535 Moreover, even before the
ultimate Supreme Court decision in Prouse, the Delaware State
Police Legal Officer, in response to the trial court's invalidation of
"random stops," "had disseminated a memorandum to all troops
and units within the State Police describing the decision, explaining the conduct it prohibited, . . . advising that it did not affect
stops based on articulable suspicion," and "provid[ing] several examples of facts that could provide sufficient articulable suspicion
'536
for a stop.
Although "systemic deterrence" is an important concept, one
often overlooked in discussions of the "deterrence" rationale or
the "deterrent" effects of the exclusionary rule, there is a good deal
to be said for removing the term "deterrence" (whatever the kind),
from the search and seizure vocabulary altogether. It is a popular
term, of course, but it has been so abused and misused in so many
judicial opinions and law review articles that it has become one of
537
those words that "needlessly obstruct clear thinking."
[The term] suggests that the police have a God-given inclination to commit unconstitutional searches and seizures
unless they are 'deterred' from that behavior. Once this
assumption is indulged, it is easy enough to criticize the
[exclusionary rule] on the ground that it 'does not apply
any direct sanction to the individual officer whose illegal
conduct
results in the exclusion,' and so cannot 'deter'
53 8
him.
But as we have seen, the rule could not, need not, and does not
"deter" that way. It does not work the way the criminal law is supposed to operate.
Even if one accepts the notion that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to influence police behavior, and that its continued
existence depends on its ability to do so, the term "deterrence" is
awkward and misleading. It is more accurate and more useful to
view the rule as "a counterweight within the criminal justice system," 539 or as a "disincentive. ' 54° It is not a "deterrent" because
application of the rule does not leave the police "in a worse posi535.

Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 400.

536. Id.
537. J. FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 139 (1945).
538. Amsterdam, supra note 443, at 431, quoting Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 416.
539. Amsterdam, supra note 443, at 431. It prevents the criminal justice system
"from functioning as an unmitigated inducement to policemen to violate the fourth
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tion than if they had never searched in the first place."' 54 1 Indeed,
they can still use the knowledge they gained from the illegal
542
Ensearch if they can obtain it from an "independent source."
forcing the rule does not deter the police from violating the search
rule would positively enand seizure guarantee, "but repealing the
' 543
courage such unconstitutional activity.
Viewing the exclusionary rule in this light, the Court's recent
decisions declining to apply the rule in settings other than its central application appear more ominous. If "[tihe rule encourages
police to refrain from unreasonable searches not for fear of punish5
ment, but simply because there is no reason for making them," "
every time "the courts allow some violations of the fourth amendment to reap rewards, the removal of incentives . . . is
'545
undermined.
The Court seems to think that it can decline to apply the exclusionary rule in settings other than the criminal trial (and, even in
the criminal trial, only when a defendant has "standing" and is objecting to evidence being offered in the prosecution's case-in-chief)
without affecting the vitality of the rule in its central application.
But "changing the law is like making a change in the intricate part
one part without
of a highly organized drama, you cannot change
' 546
other parts being affected in unexpected ways. "
Every time the Court fails to avail itself of an opportunity to
remove another police incentive for violating the fourth amendment-by authorizing its use in grand jury proceedings or civil tax
proceedings tied closely to a criminal prosecution, by expanding
its use for impeachment purposes 547 or by establishing and stiffenamendment on every occasion when there is criminal evidence to be gained in doing so." Id.
540. See note 529 supra.
541. See id.
542. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
543. See note 529 supra. The Court, per Stewart, J., scrambled the "deterrence"
and "disincentive" notions somewhat in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 205 (1960):
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 217. The Court, per Powell, J., said it
more cleanly in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976): "[W]e have assumed that the
immediate effect of exclusion will be to discourage law enforcement officials from
violating the Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. at
492. But elsewhere in the Stone opinion the Court talked about the "deterrent effect" of the rule.
544. Note, supra note 528, at 357.
545. Id. See also Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 529, at 1219.
546. M. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE 421 (2d ed. 1953).
547. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980), discussed in note 437
supra.

HeinOnline -- 16 Creighton L. Rev. 662 1982-1983

19831

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

ing "standing" requirements 548-it invites police officers with a
"nothing-to-lose-and-everything-to-gain philosophy"5 49 to engage
in unreasonable searches or seizures. There is little, if anything, a
court can do, of course, when "the police either have no interest in
prosecuting or are willing to forego successful prosecution in the
interest of serving some other goal.15 50 But every time a judge permits unconstitutional searches to yield benefits in her courtroom,
she "encourages" the police to "proceed in an irregular manner on
the chance that all will end well," 5'5 even when their purpose is
prosecution and conviction.
I have no doubt that some judges sincerely believe that "selective enforcement" of the rule will "prune" it, "make it more acceptable and hence more lasting. 5 52 But I think not. I think "selective
enforcement" only serves to undermine the rule. Even assuming
that the damage caused by any one exception is tolerable, the cumulative effect of all the exceptions may be too great:
If, for example, the police unlawfully stop and search a car
and its occupants, it is likely that some of the passengers
would not have standing to challenge admission of unlaw548. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (car passengers lack "standing" to
contest legality of car search; first Supreme Court case holding that "legitimate
presence" at time of search insufficient to confer standing), closely analyzed in
Kuhns, The Concept of Personal Aggrievement in Fourth Amendment Standing
Cases, 65 IowA L. REV. 493, 530-52 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)
(abolishes "automatic standing" when defendants charged with crimes of possession), discussed crisply in Bradley, supra note 437, at 436-39; Rawlings v. Kentucky,
448 U.S. 98 (1980) (discussed below). Cf. United States v. Payner, discussed in text
at notes 390-98 supra.
Rawlings, supra, the Court's latest major pronouncement on the subject, evidently rejects the long-settled principle that a possessory interest in the items
seized is sufficient to establish "standing." See 448 U.S. at 118 (Marshall, J., joined
by Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, the case suggests that one may invoke the
protection against unreasonable search and seizure "only if his expectation of privacy in the premises searched is so strong that he may exclude all others from that
place" - "a harsh threshold requirement... not imposed even in the heyday of a
property rights oriented Fourth Amendment." Id. at 119-20.
It may be, as the leading search-and-seizure commentator hopes, that because
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court "is based upon a series of notions which,
if taken seriously, would reduce the fourth amendment to nothing more than 'a
form of words,'" 3 LAFAVE, supra note 383, § 11.3(c) at 196 (1983 Pocket Part), Rawlings "will have a short life" or be limited to its peculiar facts. Id. In the meantime,
however, the case has generated much confusion, a state of affairs not likely to
eliminate significant incentives for police violations of the fourth amendment or
prosecution use of such violations.
549. Note, supra note 528, at 357.
550. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968).
551. As Judge (later Chief Justice) Vinson expressed it in Nueslein v. District of
Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940): "Officers should not be encouraged to proceed in an irregular manner on the chance that all will end well." Id. at 694.
552. Cf.Kaplan, The Limits of the ExclusionaryRule, 26 STAN. L REV. 1027, 1045
(1974).
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fully-seized evidence, or that the evidence will be admitted either to impeach the testimony of a defendant, or to
secure an indictment in a grand jury proceeding. Although the police may not be thinking about any particular one of these permissible collateral uses of unlawfullyseized evidence, they may well go ahead with the unlawful
that in one way or another it is likely to
search, 55confident
3
pay off.
The point Justice Stewart made dissenting in Janis554 seems
to have even greater force when applied to a cluster of exceptions
to the exclusionary rule. At some point the combined impact of
authorizing the use of illegally seized evidence in various "collateral" or "peripheral" settings negates whatever benefits are
achieved by excluding the evidence in its central setting; at some
point so many incentives for acquiring evidence illegally have been
made available (or not eliminated) that the exclusionary rule,
where it does apply, cannot be expected to serve as a meaningful
disincentive. A plausible case can be made for the proposition that
we have already reached that point, or that at the very least we are
rapidly approaching it.
In recent years the Court has told us again and again in various contexts that the "incremental" or "marginal benefits" of the
rule are outweighed by its "substantial" or "well-known costs."
But every time the "costs" of exclusion are held to outweigh the
rule's benefits in a collateral setting, it diminishes the "benefits" of
the rule in its central application. The "benefits" of the rule where
it still applies may have been so reduced that it no longer outweighs the costs of exclusion. This may yet turn out to be the ultimate "cost" or, depending upon one's viewpoint, the ultimate
"benefit" of the cost-benefit analysis.
If and when the exclusionary rule, which has been subjected
to a "war of attrition," is toppled in its last stronghold (more likely
replaced by legislation providing what we shall be assured is an
"effective" tort remedy, rather than abolished outright), not a few
will see it as the culmination of a campaign launched by Chief Justice Burger in the American University Law Review 555 almost
twenty years ago. Thus, a close student of the subject has noted
that "[b] efore his appointment, our present Chief Justice had publicly called for the restriction and eventual abolition of the exclu553. Mertens &Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 388. See also Dershowitz & Ely,
supra note 529, at 1221 n.93.
554. See text accompanying notes 431-35 supra.
555. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L REv. 1 (1964).
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sionary rule. ' 55 6 I would have agreed if I had not reread the Chief
Justice's 19-year-old law review article quite recently.
Judge Burger (as he was at the time) did disparage the exclusionary rule as a "deterrent"-at one point he called the notion
that the exclusionary rule effectively deters the police "never more
than wishful thinking on the part of the courts" 557 -and he did propose an independent Review Board as a means of "eliminat [ing]
the practices leading to the exclusion" 558 -but as a supplement to,
559
not a substitute for, the exclusionary rule.

Of course, some supporters of Weeks and Mapp would challenge Judge Burger's view of the rule's effects on the police as
''never more than wishful thinking." They would say that one can
reach such a conclusion only by proceeding on the erroneous
premise that the rule is supposed to influence the police the way
the criminal law is supposed to restrain the general public. 560 But
no supporter of Weeks and Mapp would quarrel with Burger for
seeking a supplement to the rule. "No proponent of the exclusion'56 1
ary rule has suggested that it should act in isolation."
"To challenge, as I do, the oft-repeated claim that suppression
of evidence operates as a deterrent on police," pointed out the
present Chief Justice in his 1964 article, "is not to attack the doctrine itself,for courts are bound to uphold constitutions and statutes. But society must inquire whether the Suppression Doctrine
has in fact accomplished its stated purpose of deterrence and meet
the frustrated and plaintive cry that 'There must be a better way to
do it.'

"562

As I read the article, however, a better way to influence police
behavior did not mean scrapping the exclusionary rule because it
was a poor way to do it:
We must recognize suppression as an essential tool to implement the Constitution and nothing more, and that other
556. Kaplan, supra note 552, at 1040.
557. Burger, supra note 555, at 12.
558. Id. at 15.
559. The matter is not entirely free from doubt. One portion of the article, see
id. at 23, can be read as a plea to abolish the rule, but at a number of other places
Judge Burger seemed to make it plain that this is not his intention. See text accompanying notes 562-66 infra.
560. See text accompanying notes 526-36 supra.
561. Pye, Charles Fahy and the Criminal Law, 54 GEO. LJ.1055, 1072 (1966).
Continues Dean Pye: "Nothing prevents the use of internal sanctions within the
police department or pressure upon the department from prosecutors and city officials simultaneously with the use of the exclusionary rule. It is because such devices are by themselves ineffective that the occasion for the invocation of the
exclusionary rule continues to exist." Id.
562. Burger, supra note 555, at 10 (first emphasis added).
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I suggest judges had a right to assume that other branches
of government, and police in particular, would recognize
that this mechanism of suppression was not an end in itself but a means, which needed implementationfrom the
legislative and the executive branches. Those branches of
government, not the courts, have the jurisdiction and
power to make the [suppression] doctrine a positive force.
Courts cannot conduct post-mortem examination of police
action or conduct training courses
for the police. That is
56 4
the responsibility of others.
In the course of presenting his proposal, Judge Burger suggested the following basis for the exclusionary rule, one that, "although never articulated by the Supreme Court, may well be
implicit in all that the Court has said on the subject"5 65 up to this
point:
It is the proud claim of a democratic society that the people are masters and all officials of the state are servants of
the people. That being so, the ancient rule of respondeat
superior furnishes us with a simple, direct and reasonable
basis for refusing to admit evidence secured in violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions. Since the policeman is society's servant, his acts in the execution of his
duty are attributable to the master or employer. Society
as a whole is thus responsible and society is 'penalized' by
refusing it the benefit of evidence secured by the illegal
action. This satisfies me more than the other explanations
because it seems to me that society-in a country like
ours--is involved in and is responsible for what is done in
its name and by its agents. Unlike the Germans of the
1930's and early '40's, we cannot say 'it is all The Leader's
doing. I am not responsible.' In a representative democracy we are responsible, whether we like it or not. And so
each of us is involved and each is in this sense responsible
when a police officer breaks
rules of law established for
566
our common protection.
What I have quoted is what the present Chief Justice said
about the exclusionary rule the first time he focused on the sub563. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
564. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
565. Id. at 14.
566. Id. (emphasis in original). Cf. Chafee, The Progressof the Law, 1919-1922:
Evidence, III, 35 HARv. L. REV. 673, 694-95 (1922). The view that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence is admissible and that the injured person's only remedy is a civil
action against the offending official, commented Professor Chafee, a proponent of
the exclusionary rule, "would place the penalty for the violation of the Constitution
upon the official and not upon society." Id.
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ject. Of course, his thinking about the matter has changed significantly since ascending to his present post. The second time he
dealt with the matter at length, in the 1971 Bivens case, he
launched a powerful attack on the exclusionary rule but "hesitate[d] to abandon it until some meaningful substitute is developed. '5 67 The third time he addressed the issue at length,
concurring in the 1976 Stone case, the Chief Justice had grown
more impatient. He called for the rule's immediate abolition, aska surge of
ing us to believe that such a development "would inspire
68
activity" toward providing an effective alternative.
I submit he was right thefirst time.

567. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
568. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring). But see
Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in HistoricalPerspective: The Struggle to Make the
Fourth Amendment More Than "an Empty Blessing," 62 JUDICATURE 337, 345-50
(1979).
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